Re: [tor-relays] What is the different between Tor browser and Tor source code

2018-06-10 Thread Georg Koppen
dave` dave: > I know that i can download Tor Browser and use it as a regular browser with > a touch of anonymity. but, if i want to change a few things in Tor i can > change in .torrc file like the ExitNode, EntryNodeetc.. as i have here in > Tor's manual: > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-m

Re: [tor-relays] missing pluggable transport

2015-01-08 Thread Georg Koppen
Hi, qq1693129601: > When open tor-browser, it says > > Tor failed to establish a Tor network connection. > > Connecting to a relay directory failed (missing pluggable transport). > > The log is below, could anyone help? it seems you might want to get in touch with our help desk via h...@rt.tor

Re: [tor-relays] tor-browser still fails on FreeBSD 9.2-STABLE

2014-02-28 Thread Georg Koppen
Scott Bennett: > I just downloaded tor-browser-linux32-3.5.2.1_en-US.tar.xz and tried it. > It fails on FreeBSD 9.2-STABLE exactly the same way the previous version did: > > [hellas] 128 % ./start-tor-browser > > Launching Tor Browser Bundle for Linux in > /home/hellas/bennett/src/tor/tor-b

Re: [tor-relays] Short heads up

2023-01-09 Thread Georg Koppen
Neel Chauhan: On 2022-12-25 00:27, Frank Steinborn via tor-relays wrote: Hi friends, I made some smaller tweaks over the last few hours which should especially help relays on nearly OOM or thrashing situations (making use of Zswap + MGLRU if available). The rules themselves are just the sam

[tor-relays] PSA: Tor 0.4.5 reaches end of life (EOL) on 2023-02-15

2023-01-23 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on Tor 0.4.5.x: the 0.4.5 series is going EOL on *2023-02-15* (roughly in 3 weeks from now). That's currently still 760 relays, which means roughly 7% of the advertised bandwidth of the network (and 387 bridges, whic

Re: [tor-relays] PSA: Tor 0.4.5 reaches end of life (EOL) on 2023-02-15

2023-01-25 Thread Georg Koppen
t way at least the Debian relays would get a proper update I assume. --- Original Message --- Georg Koppen g...@torproject.org schrieb am Montag, 23. Januar 2023 um 16:59: Hello! In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on Tor 0.4.5.x: the 0.4.5 series i

[tor-relays] 4 relays per IP address are allowed from now (Feb 2023) on

2023-02-02 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello everyone! You might recall that Tor is restricting the possible amount of Tor relays per IP address to 2, mainly for Sybil prevention reasons.[1] Given that Tor on the relay side at least is not multithreaded yet (and will likely not be for the near and medium future) that's wasting a lo

Re: [tor-relays] disable moderation on tor-relays again?

2023-02-14 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: Hi, can we try to disable moderation on this list again and see how it goes? If it gets out of hand you can always move back to a moderated mode or a mode where the first email of a sender is moderated. I've no strong opinion but looking over my moderator experience spanning the pa

Re: [tor-relays] disable moderation on tor-relays again?

2023-02-14 Thread Georg Koppen
ot as aggressively as we could). Georg This feature could be used more often to avoid those frustrating delays for a growing number of participants. C: Am 14. Februar 2023 09:57:38 MEZ schrieb Georg Koppen : nusenu: Hi, can we try to disable moderation on this list again and see how it goes?

Re: [tor-relays] removing tor versions from "recommended versions" before they reach EOL

2023-03-01 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: Hi, the tor 0.4.5.x end of live versions are still on the recommended versions list: https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#recommendedversions consensus client-versions 0.4.5.6, 0.4.5.7, 0.4.5.8, 0.4.5.9, 0.4.5.10, 0.4.5.11, 0.4.5.12, 0.4.5.14, 0.4.5.15, 0.4.5.16, 0.4.7.7, 0.

Re: [tor-relays] D5A3882CBDBE4CAD2F9DDA2AB80FE761BEDC3F11 is spoofing my contact info

2023-03-06 Thread Georg Koppen
li...@for-privacy.net: This is _not_ my relay: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/D5A3882CBDBE4CAD2F9DDA2AB80FE761BEDC3F11 https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/w/relay/D5A3882CBDBE4CAD2F9DDA2AB80FE761BEDC3F11.html Thanks for the report, marked for rejection. Once a majority of dire

Re: [tor-relays] Open call for proposals for improving the health of the Tor relay operator community and the Tor network

