[TLS] -03 update to draft-beck-tls-trust-anchor-ids

2024-12-18 Thread Devon O'Brien
We have cut a new -03 version of the Trust Anchor Identifiers draft: URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-beck-tls-trust-anchor-ids-03.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-beck-tls-trust-anchor-ids/ HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-beck-tls-trust-anchor-ids-03.ht

[TLS] Re: PQ Cipher Suite I-Ds: adopt or not?

2024-12-18 Thread Alicja Kario
On Monday, 16 December 2024 22:59:50 CET, Sean Turner wrote: Ask: Is the WG consensus to run four separate adoption calls for the individual I-Ds in question? I'm FOR adoption of all of the four mentioned drafts. I don't have a strong opinion if they should be considered separately or not.

[TLS] Re: PQ Cipher Suite I-Ds: adopt or not?

2024-12-18 Thread Bas Westerbaan
> > (C) within the PQ part, providing alternatives that are less likely > to fail in the first place.` > I think there is some more to say about what would make a good alternative KEM. Let's consider Saber. There are differences between ML-KEM and Saber. A simple implementation of Sab

[TLS] Re: PQ Cipher Suite I-Ds: adopt or not?

2024-12-18 Thread Bas Westerbaan
> I think that if we pursue an alternative structured lattice KEM, it should > bring at least another advantage to the table. From a performance > perspective BAT ( https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/031 ) improves > considerably over ML-KEM in certain use cases: its ciphertexts and public > keys are sma