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(212) 447-1100 (USA) or
> autoquery @ ixquick.com."
>
> Yeah, as if! startpage.com is off my list! Next...
Strange. I don't get that error message when accessing startpage.com
over Tor. I'm not using a standard bundle like TorBrowser though. Would
be interesting to find ou
ith
>> Mozilla Firefox + Noscript (scripting disabled) + Ghostery + AdBlock Plus +
>> HTTPS Everywhere, + Cookies disabled, in addition to browsing the site via
>> the Tor Browser Bundle + Noscript (scripting disabled) + HTTPS Everywhere +
>> Cookies disabaled, and never havin
t;> my habits, or stop recommending startpage.com.
>>
> To be frank, I don't give a flying fuck what your "habits" are! You and
> your "low-key" friend, on the other hand, seem to be very keen to
> promote those two abominations of a search-engine, so the h
u reported. I am genuinely interested
in seeing what caused it, to see if it can be fixed. I myself have only
just started using that search engine because Scroogle has gone offline.
>> I just went to torproject.org and it told me to disable Tor so they
>> could log my IP address
On 29/02/12 14:57, Koos Huisman wrote:
> Can someone tell me how I can setup a Magnet application in the TOR Browser.
>
> I need to able to "download" torrent files by the magnet application.
> This is not available in the TOR browser.
I believe that in order to use magne
http://cardwellit.com/
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roat quite intensely," now.
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On 22/03/12 20:31, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
>> Does this advice apply if your torrent client can and does use a proxy
>> properly?
>
> Short answer: Yes. Long answer: see below.
>
>> If so, why?
>
> Due to protocol leaks.
> Read https://trac.
.145.79.178 "2012-05-01 01:21:07"
EXPIRES="2012-05-01 00:21:07"
250 OK
If I disconnect and reconnect, they're reversed from the very first
response. If I restart Tor and try again, then the first response is
correct, but the subsequent
P
> responses are reversed in the second and third responses:
No responses so I've taken this to trac.torproject.org -
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5723
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On 06/05/12 18:02, Shane wrote:
>> There's no point in adding a layer of SSL over hidden services; the
>> connection is already encrypted end to end.
>
> I thought it was more like proxy-to-proxy leaving a small in-the-clear
> gaps on the ends.
I guess so. There'
On 08/05/12 03:24, Rhona Mahony wrote:
> If Orbot can transparently proxy traffic from an Android phone--browser,
> chat, email--why can't Tor do it for a laptop or desktop? Incorrect premise?
On a "normal" Android device, you need to configure each app to use
Orbot v
On 20/05/12 22:50, Jesus Cea wrote:
> I am thinking about deploying a few "*.onion" services, and I am
> getting a quite surprising result: accessing the services from the
> open web via "onion.to" proxy is *FAR* faster that going TOR native.
>
> What am I doin
On 31/05/12 16:29, Maimun Rizal wrote:
> My test, based on windows, so for VoIP clients I use Phonerlite, it use
> UDP. because of TOR is TCP based, I will use openvpn to transferring udp
> packet through TOR network.
> Caller and Callee know each other. so this concept will
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On 07/06/12 11:38, Maimun Rizal wrote:
> Hi all, I would like to know, is there possibility to use just only
> one node in tor network? I just think about to use middle node is
> vpn. so the concept
>
> caller tor node -
for most use cases. Running in the
> backround 24/7 for 30 days does incur ~200MB of idle usage which
> would be significant for mobile users with smaller data plans.
> Check out the post for more details. I'm also curious if anyone has
> taken similar measurements with Tor to compare the
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On 30/06/12 12:06, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> But are there anonymous payment tools in this days of control? I
>> just
>
> Anonymous prepaid cards, or BitCoin over Tor would come to mind.
Does anyone know a method of obtaining Bi
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On 30/06/12 15:34, Rüdiger Koch wrote:
>> Does anyone know a method of obtaining BitCoins anonymously,
>> other than mining them yourself?
