Hi Robert, This draft moves the NamedCurve/EllipticCurveList into the ClientHello, and since the client sends X1 and ZKP(X1) in the ClientHello it means that is going to be a list of 1. It basically moves the client's key exchange portion from ClientKeyExchange into ClientHello. So basically, if a client wants to do TLS-ECJ-PAKE then that's the only thing it can offer and the parameters of that exchange are all selected by the client, not the server.
This is a fundamental change to TLS. If it's going to be offered, it's the only thing that can be offered and therefore the only thing that can be used. Seems like for a deployment either it's never used or it's the only thing used and that makes it sort of a proprietary protocol, not TLS. Dan. On Thu, June 16, 2016 2:51 am, Robert Cragie wrote: > I would like to ask the working group for comments on the TLS-ECJ-PAKE > draft: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-00 > > Some brief notes: > > * This intended status is informational. > * The draft is based on TLS/DTLS 1.2 as the Thread group required basis on > existing RFCs wherever possible. For that reason and due to the WGs focus > on TLS 1.3, I have understood from the chairs that it would not have > received a great deal of attention from the WG, hence the intended status > of informational. > * The draft reflects the current use of the TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 > cipher suite in Thread (http://threadgroup.org/). > * There is an experimental implementation in mbed TLS ( > https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls) > * The Thread group would like to get IANA assignments for 4 cipher suite > values and one ExtensionType value as soon as possible. > * There are at least four independent implementations, which have been > used > in interop. testing over the last 18 months. > * The security considerations recommend restriction of the use of this > cipher suite to Thread and similar applications and recommends it should > not be used with web browsers and servers (mainly due to the long > discussions regarding the use of PAKEs on this and other mailing lists). > > Robert > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
