I also don't like the AUTH48 changes -- there's no protocol-level reason to weaken the MUST, since a server that can't handle the extra state/processing can just not implement the extension at all.
-Ben On 07/11/2016 10:34 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > I agree with Watson's assessment here. This seems like the wrong > design choice. > > I'm not familiar with OpenSSL's cert selection, but I don't believe > that the issue > that this change is intended to address applies to NSS, for two reasons: > > 1. NSS does cert selection during client hello processing [0]. > http://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c#9569 > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__searchfox.org_mozilla-2Dcentral_source_security_nss_lib_ssl_ssl3con.c-239569&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=GGUhUgPsmo8P-zHms3do7kMl919w4Emye3THqWUMSgY&e=> > > 2. Unless I misunderstand the design of cached-info, all the server needs > to have is the digest of the serialized chain and it could store that > at the time > that it configures the cert (or first uses it). This seems like quite > a small burden. > > I believe the prior design was superior. > > -Ekr > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:07 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbl...@gmail.com > <mailto:watsonbl...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 7:27 AM, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com > <mailto:s...@sn3rd.com>> wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Just wanted to remind everybody that we’ve got two non-TLS1.3 > items we’re looking for WG input on: > > > > - Before 12 July, we’d like to know your thoughts about > progressing draft-ietf-tls-pwd (Watson and ekr responded): > > > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/WrNa7PXTZn2ZhfmoQDA_pnUVuN4 > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_tls_WrNa7PXTZn2ZhfmoQDA-5FpnUVuN4&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=ZzDtgI_TBc-Nia0FuETErOUeRUXahxu7BclcP8UXy7Q&e=> > > > > - Before 14 July, we’d like to know your thoughts on the > proposed AUTH48 proposed changes (nobody has commented on this): > > > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/aBvqMG7t8qkO5rPt-xaMHipuBVk > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_tls_aBvqMG7t8qkO5rPt-2DxaMHipuBVk&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=iGwvQ3uwrEzZ6N9yAb5yY5May3Sl2t1r2wy_HvSAhcg&e=> > > I don't like the AUTH48 changes. I understand the need for changing to > MAY, but the proposed method of distinguishing offends my > sensibilities. Overloading the length field is just ugly. > > > > > spt > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_tls&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=4tEhM1I3VnCdJjY-hDncM9jWkxNdHLzpOzvwPBjikg8&e=> > > > > -- > "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". > --Rousseau. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_tls&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=4tEhM1I3VnCdJjY-hDncM9jWkxNdHLzpOzvwPBjikg8&e=> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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