Hi Tommy,

I reviewed the draft. It brings forward an important architectural question: should one size fit all in this case?  That is, if you're doing DoH, why not allow the full range of HTTP capabilities to come to bear?

Eliot

On 20.10.2024 23:27, tojens.i...@gmail.com wrote:
Good day, uta WG:

We have written a draft talking about when encrypted DNS clients should (and 
should not) utilize client authentication and how best to do so. After 
consideration in the dnsop WG at IETF 120, the chairs and ADs agreed that it 
would be more appropriate to discuss this here because of our focus on using 
TLS mechanisms.

We welcome your feedback!

Thanks,
Tommy

-----Original Message-----
From:internet-dra...@ietf.org <internet-dra...@ietf.org>
Sent: Sunday, October 20, 2024 2:21 PM
To: Jeffrey Damick<jdam...@amazon.com>; Jessica Krynitsky
<jess.krynit...@microsoft.com>; Joe Abley<jab...@cloudflare.com>; Matt
Engskow<mengs...@amazon.com>; Tommy Jensen<tojens.i...@gmail.com>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-jaked-cared-00.txt

A new version of Internet-Draft draft-jaked-cared-00.txt has been successfully
submitted by Tommy Jensen and posted to the IETF repository.

Name:     draft-jaked-cared
Revision: 00
Title:    Client Authentication Recommendations for Encrypted DNS
Date:     2024-10-20
Group:    Individual Submission
Pages:    12
URL:https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jaked-cared-00.txt
Status:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jaked-cared/
HTML:https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jaked-cared-00.html
HTMLized:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jaked-cared


Abstract:

    Some encrypted DNS clients require anonymity from their encrypted DNS
    servers to prevent third parties from correlating client DNS queries
    with other data for surveillance or data mining purposes.  However,
    there are cases where the client and server have a pre-existing
    relationship and each wants to prove its identity to the other.  For
    example, an encrypted DNS server may only wish to accept queries from
    encrypted DNS clients that are managed by the same enterprise, and an
    encrypted DNS client may need to confirm the identity of the
    encrypted DNS server it is communicating with.  This requires mutual
    authentication.

    This document discusses the circumstances under which client
    authentication is appropriate to use with encrypted DNS, the benefits
    and limitations of doing so, and recommends authentication mechanisms
    to be used when communicating with TLS-based encrypted DNS protocols.



The IETF Secretariat


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