2023-03-06 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: I've got some practical experience with how things are (not) handled by the Tor Project in this space which discourages involvement. That's unfortunate. What has been the problem with past proposal-handling? And how should it have been done differently? The past has also shown that

Re: [tor-relays] Notification when tor relay goes offline

2023-03-24 Thread Georg Koppen
Keifer Bly: Hi, So I am still working on the issues for my relays, but am wondering, is it possible to sign up for email notifications when a relay goes offline? If you can wait another week until we have officially launched our new Tor Weather service then we could offer that one. If you can

[tor-relays] Launch of new Tor Weather service

2023-03-30 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello everyone! As indicated on the last relay operator meetup we were close to re-launching the Tor Weather service. Now, after fixing a bunch of last-minute issues and double-checking everything is working we can finally announce that the newly designed Tor Weather service is ready for publ

Re: [tor-relays] Launch of new Tor Weather service

2023-03-30 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: Hello everyone! As indicated on the last relay operator meetup we were close to re-launching the Tor Weather service. Now, after fixing a bunch of last-minute issues and double-checking everything is working we can finally announce that the newly designed Tor Weather service is

Re: [tor-relays] Launch of new Tor Weather service

2023-03-31 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: Georg Koppen: Hello everyone! As indicated on the last relay operator meetup we were close to re-launching the Tor Weather service. Now, after fixing a bunch of last-minute issues and double-checking everything is working we can finally announce that the newly designed Tor

Re: [tor-relays] Open call for proposals for improving the health of the Tor relay operator community and the Tor network

2023-04-02 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: I've got some practical experience with how things are (not) handled by the Tor Project in this space which discourages involvement. That's unfortunate. What has been the problem with past proposal-handling? And how should it have been done differently? I would actually like to hear t

Re: [tor-relays] Open call for proposals for improving the health of the Tor relay operator community and the Tor network

2023-04-04 Thread Georg Koppen
toroperl...@jrobin.ephemeron.org: On Sun, 2 Apr 2023, nusenu wrote: I would actually like to hear the torproject's "self-assessment" on this before I send my opinion on it. I agree: it would be nice to hear about the current (informal) process, flawed as it may be, and the Tor Project's self

Re: [tor-relays] Open call for proposals for improving the health of the Tor relay operator community and the Tor network

2023-05-11 Thread Georg Koppen
gus: On Mon, Mar 06, 2023 at 07:49:47PM +0100, nusenu wrote: gus: On Fri, Mar 03, 2023 at 11:26:07PM +0100, nusenu wrote: I've got some practical experience with how things are (not) handled by the Tor Project in this space which discourages involvement. The past has also shown that proposals

Re: [tor-relays] PSA: Tor 0.4.5 reaches end of life (EOL) on 2023-02-15

2023-05-17 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: Hello! In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on Tor 0.4.5.x: the 0.4.5 series is going EOL on *2023-02-15* (roughly in 3 weeks from now). That's currently still 760 relays, which means roughly 7% of the advertised bandwidth of the ne

[tor-relays] Providing metrics relevant to relay operators

2023-06-07 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! I got recently pinged by a large exit operator asking whether we had a website with nice graphs and statistics relevant to relay operators on our project infrastructure (showing e.g. the largest exit operators etc.), but that's currently not the case and we should fix that. There are s

[tor-relays] 8 relays pers IP address are allowed from now (end of June 2023) on

2023-06-29 Thread Georg Koppen
Hi! You might recall that Tor has been restricting the possible amount of Tor relays per IP address to 2, mainly for Sybil prevention reasons.[1] We bumped that limit to 4 earlier this year[2] to make better use of available resources and considered back then bumping that limit further to 8 r

Re: [tor-relays] Wrong "first seen" flag for bridges at metrics.torproject.org

2023-08-23 Thread Georg Koppen
Hi! telekobold: Hi together, I have an issue regarding the "first seen" flag at metrics.torproject.org: It is definitely wrong for my two bridges - both dates are much too close in the past. For one of the bridges, it seems to correspond to the last signing key renewal, for the other bridg

[tor-relays] PSA: Exit nodes on 0.4.7.x might see less traffic

2023-10-17 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello everyone! As you might have noticed, Tor Browser 13 got released last week[1] which ships for the first time a Tor 0.4.8.x version (0.4.8.7) to our stable Tor Browser users. One of the main features in the 0.4.8.x series is Conflux, which allows traffic-splitting to improve Tor performan

