If we want to change to “key erasure” we should synch with CFRG and SAAG to ensure it’s used IETF-wide. I don’t think that “forward secrecy” is so broken that it needs fixing.
Cheers, William *From:* TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Tony Arcieri *Sent:* Monday, November 30, 2015 11:20 PM *To:* Hugo Krawczyk *Cc:* tls@ietf.org *Subject:* Re: [TLS] bikeshed: Forward Security or Secrecy? On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 8:09 PM, Hugo Krawczyk <h...@ee.technion.ac.il> wrote: The more common term is "forward secrecy" I'd second this. I'm also a fan of Dan Bernstein's recommended term: "key erasure" -- Tony Arcieri
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