On Saturday, October 17, 2015 03:10:18 pm Martin Thomson wrote: > The observation is still valuable in the sense that prohibiting values > > 1.3 would reduce the likelihood of a false positive by some > miniscule amount. In other words, I agree with ekr here, though we > could cap the value to 1.3. > > Maybe we could just define two values: one for TLS 1.3 (and greater, > presumably) and one for TLS 1.2. I don't see any value in protecting > 1.1 or 1.0 from downgrade any more given relative prevalence of those > protocols and their age.
Two values seems like a good compromise to me if one isn't considered sufficient. I don't particularly want them changing in the future so old (e.g. TLS 1.3, in a future with TLS 1.4+) implementations don't need to worry about seeing something new here and making a mistake. Checks would be for one of two 64-bit values, rather than 56-bit values with a byte with a possibly unknown value. Dave _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