[tor-relays] Proposal: Restrict ContactInfo to Mandatory Email Address

2023-10-21 Thread Georg Koppen
aft[3]). """ ``` Filename: 100-contactinfo-mandatory-email-address.md Title: Restricting ContactInfo to Mandatory Email Address Author: Georg Koppen Created: 2023-10-21 Status: Open ``` ## Overview This document proposes to change the ContactInfo field from a free text field to one that is on

Re: [tor-relays] Proposal: Restrict ContactInfo to Mandatory Email Address

2023-10-26 Thread Georg Koppen
rusive than what you have in mind. But I am fine thinking more about it if there is interest from the community. Thanks, Georg -- Danny -- Yours sincerely, Xiaoqi Chen On Sat, Oct 21, 2023 at 3:55 PM Georg Koppen wrote: Hello everyone! As indicated in our bug tracker a while ago[1]

[tor-relays] Exit operators on the 0.4.8.x series, please upgrade to 0.4.8.10 ASAP!

2023-12-08 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello exit node operators! Today (2023-12-08) the Network Team has released a new Tor version, 0.4.8.10[1]. This update contains a fix to a remotely triggerable crash bug (TROVE-2023-007) affecting exit relays on the 0.4.8.x series. Please upgrade as soon as possible to maintain network stabil

Re: [tor-relays] Issue with Relay Status Discrepancy on Tor Metrics

2023-12-18 Thread Georg Koppen
Jan: Dear Tor Metrics Support Team, I hope this message finds you well. I am writing to report an issue regarding the status of my relay on Tor Metrics. According to Nyx, my relay appears to be running without any problems. However, Tor Metrics indicates that it is offline. Relay Details: Nam

Re: [tor-relays] Relay that's been running for a long time suddenly saying it's new?

2024-01-15 Thread Georg Koppen
Keifer Bly: Hi, So my relay at https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/79E3B585803DE805CCBC00C1EF36B1E74372861D is suddenly saying it's a new relay. Don't know why this would happen as it's been running for a few years, but suddenly saying it's new? Should be fine again right now, no? W

[tor-relays] PSA: Tor 0.4.7 reaches end of life (EOL) on 2024-01-31

2024-01-17 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on Tor 0.4.7.x: the 0.4.7 series is going EOL on *2024-01-31* (roughly in 2 weeks from now). That's currently still 1346 relays, which means roughly 15% of the advertised bandwidth of the network (and 964 bridges, wh

Re: [tor-relays] Relay first seen reset on Tor metrics

2024-01-30 Thread Georg Koppen
Zachary via tor-relays: The "first seen" date on my relay A00E3AAF5A24DC69740FA7A3A1C4A0ECB7972722 Got reset today while I was at work. It's not a problem and I don't particularly care, but is there anything that would cause this? IP hasn't changed, Tor version hasn't changed, etc. That's

Re: [tor-relays] Way to be notified when relay goes offline?

2024-02-05 Thread Georg Koppen
Josh Lawson via tor-relays: Does Tor Weather work with bridges? I have 2 bridges that have been operating for years and it says the fingerprints do not match any relays. I have been using Uptime Robot, but it would be cool to use Tor Weather. Right now, Tor Weather does not work for bridges.

Re: [tor-relays] Cloudflare Onions Beta and Network Stability

2018-08-20 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > > > Nathaniel Suchy: >> As some of you may have heard, Cloudflare is beta testing opportunistic >> onions. This of course is going to create more Tor traffic. Cloudflare has >> several concerns about running their own relays and says they won’t at this >> time. That said if every Cloudf

Re: [tor-relays] Strength in numbers (of $$)

2018-10-23 Thread Georg Koppen
Nathaniel Suchy: [snip] > *) Bug bounties? (Can a Tor Project staffer confirm if donation money is > used for this) We have a sponsor who is reimbursing us for bug bounties but donation money is giving us the flexibility to pay out bug bounties as soon as possible. Georg signature.asc Descri

Re: [tor-relays] Tor website overhaul -- who deserves punishment?

2019-03-28 Thread Georg Koppen
Lars Noodén: [snip] > But about the problematic layout that now exists, in general, the CSS > media rule mixes all types of screens together regardless of > orientation, aspect ratio or size. So mobile and multi-screen desktops > all fall under the 'all' or 'screen' values. Thanks for the feedb

Re: [tor-relays] Question about new website

2019-04-03 Thread Georg Koppen
Keifer Bly: > Hi all, the new website looks nice. I like the look of it. I have one > question, where can the tor expert bundle be downloaded from now? Thanks. Hm, you are right, it seems it is not possible to download it from our website at the moment. I've opened https://trac.torproject.org/proj

Re: [tor-relays] Question about new website

2019-04-05 Thread Georg Koppen
t sure what you mean, but https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29991 shows the bug for me (just tested again). Georg > --Keifer > > From: Georg Koppen > Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2019 12:14 AM > To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Qu

Re: [tor-relays] Curious up disclosure possible?

