On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 12:12 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thom...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 16 October 2015 at 13:39, Brian Smith <br...@briansmith.org> wrote: > > That would be especially true for an implementation that does False Start > > for TLS 1.2. > > I don't see how false start plays into this. We could have clients > reject false start if they see this sentinel value. But don't we want > to just treat this as an attack and abort instead? > Yes. The client needs the sentinel to know to abort the connection, if its willing to false start with TLS 1.2 when it also support TLS 1.3, right? Cheers, Brian -- https://briansmith.org/
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