On 12.08.2019 12:29, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 12/08/2019 08:23, Jan Beulich wrote:
@@ -747,16 +747,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
.bitmap = IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET,
};
- _set_tssldt_desc(
- gdt + TSS_ENTRY,
- (unsigned long)tss,
- offsetof(struct tss_
On 12/08/2019 12:04, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 12.08.2019 12:29, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 12/08/2019 08:23, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> @@ -747,16 +747,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
>>> .bitmap = IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET,
>>> };
>>> - _set_tssldt_desc(
>>> - gdt + TSS_ENTRY
On 12/08/2019 08:23, Jan Beulich wrote:
> @@ -747,16 +747,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
> .bitmap = IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET,
> };
>
> - _set_tssldt_desc(
> - gdt + TSS_ENTRY,
> - (unsigned long)tss,
> - offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1,
From: Andrew Cooper
The XPTI work restricted the visibility of most of memory, but missed a few
aspects when it came to the TSS.
Given that the TSS is just an object in percpu data, the 4k mapping for it
created in setup_cpu_root_pgt() maps adjacent percpu data, making it all
leakable via Meltd