2019-06-04 Thread Georg Koppen
Dr Gerard Bulger: > Conclusion...avoid http, 80 ? > > https://blog.duszynski.eu/tor-ip-disclosure-through-http-301-cache-poisoning/ From the blog post: "Use latest version of the Tor browser whenever possible for browsing web pages." I think that's the right approach to tackle application level

Re: [tor-relays] Status of "new" defect #30767 Custom obfs4 bridge does not work on Tor Browser for Android

2019-09-02 Thread Georg Koppen
nottryingtobel...@protonmail.com: > I hate to be that guy, but I was wondering if there is any progress on > resolving this defect? I'm sure it's not a front burner type of problem, but > it would be nice to be able to use the Android app as intended. Using > Orbot/Orfox as a backup feels like a

Re: [tor-relays] Article: The Growing Problem of Malicious Relays on the Tor Network

2019-12-11 Thread Georg Koppen
Hi! Let me use this mail to reply to both niftybunny's and Dirk's points as they are kind of related. niftybunny: > The main issue I see here is the 10%. Thats a really big chunk. They were > bigger than me :( I also mailed the Tor Project after Nusenu did not receive > an answer. This has to

Re: [tor-relays] ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification updates and final comments until 2020-02-02

2020-01-13 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > Hi, > > I made some updates to the > ContactInfo Information Sharing Specification > draft. > > Most notably I added a new field 'verifyurl' that should allow > the automatic verification of the operatorurl claim. > > Without it anyone could claim to be part of some operator without t

Re: [tor-relays] ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification updates and final comments until 2020-02-02

2020-01-16 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: >> It seems to me the specification tries to make use of the fact that the >> ContactInfo field is essentially unstructured text to put things into >> it, in a slightly structured manner, that could be helpful in a number >> of areas (bad relay detection, relay metrics, network growth...).

Re: [tor-relays] ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification updates and final comments until 2020-02-02

2020-01-19 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > Georg Koppen: >> Yes, that's what I figured. So, it seems to me not all your proposed >> keys are equally important (e.g. your require the email one). Which of >> those (or maybe even which cluster of those) are/is important enough in >> your opinion to co

Re: [tor-relays] BadExit

2020-03-24 Thread Georg Koppen
Hi! ger...@bulger.co.uk: > Oh the shame! Never had that tag on my exit before. Sorry to hear. :( > > > I assume it was due to a bad boy attacking an IP, pointed out by my ISP, and > the ISP put my server "under mitigation".I assume some filtering, which > of course would have looked bad

Re: [tor-relays] BadExit

2020-03-27 Thread Georg Koppen
teor: > Hi, > >> On 27 Mar 2020, at 02:00, niftybunny >> wrote: >> >> My bad. Never seen this before. I there a good reason for the accept >> 133.0.0.0/8:80 ? >> >>> On 26. Mar 2020, at 15:06, ger...@bulger.co.uk wrote: >>> >>> "btw, you need to have at least port 80 and 443 … port 80 is missi

[tor-relays] Update on the status for sbws (simple bandwidth scanner)

2020-04-07 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello everyone! Some of you might have read about relay operators being affected by a drop of bandwidth on their relays recently or might even have hit this problem themselves. Bug 33775[1] has more details about what is going on (in short: sbws, our new bandwidth scanner, has still release criti

Re: [tor-relays] Sudend drop in Consensus Weight

2020-04-07 Thread Georg Koppen
Clément Février: > Hello, > > On April 5th, the consensus weight of my tor relay dropped to 0, see > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/33D88F331408141F2A2CC563239E54E48F7A211B > > As far as I know, nothing specific happened, no update nor reboot. > Nothing in the logs. > Can anyone e

[tor-relays] Guidelines and processes for our bad relay work

2020-04-08 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! There has been some confusion among relay operators about how we deal with bad relays and who is actually making decisions and how the overall process is working. Even though we don't have a document yet to point to for answering all those questions (more on that below) we thought it could

Re: [tor-relays] Blog: How Malicious Tor Relays are Exploiting Users in 2020 (Part I)

2020-08-14 Thread Georg Koppen
Igor Mitrofanov: > Is there anything Tor can do inside the Tor browser itself? > I would understand and support something as drastic as disabling non-HTTPS, > non-Onion connections altogether. When the user types a URL with no > protocol prefix, the browser will assume HTTPS. > This may break some

