Hi,
I am aware this discussion have moved to uta (added to cc), but I do not
have any thread there to respond yet. And I have idea dnsop people might
want to comment about.
First issue is this should allow banning devices stolen to deny access
into protected internal names. To make it possib
Hi Tommy,
I reviewed the draft. It brings forward an important architectural
question: should one size fit all in this case? That is, if you're
doing DoH, why not allow the full range of HTTP capabilities to come to
bear?
Eliot
On 20.10.2024 23:27, tojens.i...@gmail.com wrote:
Good day, u
Hey Eliot,
My opinion offered from an airport gate, without prior discussion with
coauthors:
If we need to rework the doc to do so, I want to make sure we aren't "allowing"
or "not allowing" anything, rather recommending things based on justified
criteria then adding considerations for other t
Well, I was thinking about that entire Section 7, and wondering if
perhaps it's time to retire a few mechanisms, and I was specifically
thinking of DoT. DoH seems to cover that ground well. Do we have a
strong use case for where DoT is useful where DoH is not?
I realize this is a bit beyond
