On Thursday, July 23, 2015 01:10:30 pm Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 7:06 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie>
> wrote:
> > A suggestion - could we remove mention of anything that
> > is not a MUST or SHOULD ciphersuite from the TLS1.3 document
> > and then have someone write a separate draft that adds a
> > column to the registry where we can mark old crap as
> > deprecated?
> 
> I'm starting to lean towards this. I don't generally think of TLS 1.3 as a 
> vehicle
> for telling people how to configure use of TLS 1.2, and I think it might be 
> better
> to move all that stuff out.

If we've learned one thing from the past year of high-profile vulnerabilities 
with names and logos, it's that TLS is not really secure if you don't take into 
account its weakest/oldest feature that's still possible. I don't think any 
responsible TLS 1.3 spec can afford to not acknowledge this.

That said, if all you want to move out are things that aren't MUSTs or SHOULDs, 
I don't see a problem with that. (with possibly the exception of a "NOT 
RECOMMENDED" or two, though that's really just a synonym for "SHOULD NOT") What 
would that actually entail? Or, did you just mean to cut out all 
non-MUST/SHOULD cipher suites? I also don't see a problem with that. I just 
updated the list with everything. The full list can go in a separate document 
if we want to just focus on MUST/SHOULD support ciphers in the spec, proper.

Also on the topic of cutting out hunks of text, someone should write up a 
DSS/DSA removal PR. There's quite a bit of text scattered throughout the spec 
to handle it that we don't need anymore.


Dave

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