Hi, You should probably check out TM docs - specifically failure route ( http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules/tm.html#tm.f.t_on_failure) and t_is_expired ( http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules/tm.html#tm.f.t_is_expired).
>From there you can do what you like. Cheers, Charles On 5 Apr 2016 1:22 p.m., "Marrold" <kamai...@marrold.co.uk> wrote: > I am interested in 'fingerprinting' various SIP scanner attacks and using > them to intelligently block attacks, rather than just blindly black listing > any SIP message to a honey pot. > > Additionally I think it would be wise to detect these missing ACKs and/or > incomplete transactions from a legitimately mis-configured or > malfunctioning end point, to help protect the core network from needless > re-transmissions. > > Having checked the Asterisk logs, this is what I'm looking to block if a > certain threshold is exceeded- > > [2016-04-05 13:10:52] WARNING[2010] chan_sip.c: Retransmission timeout > reached on transmission eff430b8c1b6d21c2058049f41a7ec57 for seqno 1 > (Critical Response) > > Thanks > > > On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 1:14 PM, Daniel Tryba <d.tr...@pocos.nl> wrote: > >> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 12:09:29AM +0100, Marrold wrote: >> > I have been running a couple of Asterisk honey pots to get a better >> > understanding of the tools and methods potential hackers are using to >> > exploit SIP servers. >> > >> > I have observed many attacks from the 'sipcli' user agent that don't >> send >> > ACKs. >> [...] >> > Please could anyone point me in the right direction to detect these non >> > completed calls with a missing ACK in Kamailio? I am unsure on the >> > terminology I should be using to search the online documentation. >> >> Why do you care? The attacker doesn't care about receiving SIP messages, >> they are only interested in initiating a call to a target, if the target >> gets dialled you will be abused, by either an other source with a fully >> function SIP stack or just something that might be spoofed. >> >> What I do is blacklist addresses that send any SIP messages to my >> honeypots, might be dangerous since with UDP anything can be spoofed (so >> better make sure you have a whitelist and there is no connection between >> the honeypots and your client facing SIP platform) >> >> _______________________________________________ >> SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing list >> sr-users@lists.sip-router.org >> http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >> > > > _______________________________________________ > SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing list > sr-users@lists.sip-router.org > http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users > > -- Sipcentric Ltd. Company registered in England & Wales no. 7365592. Registered office: Faraday Wharf, Innovation Birmingham Campus, Holt Street, Birmingham Science Park, Birmingham B7 4BB.
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