Re: [tor-relays] Blog: How Malicious Tor Relays are Exploiting Users in 2020 (Part I)

2020-08-19 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > niftybunny: >> https://medium.com/@nusenu/how-malicious-tor-relays-are-exploiting-users-in-2020-part-i-1097575c0cac >> >> There are multiple indicators that suggest that the attacker still >> runs >10% of the Tor network exit capacity (as of 2020–08–08) >> >> And on this one: I trust nus

Re: [tor-relays] Malicious Tor relays - post-analysis after two months

2020-10-05 Thread Georg Koppen
Mike Perry: > On 10/3/20 6:38 AM, nusenu wrote: >>> Me and several tor relay operator friends have questions about >>> Malicious Tor exit nodes. How do you define a node as malicious ? >> >> In the particular case (at least the initial detection): Traffic >> manipulation at the exit relays. >> >>>

Re: [tor-relays] Malicious Tor relays - post-analysis after two months

2020-10-07 Thread Georg Koppen
Corl3ss: > Hello, > > > > This summer Nusenu shared his posts about malicious relays [1][2] and it was > followed by many answers. > > A very important is Roger's one [3] explaining that the malicious relays have > been kicked out of the network and that any new one should be reported. > >

Re: [tor-relays] 253 new exits - up and down

2020-11-02 Thread Georg Koppen
Corl3ss: > Hi, > > today 253 new exit nodes joined the network : > https://onionoo.torproject.org/summary?search=apokaliz > > It was active for 12 hours and then down. > It is enough odd to report it here. > > If you have any information about it, it will be a pleasure to read it. It's even pub

Re: [tor-relays] Questing regarding Team Cymru Tor Relays and Bridges

2021-03-22 Thread Georg Koppen
Lisa Winter: > Hello list, > > I just visited BridgeDB and got a bridge from "Team Cymru", according to > the whois of the IP - should the Tor Project really allow a company > trying to "track and take down threat actors and criminals around the > globe" host a substantial portion of the network,

Re: [tor-relays] Tor project helping to attempt to cancel Richard Stallman

2021-03-25 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! Jeffrey Cliff: > I've been running a relay/exit node for many years. Tor user since ~2004. > To the extent that my voice means anything at all here, I would like to > strongly condemn the Tor project joining the attempt to cancel Richard > Stallman. Stallman represents software freedom to

Re: [tor-relays] Tor project helping to attempt to cancel Richard Stallman

2021-03-26 Thread Georg Koppen
George: > On 3/26/21 12:02 PM, Roman Mamedov wrote: >> On Fri, 26 Mar 2021 11:26:16 -0400 >> Chris Dagdigian wrote: >> >>> telling new female  undergrads and grad students to ensure that they >>> never, >>> ever, were placed in a room alone with him. >> >> It is a bad idea to stay alone in a room

Re: [tor-relays] This is not me

2021-03-31 Thread Georg Koppen
Paul Templeton: > the relay with fingerprint B8D95BB1AAFB6F234EC50A100F46E4CC8E8E90FB > (coffswifi5)is not me... > > coffswifi4 is mine so don't ask me to add as a family... We won't, promised. :) We are aware of that relay and similar ones and are about to bump them out of the network. Thanks f

Re: [tor-relays] malicious exit relays by andrejgvozde...@gmail.com

2021-04-12 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > Hi Andrey, > > Roger Dingledine: >> For completeness, I'm including below the set of fingerprints that we >> bumped out. > [...] >> Group #7: other >> 4E6C7297F16523A236EE1A2EE23AF54ABEF15490 >> 55D490E9E440DD4458F16ABCDD79F48396D55EA9 >> 78F699D58F3353AB6C4CE39E3BD96CE87439753A >> B1896

Re: [tor-relays] malicious exit relays by andrejgvozde...@gmail.com

2021-04-13 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: >> FWIW: we kicked a bunch of relays out of the network today which might >> or might not contain any of those, hard to tell. > > Please publish the relay fingerprints that directory authorities remove, > otherwise > only the malicious entities get to learn and improve since they see the

Re: [tor-relays] let's make ContactInfo mandatory for exits (and warn others)

2021-04-24 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > After looking at lots of malicious relay data of the past few months > I've come to the conclusion that exit relays without ContactInfo are > largely run by malicious actors. > > I propose to make torrc's ContactInfo mandatory for exit relays with the > following timeline: > > * tor 0.

