Jacob Appelbaum <ja...@appelbaum.net> writes: >TCP/IP and DNS are out of scope, though obviously related.
Why are they out of scope? You can't just ignore a threat if it's inconvenient, you need to look at the overall picture. Arguing over plugging a mousehole in the corner of the barn is pointless when two of the four walls are missing. As Martin has pointed out: There are so many ways and places where the servername WILL be leaked, (URLs, bookmarks, HTTP-Header-Fields, HTTP-Referer headers, etc.) that bottom line, encrypting SNI amounts to crazy and pointless idea. I'm not sure if I'd call it crazy and pointless, just not worthwhile. You're leaking server-name information in a great many other locations and ways, and encrypted SNIs causes so many problems, that the cost/benefit tradeoff doesn't make it worthwhile (which, I guess, could be classed as "pointless"). Perhaps someone could write an RFC for a play-with-experimental-features TLS extension, where implementers could encrypt lengths and SNIs and anything else they want, and then test them out in the real world to see what effect it has. Peter. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