>>
> Such a question from a TOR list is a bit surprising, is it not?
I can't ide
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On 30/06/12 20:29, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
>>> After all, SR is on TOR. Maybe reading their FAQ helps. Hint:
>>> Use a Tumbler.
>> I've no idea what "SR" is. "Tumbler" sounds like some sort of
>>
FvzTmkAN
kgd38C9WJbHC
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re, I'd like to pin the SSL certificate's
> fingerprint. How can that be done? Running an own local CA or is
> there an easier way?
>
> How to download the SSL public key from torproject.org and sign it
> with a local CA?
The Tor project SSL certs are already pin
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On 09/07/12 21:15, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> It's also useful to run as an exit enclave for these purposes. You
> configure yourself as an exit but only to your public IP address.
> Then tor nodes will switch to using you to exit to
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On 04/08/12 17:59, Noel Pluny wrote:
>> It's just an idea... Could Tor be a solution? The wifi interfaces
>> routes all traffic over Tor. Before people can start using the
>> wifi they have to notice a small website explainin
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On 19/09/12 09:26, atra...@mailtor.org wrote:
> I am running Tor and dovecot (mail) on debian. No I can let listen
> the dovecot server on "Listen *:1234"
> The problem is, that you also can access this server without tor.
ide who I'm talking to and when, which is
just as important.
If Orbot on my phone and my friends phone were both running hidden
services. Then they could both make a "direct" connection to each
other, and transmit SMS/BBM/Kik/WhatsApp style messages directly over
the Tor network betw
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On 28/09/12 14:07, ahmia wrote:
> We are working on Tor related projects including running Tor exit
> nodes and the first public Tor hidden service search engine
> (http://ahmia.fi/).
>
> We would love to hear opinions and ideas
KOUBpebEgFdd0WdkQHDYc5oz7PJVvcqFX
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P7hEdDwWOOV5Nn16ZYpDSwRZUpbWKd7IH5j6FL0Hr1+dfnbPjF
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ZQrmOFI/qtHsEJ8VKHtoL5NXw+kR8xjhXqvj
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NS4J1
iIGkE77+QnzjKPH+VmDy7ViqVjPsToJQULw/yXSPj6+CatAmys/eNZ5oqvCW54v5
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On 02/12/12 15:12, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
> I would like to do some small experiment hiding distributed
> database server (2 or 3) with .onion. Every server should synchro
> over Tor exclusive and not know actual IP of any other. Database
&
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On 16/12/12 17:06, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
> Why not good idea?
>
> To be true, all free Wifi user should be suspicious. Why this would
> be any different?
The problem is, there seems to be a much higher ratio of bad:good Tor
exi
AbZY2qS9hPy3AU8er
9dYLScx/UvMTJCXMAm0BC4jHZBOH3a5aXtDjKH0m8zmUHcWQH/+Grz3dlm5dq139
cAc9PDN9/1Ol
=lMQy
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On 06/03/13 20:00, Griffin Boyce wrote:
>>> Hidden services are definitely weaker than regular Tor
>>> circuits, a) because the adversary can induce them to speak,
>> Care to elaborate on that? You mean timing attacks (ba
administrator to make sure the proxy server is
working.
Surely it's already been covered in Forums for raw beginners like me?
JT
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Many thanks, Moritz.
You are spot-on.
I deleted all my existing Tor stuff, downloaded a new Bundle and - hey,
presto - Tor Browser is connecting again!
Most grateful.
JT
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013, at 04:38 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Tor Browser Bundle should work without any conf
Hello,
Well done! I've migrated to UBUNTU 10.04 LTS (Lucid lynx) and tor server run
well again.
But, any information about end of life of Jaunty version of tor?
And what about end of life of Lucid Lynx version in few month/years?
Regards,
--
Christian.
