Issues
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* tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+3/-2/💬28)
3 issues created:
- Tidy up all codepoints before -08 (by chris-wood)
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/322
- legacy_session_id should match between inner and outer (by davidben)
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-iet
Hi Ben,
any progress on the cid-length / calculate MAC topic?
As I wrote, though the cid-length itself is not "on the wire" (it's only
the cid), I can't see, that the cid-length could be injected.
Do I oversee soemthing?
best regrads
Achim Kraus
Weitergeleitete Nachricht
Betr
BTW, if anybody is hoping I'll update my test server
to support TLS 1.3, I am not going to be doing that.
Version 1.3 is broken and I don't think anybody should
use it.
Mike
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Hi,
I'm pretty sure TLS 1.3 is completely broken. Can we
please stop deprecating things that TLS 1.2 uses and
make them all Recommended again?
Mike
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Mike,
The server receives a ClientHello from a prospective client. In the case of
DTLS and QUIC, this path has not yet been validated, so the server may want
to verify the remote address prior to continuing the handshake. This is
incredibly important as generating key_shares and signing the transc
Mike,
I suggest you make sure you understand the analyses (plural) that have been
done. You are very far in the minority here. Even some folks who say "we don't
need these features," but nobody else has said "this is not secure."
This is not to say that the RFC could not be improved, and gain