Re: [tor-relays] let's make ContactInfo mandatory for exits (and warn others)

2021-04-25 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > > The Doctor [412/724/301/703/415/510]: >> Also, not all of us are okay with the world finding out that we run Tor >> nodes. Some of us >> just do it and don't make a big deal about it. > > Since this is an often misunderstood point: > > a non-empty contactinfo is far from anything t

Re: [tor-relays] malicious exit relays by andrejgvozde...@gmail.com

2021-05-06 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: > nusenu: >>> FWIW: we kicked a bunch of relays out of the network today which might >>> or might not contain any of those, hard to tell. >> >> Please publish the relay fingerprints that directory authorities remove, >> otherwise >>

[tor-relays] New Test for Measuring the Accuracy of Tor Relays' Advertised Bandwidths

2021-05-10 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello everyone! Some of you might remember the speed test Rob had been running during August 2019 to investigate the accuracy of the advertised bandwidth a relay is reporting in its server descriptor.[1] Back then this involved, for each relay, downloading several large data streams for a period o

Re: [tor-relays] New Test for Measuring the Accuracy of Tor Relays' Advertised Bandwidths

2021-05-12 Thread Georg Koppen
Scott Bennett: > Georg Koppen wrote: > >> Some of you might remember the speed test Rob had been running during >> August 2019 to investigate the accuracy of the advertised bandwidth a >> relay is reporting in its server descriptor.[1] Back then this involved, >&g

[tor-relays] Documenting rejection of bad relays

2021-05-17 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! We finally sat down and documented the current criteria for and the process of dealing with bad relays. If you are interested in that topic, have a look at our wiki page[1] which is explaining the details. We plan to keep that page updated as our criteria and process are evolving in the fut

Re: [tor-relays] New Test for Measuring the Accuracy of Tor Relays' Advertised Bandwidths

2021-06-07 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > The effect of these measurements is visible in significant (temporary) > "increase" of adv. bw > visible on metrics: > > https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html?start=2021-04-20&end=2021-05-21 > > and on the OrNetStats per operator graphs, this is a good example: > > https://nus

Re: [tor-relays] Relay consensus weight drop

2021-06-09 Thread Georg Koppen
mikefloyd2: > Hi, > I've noticed that my relay's bandwidth has been continuously dropping during > the last couple of weeks. > My bandwidth has been stable during that time, and I haven't changed anything > in terms of configuration. > I've also noticed that bastet, longclaw and maatuska are show

Re: [tor-relays] Relay consensus weight drop

2021-06-10 Thread Georg Koppen
Scott Bennett: > Claus Jacobsen wrote: > >> Mike is not the only one - I've been seeing the exact same thing. >> My relay is >> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/A2F5DF163132CF8FFC1F6343135D3397CA85CF89 >> > I posted an alarm about this on 3 June, but there were no followups. >

Re: [tor-relays] Relay consensus weight drop

2021-06-10 Thread Georg Koppen
mikefloyd2: > Following further decline of my server's consensus weight, I looked around a > bit. > I found some more servers that show similar behavior in the graphs shown on > the Metrics website: > * > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/01729F10A81DDD8A92D770B2133082EB56C75E26 > *

Re: [tor-relays] Can't compile 0.4.6.5 on Ubuntu 18.04

2021-06-14 Thread Georg Koppen
William Denton: > I went to upgrade a relay running on Ubuntu 18.04 to the new release > (0.4.6.5) and to my surprise it didn't compile.  Every other version has > built without any trouble.  Wading into the Gitlab site was rather > confusing, so I thought I'd send this here, in the hopes it reache

Re: [tor-relays] Verify my Relay

2021-06-23 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! S1l3nt Hash: > Hello, > > I wanted to do my part in helping the TOR network grow, so I've started a tor > relay on a debian system. After running for a while and monitoring on Nyx, > and checking Relay Search I've notice my link says "Offline". Just wanted to > know if there is a way to

Re: [tor-relays] Relay consensus weight drop

2021-06-25 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: > mikefloyd2: >> Following further decline of my server's consensus weight, I looked around a >> bit. >> I found some more servers that show similar behavior in the graphs shown on >> the Metrics website: >> * >> ht

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing rejected fingerprints

2021-06-27 Thread Georg Koppen
Trofim Maslow: > > Hi everyone. I think it’s a good idea to publish a list of rejected relay > fingerprints and reason why they are rejected once a month. This should make > Tor more transparent. Nice to see that folks are interested in our bad-relays work! We started to document (on a monthly

