Konstantin Belousov <kostik...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Consider a downstream vendor who has support for signed binary > > executions. If rtld allows a backdoor around exec(2) to run an unsigned > > binary, that could be a problem for them. It is on them to add support > > to exec(2) to validate the special case of execing rtld with an > > argument, or to just disable the feature in rtld from this commit. > > Note the undocumented O_VERIFY flag in open(2) from the patch. > This is very vendor-ish addition to request veriexec (?).
Yep, we make rtld use O_VERIFY so that it will not load/link anything which is unsigned. _______________________________________________ svn-src-head@freebsd.org mailing list https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/svn-src-head To unsubscribe, send any mail to "svn-src-head-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"
