Re: [TLS] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Keith Moore
While I agree that TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 should be avoided as much as possible, I believe this document fails to consider that there are old systems that are still in use that cannot be upgraded.   Strict implementation of the MUST NOT rules in this document can even prevent those systems from be

Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Eric Rescorla
Keith, Thanks for your note. Most of the general points you raise here were discussed when the TLS WG decided to move forward with this draft [0], though perhaps some of that is not reflected in the text. Of course that doesn't make this points invalid, so I'll try to summarize my view of the rati

Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Keith Moore
On 11/27/20 9:53 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: Keith, Thanks for your note. Most of the general points you raise here were discussed when the TLS WG decided to move forward with this draft [0], though perhaps some of that is not reflected in the text. Of course that doesn't make this points invali

[TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests-06

2020-11-27 Thread Dale Worley via Datatracker
Reviewer: Dale Worley Review result: Ready I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments. For more information

Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Eric Rescorla
Hi Keith, Thanks for your note. I think it's clear we see things differently, and I don't think it's that useful to get into an extended back and forth on those points. Accordingly I've done a fair bit of trimming to focus on the points where I think you may have misunderstood me (perhaps due to u

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Gary Gapinski
Looking at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-09 §2: §2 ¶5 has «TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]…». §2 ¶4 has «TLSv1.2, specified in RFC5246 [RFC5246]…» §2 ¶3 has «TLS 1.1, specified in [RFC4346]…» Were these

Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Keith Moore
On 11/27/20 11:30 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: Well, I can't speak to how it sounds to you, but it's not a marketing argument but rather a security one. This is easiest to understand in the context of the Web, where you have a reference that contains one bit: http versus https,and all https content

Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Eric Rescorla
Well, I think our respective positions are clear, so I'll just limit myself to one point. On Fri, Nov 27, 2020 at 8:43 PM Keith Moore wrote: > > > > > > > > I'm not sure what clients you're talking about, but for the clients > > > > I am aware of, this would be somewhere between a broken experie

Re: [TLS] [Last-Call] Last Call: (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

2020-11-27 Thread Keith Moore
On 11/27/20 11:58 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: To clarify, my suggestion was that https with TLS < 1.2 be treated as insecure, not as neither secure nor insecure or any kind of "in between". Well, the problem is that it is secure from the perspective of the site author but insecure fr