Re: [tor-relays] end of life: tor 0.4.4 (2021-06-15)

2021-07-06 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > Reminder: tor 0.4.4 reached it's end of life on 2021-06-15. > > Over 1000 relays and about 20% of the network capacity runs an > unsupported version of tor. > > https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/team/-/wikis/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases#end-of-life > > > Consider upgrading if you

[tor-relays] Network experiments on the Tor network

2021-08-25 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello everyone! As you might have seen we had announcements on this list a couple of months back about experiments being run on the live Tor network.[1][2] This shows that our network is quite popular among researchers, which is great. However, it means as well that there are a bunch of questions

[tor-relays] New round of measuring the accuracy of Tor relays' advertised bandwidth

2021-08-25 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! You might recall we ran two "speed tests" so far for investigating the accuracy of a relay's advertised bandwidth, one in 2021[1] and another one earlier this year[2]. We gonna pick this test up again this week. However, this time it won't be just a single run but we are rather scheduling

Re: [tor-relays] Inflated throughput measures from torproject metrics?

2021-08-30 Thread Georg Koppen
torix via tor-relays: > The advertized bandwidth of my aramis family of relays has gone up from > around 45 to 67 total since last week. ZimmerLinux (quetzalcoatl) sees > inflation as well. I found a graph here of quetzalcoatl: > https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/quetzalcoatl-relays.org.html >

Re: [tor-relays] New round of measuring the accuracy of Tor relays' advertised bandwidth

2021-08-31 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: > Hello! > > You might recall we ran two "speed tests" so far for investigating the > accuracy of a relay's advertised bandwidth, one in 2021[1] and another > one earlier this year[2]. > > We gonna pick this test up again this week. However, t

Re: [tor-relays] Inflated throughput measures from torproject metrics?

2021-08-31 Thread Georg Koppen
that caused issues for your relay (not sure which one was affected). Georg [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-July/017535.html [2] https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html > --Torix > > > ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ > > O

Re: [tor-relays] New round of measuring the accuracy of Tor relays' advertised bandwidth

2021-09-02 Thread Georg Koppen
Toralf Förster: > On 8/25/21 12:02 PM, Georg Koppen wrote: >> Hello! >> >> You might recall we ran two "speed tests" so far for investigating the >> accuracy of a relay's advertised bandwidth, one in 2021[1] and another >> one earlier this year[2

Re: [tor-relays] Inflated throughput measures from torproject metrics?

2021-09-02 Thread Georg Koppen
rapping your head around that. :) Hope this helps, Georg [1] https://onbasca.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bandwidth_tor.html#bandwidth-values-origin > --Torix > > Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. > > ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ > > On Wednesday, September 1st, 2021 at 6:06 AM, Geor

Re: [tor-relays] New round of measuring the accuracy of Tor relays' advertised bandwidth

2021-09-03 Thread Georg Koppen
Toralf Förster: > On 9/2/21 9:11 AM, Georg Koppen wrote: >> No. As far as it matters for the test those two relays are independent >> relays which each get tested as two random relays would get. > > Except, that both shares the same network card ... Right, good point. We

Re: [tor-relays] Ripped off relay name

2021-09-20 Thread Georg Koppen
xplato via tor-relays: > Just curious a relay appeared with a nearly identical name to a relay I have > run for a while. Is this just a lack of creativity or something that I should > be concerned about? The name is fairly unique and the new relay is almost > identical in name. This happens fro

Re: [tor-relays] New round of measuring the accuracy of Tor relays' advertised bandwidth

2021-09-23 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: > Georg Koppen: >> Hello! >> >> You might recall we ran two "speed tests" so far for investigating the >> accuracy of a relay's advertised bandwidth, one in 2021[1] and another >> one earlier this year[2]. >> >> We gonna pi

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-09-27 Thread Georg Koppen
Gary C. New via tor-relays: > Hiro, > Presently, I'm seeing a similar issue. On my laptop, I'm observing an > overloaded status for my relay. However, the same relay shows a green status > on my phone. > Do you do any user-agent detection? > I'm still interested in those magic numbers, which det

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-09-27 Thread Georg Koppen
Toralf Förster: > On 9/25/21 4:11 PM, Silvia/Hiro wrote: >> If it happens again there are two buttons at the end of the page where >> you can see the latest server and extra-info descriptors. > Only, if the DirPort is (still) opened, or ? Yes, I think so. (Good catch) Georg OpenPGP_signature D

