On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 3:06 AM, Dan Harkins <dhark...@lounge.org> wrote: > > Hi Robert, > > This draft moves the NamedCurve/EllipticCurveList into the > ClientHello, and since the client sends X1 and ZKP(X1) in the > ClientHello it means that is going to be a list of 1. It basically > moves the client's key exchange portion from ClientKeyExchange into > ClientHello. So basically, if a client wants to do TLS-ECJ-PAKE > then that's the only thing it can offer and the parameters of > that exchange are all selected by the client, not the server. > > This is a fundamental change to TLS. If it's going to be offered, > it's the only thing that can be offered and therefore the only thing > that can be used. Seems like for a deployment either it's never used > or it's the only thing used and that makes it sort of a proprietary > protocol, not TLS.
This stems from the multiple rounds used in JPAKE. SPAKE2 uses only 2 rounds, and would be easier to put into TLS. I'm still working on the draft, but haven't gotten to it in a while. Sincerely, Watson > > Dan. > > On Thu, June 16, 2016 2:51 am, Robert Cragie wrote: >> I would like to ask the working group for comments on the TLS-ECJ-PAKE >> draft: >> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-00 >> >> Some brief notes: >> >> * This intended status is informational. >> * The draft is based on TLS/DTLS 1.2 as the Thread group required basis on >> existing RFCs wherever possible. For that reason and due to the WGs focus >> on TLS 1.3, I have understood from the chairs that it would not have >> received a great deal of attention from the WG, hence the intended status >> of informational. >> * The draft reflects the current use of the TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 >> cipher suite in Thread (http://threadgroup.org/). >> * There is an experimental implementation in mbed TLS ( >> https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls) >> * The Thread group would like to get IANA assignments for 4 cipher suite >> values and one ExtensionType value as soon as possible. >> * There are at least four independent implementations, which have been >> used >> in interop. testing over the last 18 months. >> * The security considerations recommend restriction of the use of this >> cipher suite to Thread and similar applications and recommends it should >> not be used with web browsers and servers (mainly due to the long >> discussions regarding the use of PAKEs on this and other mailing lists). >> >> Robert >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
