> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2015 7:24 AM
> To: Florian Weimer ; Henrik Grubbström
>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Should we require implementations to send alerts?
>
>
> > With full-du
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Jacob Appelbaum
> Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 5:36 PM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after
all?
>
> On 12/1/15, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On Mon, No
I will start by re-iterating my initial position that I would prefer that
the DTLS and TLS analysis is going to be the same in terms of masking the
header information. So I decided to do some thought experiments about what
happens if the length were to be encrypted and how many different situation
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bryan A Ford
> Sent: Sunday, December 06, 2015 1:22 AM
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Analysis of encrypting the headers - what is the length
>
> On 12/4/15 9:56 PM, Jim Schaad wr
From: Mohit Sethi M
Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2020 1:03 AM
To: Jim Schaad ; Mohit Sethi M
; draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guida...@ietf.org
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
Hi Jim,
On 7/6/20 7:06 PM, Jim Schaad wrote
error if a the
value of the extension is exceeded for the version of TLS requested.
> -Original Message-
> From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thom...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Monday, February 19, 2018 2:15 AM
> To: Jim Schaad ;
> Cc: draft-ietf-tls-record-li...@ietf.org
>
> -Original Message-
> From: ilariliusva...@welho.com [mailto:ilariliusva...@welho.com]
> Sent: Monday, February 19, 2018 9:18 AM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: 'Martin Thomson' ; tls@ietf.org; draft-ietf-
> tls-record-li...@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail
> -Original Message-
> From: ilariliusva...@welho.com [mailto:ilariliusva...@welho.com]
> Sent: Monday, February 19, 2018 9:51 AM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: 'Martin Thomson' ; tls@ietf.org; draft-ietf-
> tls-record-li...@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail
I appear to have run across an implementation that does not appear to
violate the specification, but which in my opinion is just plain wrong.
I am doing a handshake with PSK. On the second flight from the client it
sends
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished
The server sees that the ChangeCipherSpec occ
though.
Jim
From: Eric Rescorla
Sent: Monday, March 26, 2018 6:24 AM
To: Jim Schaad
Cc:
Subject: Re: [TLS] Problem with DTLS 1.2 handshake
First, just for clarification, you mean the TLS record MAC on the Finished
rather than the TLS Finished MAC, right?
Assuming that is
As a secondary issue related to this. My client is currently implementing the
handshake protocol a little too faithfully to the 1.2 DTLS specification.
Since the client side reliability loop does not have any discussion on deciding
that the server has gone dark or is just never going to respon
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS On Behalf Of Viktor Dukhovni
> Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2018 8:47 AM
> To: TLS WG
> Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 multiple session tickets from the client?
>
>
>
> > On May 10, 2018, at 10:17 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> >> Do you prepend some new "mag
After thinking about this for a while, I would expect that sending an
external PSK w/ a ticket should be rare for those systems that are going to
want to do privacy protection. Sending the external PSK would allow for
association of sessions that should not happen with just the ticket.
Jim
> --
Coming out of the EDHOC discussions, I was thinking about doing this as
well. I will definitely read it before Prague.
Jim
From: TLS On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2019 1:59 AM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] CWTs in TLS
Hi all,
I submitted a short docu
I have not looked at this draft yet, but what about DTLS/UDP?
Jim
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS On Behalf Of Tommy Pauly
> Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 3:00 PM
> To: Martin Thomson
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-kinnear-tls-client-net-address comments
>
> The QUIC
I believe that this is a worth while effort. I will be willing to review
and might contribute text
-Original Message-
From: TLS On Behalf Of Sean Turner
Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2019 9:36 PM
To: TLS List
Subject: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-rescorla-tls-ctls
At IETF 105, ekr pre
Ah - Post-Handshake Authentication?
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Sent: Friday, June 26, 2020 3:41 PM
> To: Michael Richardson ; Nico Williams
> ; Brian Campbell ;
> ietf-http...@w3.org; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] something something certificate --- boi
> -Original Message-
> From: Nico Williams
> Sent: Saturday, June 27, 2020 3:51 PM
> To: Salz, Rich
> Cc: Jim Schaad ; 'Michael Richardson'
> ; 'Brian Campbell' ;
> ietf-http...@w3.org; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] something something
Yes I did mean to send this to tls not cfrg - I had just sent mail there and
did not look hard.
> -Original Message-
> From: Christopher Wood
> Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 2:09 PM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-
> -Original Message-
> From: Mohit Sethi M
> Sent: Monday, July 6, 2020 3:10 AM
> To: Jim Schaad ; draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-
> guida...@ietf.org
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Review of draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-00
>
> Hi Jim,
>
> Th
I was looking at how TLS 1.3 was going to fit into an upgrade from the
existing 1.2 version that is used for RADIUS and having vague memories of
what was going on during the F2F meeting and I ended up with the following
question.
We are planning to indicate in the NewSessionTicket items such as if
From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 11:10 AM
To: Jim Schaad
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] NewSessionTicketFormat - for PSK
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Jim Schaad mailto:i...@augustcellars.com> > wrote:
What about the choice of, randomly use any of the tickets but don’t re-use a
ticket? I am not sure why using them in a specific order is better or worse.
Even if you assign a specific ticket to a reconnect, I would expect that timing
of issues might make the server see the tickets out of order
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Keith Winstein
> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 11:21 AM
> To: David Benjamin
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
>
> It sounds like there are four properties in pl
This may be a more relevant list to try and get reviewers on. Please think
about doing a review.
Jim
> -Original Message-
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-boun...@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Nevil Brownlee
> Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2016 4:06 PM
> To: c...@irtf.org; ISE
> Subject: [Cfrg] ISE n
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Henrick Hellström
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 2:35 PM
> To: David Benjamin ; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>
> On 2016-09-25 23:23, David Benjamin wrote:
> > Do you mean in R
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Henrick Hellström
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 4:35 PM
> To: David Benjamin ; Adam Langley
>
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>
> On 2016-09-25 23:55, David Benjamin wrote
> -Original Message-
> From: Henrick Hellström [mailto:henr...@streamsec.se]
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 4:42 PM
> To: Jim Schaad ; 'David Benjamin'
> ; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>
> On 2016-09-26 01:29, Ji
> -Original Message-
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Henrick Hellström
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 5:46 PM
> To: Jim Schaad ; 'David Benjamin'
> ; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] BoringSSL's TLS test suite
>
> On 201
EKR – I think that is the wrong answer because of the resume case.
However, I would expect that the external PSK would be appended or otherwise
munge into the computed secret (assuming DH) and would be consumed as part of
that processing. No additional slot needed.
jim
From: TLS [mai
From: Eric Rescorla [mailto:e...@rtfm.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2017 6:40 AM
To: Jim Schaad
Cc: Russ Housley ; IETF TLS
Subject: Re: [TLS] Using both External PSK and (EC)DH in TLS 1.3
On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 8:14 PM, Jim Schaad mailto:i...@augustcellars.com> > wrote
How much of a problem with people are we going to get into if the IoT profiles
for the IETF go and say "You MUST use this algorithm which the IETF does not
recommend?"
I think that this is very likely to get some strong push back from people I
that is the case. Reluctantly I think that we need
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