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-09-29 Thread Georg Koppen
David Goulet: [snip] > There are two other overload lines that tor relay report: > "overload-ratelimits" and "overload-fd-exhausted" but they are not used yet > for the overload status on Metrics. But you can find them in your relay > descriptor[0] if you are curious. Small correction here: thos

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-10-05 Thread Georg Koppen
Gary C. New via tor-relays: > > David Goulet: > > > > > Will you confirm whether the Advertised Bandwidth metric is also client > initiated (I'm assuming to the Directory Authority)? > > > > > I have a 250Mb pipe and have seen a maximum Advertised Bandwidth rate of > 4MB/s with my Tor re

Re: [tor-relays] A Simple Web of Trust for Tor Relay Operator IDs

2021-10-05 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: > Hi, > > I wrote down a spec for a simple web of trust > for relay operator IDs: > > https://gitlab.torproject.org/nusenu/torspec/-/blob/simple-wot-for-relay-operator-ids/proposals/ideas/xxx-simple-relay-operator-wot.md#a-simple-web-of-trust-for-tor-relay-operator-ids Thanks! You don't

[tor-relays] Relays running an unsupported (EOL) Tor version

2021-10-05 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1] but then we dropped

Re: [tor-relays] Unreachable DirPorts

2021-10-07 Thread Georg Koppen
Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays: > Hi to all relay operators! > > I run two Tor relays: > > 77D08850C1EE8587451F838D3F49874F75B0B1AC > 09A70E396DE93F54D4541BBB0EC8E2B23761F34F > > They both have DirPorts configured on port 80. I can connect to this port on > both hosts externally. However, Relay

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-10-07 Thread Georg Koppen
Bleedangel Tor Admin: > Can you link to where I can edit the torproject.org documentation? I cannot > find > this feature. This is nowadays tracked in our Gitlab instance.[1] Thus, you could fork the respective project and make a merge request. We'd be happy to review it and improve our document

Re: [tor-relays] A Simple Web of Trust for Tor Relay Operator IDs

2021-10-09 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: >> Thanks! You don't have an email-friendly version of that proposal by >> chance, which one could reply to inline? > > there is just the .md file. > > You can also comment inline on the md file on gitlab. > > Due to David's comment on tor-dev there is a merge request on gitlab: > https

Re: [tor-relays] Bridge showing offline

2021-10-14 Thread Georg Koppen
Eddie: > Looking at tor metrics, one of my bridges is showing as off-line: > B080140DC1BAB5B86D1CE5A4CA2EF64F20282440 > > However, the log isn't showing any issues: > > Oct 14 00:00:28.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.5.8 opening new log file. > Oct 14 00:00:28.000 [notice] Configured hibernation.  This inte

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-10-14 Thread Georg Koppen
Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays: >> Did you use a lot of ram or cpu power recently? I got flagged as overloaded >> when I was compiling something and used a lot of cpu. > > Nothing out of the ordinary. The server is a virtual machine which is > dedicated to running a Tor relay. I don't use it for

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-10-15 Thread Georg Koppen
Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays: >> The problem is that it’s *not* currently overloaded, there’s nothing to see. >> Maybe you can check your syslogs for anything out of the ordinary >> system-wide? > > I've checked dmesg. Nothing that stands out as being problematic. Even if > there was something

Re: [tor-relays] Loss of Guard and HS Dir flags

2021-10-18 Thread Georg Koppen
Eddie: > On 10/13/2021 11:29 PM, Eddie wrote: >> I currently run 3 relays, across different servers and today I noticed >> that one has now lost it's Guard and HS Dir flags.  What's surprising >> is that this particular relay has the highest Bandwidth and Consensus >> Weight of all 3 and has not be

Re: [tor-relays] Overloaded state indicator on relay-search

2021-10-19 Thread Georg Koppen
David Goulet: > On 17 Oct (13:54:22), Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays wrote: >> Hi, > > Hi Arlen! > >> >> I've done some further analysis on this. The reason my relay is being marked >> as overloaded is because of DNS timeout errors. I had to dive into the >> source code to figure this out. >> >> I

[tor-relays] Relay operator section in our forum

2021-10-27 Thread Georg Koppen
Hello! Some of you might already have seen that we have a shiny new forum now.[1] And, of course, there is a part of it dedicated to providing support for relay operators as well.[2] Check it out and feel free to contribute! Thanks, Georg [1] https://forum.torproject.net/ [2] https://forum.torpr

Re: [tor-relays] Relays running an unsupported (EOL) Tor version

2021-10-28 Thread Georg Koppen
Georg Koppen: > Hello! > > Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never > really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might > recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to > get operators, running an unsupport

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