- "Christian" <>
On 21/04/2011 07:54, Jan Reister wrote:
>> I run Dropbox over Tor at very low bandwidth. I have detailed this setup
>> for others here:
>> http://openideals.org/2011/04/20/my-quick-guide-to-a-less-risky-dropbox/
>
> Nathan, did you audit the network traffic for non-
On 03/05/2011 20:02, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
> http://www.androidzoom.com/android_applications/communication/orbot-tor-on-android_jqte.html
>
> interface is great -- why not something like this for mac (and even windows
> too) ? it would be handy on a mac to selectively torify apps!
T
.com/mickeyc
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ertificates that https websites serve. It then alerts you if they
change. It displays information about the old certificate next to the
new certificate so you can tell if the issuer has changed, and if the
old cert was due to expire anyway.
Should come in handy if you come across a Tor Exit node that
u can tell if the issuer has changed, and if the
>> old cert was due to expire anyway.
>>
>> Should come in handy if you come across a Tor Exit node that is somehow
>> generating "valid" certificates for a domain and MITM'ing you.
>
> yes - that looks he
ress and the Apache web server remains
> bound to the IPv4 interface. I think this will do the trick. People who
> really rely on the Tor network status site might use their local hosts
> file for IPv4 address resolving.
>
> Missing IPv4 probably will break tons of bots ac
boot
>
> even though its over Tor?
I have a pretty decent knowledge of the SMTP, POP3 and IMAP4 protocols,
and I'm not aware of any part of the protocol which transmits this
information.
> If so, can't these be used to trace a client machine which might also be
> accessing
;> very few people that have alleged Tor is coy about security. Maybe if
>> you laid your case out in more detail, with moderated rhetoric, we
>> could engage on substance. best, Joe
>
> What is think he is trying to say is that if someone finds a security
> vulnerability i
me
>>> 3. client machine time since last boot
>>>
>>> even though its over Tor?
>>>
>>
>> I have a pretty decent knowledge of the SMTP, POP3 and IMAP4 protocols,
>> and I'm not aware of any part of the protocol which transmits thi
ar.com/ https://twitter.com/mickeyc
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t;>
>> https://grepular.com/Preventing_Web_Tracking_via_the_Browser_Cache
>
> None of this is news.
>
> FYI, Torbutton traditionally handled both HTTP auth and cache through
> the toggle feature. I've since realized that the toggle model was
> broken, and we'
that you're the same person. Even if you're coming from a different Tor
>> exit node, even if you clear cookies inbetween. That is unless you have
>> the patience to only visit one site at a time, and toggle off/on between
>> each different site visit.
>
> Di
Hi,
I was just reading through the tor man page, and I came across the
HardwareAccel and AccelName options. This peaked my interest because my
new laptop has the AES-NI CPU instruction set. I added this to my torrc:
HardwareAccel 1
AccelName aesni
And now when I start Tor I get this
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On 09/09/11 06:43, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote:
> Very intresting what is the vulnerabilities they used for breaking systems?
> In the lite of that facts I don't know what I need to advice my clients
> - setting up hidden services on their home computers or on overseas
> vdses? (M
On 09/09/11 12:19, Orionjur Tor-admin wrote:
> How I need to set my VM for thas purposes?
> I use a VirtualBox under transparently torified user on host machine for
> the most secure browsing in the Internet but I cannot to get access to
> that machine through ssh from my host mac
om/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
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t this email was signed by me, and that it hasn't been tampered with.
This is the same process used to sign Tor.
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Professional http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
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machine, over a VPN using SMTP, which also has
encrypted incremental backups using duplicity/gpg.
Another possibility would be to have a mail server as a hidden service,
and then just set up the Internet facing server to immediately forward
all incoming email to the hidden server via Tor.
rdwell https://grepular.com/ https://twitter.com/mickeyc
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On 06/11/11 01:26, Arturo Filastò wrote:
> I have made a patch to check.torproject.org to expose a JSONP interface
> that would allow people to have the user check client side if (s)he is
> using Tor.
