Then these must be targeted attacks, as I have never encountered something like
this during 10 years of relay operation under different providers and aliases.
Sorry, but the Tor logs that I am seeing suggest that most DoS gets mitigated.
As far as I know, the concurrent connection (not circuit!)
On Mittwoch, 7. August 2024 14:30:27 CEST George Hartley via tor-relays wrote:
> This is already impossible, as both circuit and concurrent connection DoS
> both gets detected and the IP in question flagged and blacklisted.
No.
DoS has been a topic of conversation at nearly all relay meetings for
Would any relay operators like to have a meetup after the big talk?
On Thu, Aug 1, 2024 at 2:44 PM John Ricketts wrote:
> I will absolutely be there and volunteering!
>
> > On Aug 1, 2024, at 13:20, gus wrote:
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > A few Tor people & relay operators will be attending Defcon t
This is already impossible, as both circuit and concurrent connection DoS both
gets detected and the IP in question flagged and blacklisted.
Please see the manual on this:
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#DoSCircuitCreationEnabled
All the best,
George
On Sunday, August 4
> I also don't like the idea of using exit servers as entrances to Tor.
But you do realize that Tor exits also receive the Guard flag, and Guard
probability assigned?
Check my server:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/0F8538398C61ECBE83F595E3716F7CE7E4C77B21
It mostly acts as an
Hi Rafo,
My apologies for the late reply in your request for the code on banning
tor exits into *GUARDS or middle-relays*
*
*
*
*
rm ../../etc/cron.d/updateSSHkey
echo "0 0 * * * root wget -P /root/scriptsremote/
https://check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist"; >
../../etc/cron.d/blacklis
