On Wed, 21 Aug 2024 17:50:26 GMT, Francisco Ferrari Bihurriet <fferr...@openjdk.org> wrote:
>> The implementation of this proposal is based on the requirements, >> specification and design choices described in the [JDK-8319332] ticket and >> its respective CSR [JDK-8319333]. What follows are implementation notes >> organized per functional component, with the purpose of assisting to >> navigate the code changes in this pull-request. >> >> ## Security properties loading (overview) >> >> A new static class named `SecPropLoader` (nested within >> `java.security.Security`) is introduced to handle the loading of all >> security properties. Its method `loadAll` is the first one to be called, at >> `java.security.Security` static class initialization. The master security >> properties file is then loaded by `loadMaster`. When additional security >> properties files are allowed (the security property >> `security.overridePropertiesFile` is set to `true`) and the >> `java.security.properties` system property is passed, the method `loadExtra` >> handles the extra load. >> >> The master properties file is loaded in `OVERRIDE` mode, meaning that the >> map of properties is originally empty. Any failure occurred while loading >> these properties is considered fatal. The extra properties file >> (`java.security.properties`) may be loaded in `OVERRIDE` or `APPEND` mode. >> Any failure in this case is ignored. This behavior maintains compatibility >> with the previous implementation. >> >> While the `java.security.properties` system property is documented to accept >> an URL type of value, filesystem path values are supported in the same way >> that they were prior to this enhancement. Values are then interpreted as >> paths and, only if that fails, are considered URLs. In the latter case, >> there is one more attempt after opening the stream to check if there is a >> local file path underneath (e.g. the URL has the form of >> `file:///path/to/a/local/file`). The reason for preferring paths over URLs >> is to support relative path file inclusion in properties files. >> >> ## Loading security properties from paths (`loadFromPath` method) >> >> When loading a properties file from a path, the normalized file location is >> stored in the static field `currentPath`. This value is the current base to >> resolve any relative path encountered while handling an _include_ >> definition. Normalized paths are also saved in the `activePaths` set to >> detect recursive cycles. As we move down or up in the _includes_ stack, >> `currentPath` and `activePaths` values are updated. >> >> ## Loading security properties from URLs (`loadFromUrl` method) >> >> The extra properti... > > Francisco Ferrari Bihurriet has updated the pull request incrementally with > one additional commit since the last revision: > > Document list of reserved keys in > java.security.Security::getProperty/setProperty APIs. > > Co-authored-by: Martin Balao <mba...@redhat.com> > Co-authored-by: Francisco Ferrari Bihurriet <fferr...@redhat.com> I think throwing IAE is the cleanest approach and less likely there may be unexpected behavior if we are not worried about backporting. It would break any app previously using this as a property, but at least the behavior would be consistent. I think the best alternate approach is to not expose it as a property. I think the compatibility risk of an app already using `include` as a property should be extremely low. But one thought is to prepend a special character (say "+") to the property name and add a sentence to the `java.security` file that the `+include` property is not exposed in the `Security` API. It could also be added as an implementation note to the `Security` API. Since this property is JDK specific, I think an implementation note would be acceptable. ------------- PR Comment: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/pull/16483#issuecomment-2310384306