It would be safer to expose a JSON web service than a JSONP web service,
and use a wil
On 07/11/11 02:32, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> I'd like to see someone do research that proves or disproves this fear that
> javascript and cookies everywhere is hazardous to the anonymity of a tor
> user.
I don't think any research is required to know that "third party&quo
yc
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't read your email
TorMail : Has a policy that they don't read your email
If GMail does read your email, there may be legal or commercial
consequences. If TorMail reads your email, there is no recourse. None.
> Tor and other privacy-enhancing technologies provide "privacy by
> de
On 24/11/11 17:06, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> So I am thinking on implementing tor, and then establishing the
> openvpn connection over it.
> Is this at all possible?. Has anyone done something like it?, any help
> or comment on this would be highly appreciated.
That is perfectly possib
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Are there any plans to add support for the DNSSEC related RR types to
the DNS resolver built into Tor? Ie, DNSKEY, RRSIG, DS, NSEC and NSEC3?
If not, I think it would be a good thing to add, now the root zone and
major top level zones have been signed, browsers are starting to
experiment with
On 29/11/11 14:35, Adam Langley wrote:
>> If the SSHFP RR type is added too, people who use OpenSSH with the
>> VerifyHostKeyDNS option can benefit from public key verification when
>> SSH'ing into a box for the first time, over Tor.
>
> (It's important to note
On 06/12/11 00:33, Jago Pearce wrote:
> I think it would be great if it was easier to setup a mirror of an onion
> site.
>
> I want to make an onion site but I know my 90% of this particular
> audience won´t be installing tor to view sites.
>
> So what I think would be a
On 20/12/11 04:44, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> This also requires the user not being very sophisticated. If you load
> up html emails full of web-bugs, javascript, and your normal browser
> pointed at Tor, then I believe most of what 'SR' says is correct. I
> don't believe t
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Hi,
I have some questions regarding enclaved servers and hope you can help
me finding the answer to these questions. I have tried to find those
answers on this mailing list and also in the TOR documentation and the
wiki, but to no avail. If my questions have been answered over and over
again
On 21/12/11 11:17, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> http://janusvm.com/ last release from Jan-2010, almost got Jan-2012, new tor
>> version just been released...
>>
>> Is janusvm still safe?
>
> No, not safe.
>
> Probably has been unsafe to use for years.
Thank you very much for the very helpful answers to my questions. I do
now much better understand the problems I am facing and how to tackle them.
Thanks again, >Y<
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On 04/01/12 14:19, h...@safe-mail.net wrote:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TransparentProxy
>
> Since Tor does not support IPv6 yet...
>
> What about IPv6 traffic? Is it blocked when following these instructions?
>
> If not, how to do so?
If you have
regarding bad-relays discussion should be tighter than even a
closed mailing list, is my thought.
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Hi,
Not sure if that has been discussed yet... the site
torbundlebrowser.org is a almost perfect copy of the TOR webpage and
has a TBB download which has malware in it. (down at the moment)
http://dustri.org/b/torbundlebrowserorg.html
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Hi,
This work could be of interest for the TOR project.
https://gnunet.org/sites/default/files/ma_kirsch_2014.pdf
Quote:
"TCP Stealth replaces the traditional random TCP SQN number with a token
that authenticates the client and (optionally) the first bytes of the TCP
payload. Client
ually done". "How it is
actually done" is exactly the critical point, in particular if someone
is trying to declare a plague on all Tor hidden services.
Another possibility, for example - we don't know how well these
darknet sites were set up. If they had the same developer(s
Hi,
I have already a web server running to serve clearnet and I want to
provide access to the same site on the same machine via onion service.
What is the easiest way to do so?
Thanks,
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On 2014-12-26 11:43, Justaguy wrote:
what should happen to these all
Slap 'em all with BadExit flags?
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is
possible with the type of product you're presenting. "Instantly stop
NSA spying with this powerful software" orly?
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