Good afternoon all,
The RFC 8446 mentions key schedule, resumption_master_secret and new session
ticket and I am not quite sure if I understand the session resumption
behavior correctly.
My understanding is that both the client and server calculate all the
secrets of the key schedule theref
On Sun, May 05, 2019 at 01:11:27PM +0200, geyer.lu...@gmail.com wrote:
> Good afternoon all,
>
>
> The RFC 8446 mentions key schedule, resumption_master_secret and new session
> ticket and I am not quite sure if I understand the session resumption
> behavior correctly.
>
>
> My understanding is
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8448,
"Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3".
--
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5720
--
Type: Technical
Reported by: Martin Th
Thanks for noticing that Tobias. I've opened an erratum, but am still waiting
for the RFC editor's email confirming it. I'll pass that along when that comes
through.
(This is the result of a bug in NSS, so in case you are interested:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1549225)
On S
I guess we want Hold For Document Update?
-Ben
On Sun, May 05, 2019 at 03:36:20PM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8448,
> "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3".
>
> --
> You may review the report below a
Ilari answered your question, but this jumped out:
On Sun, May 5, 2019, at 21:11, geyer.lu...@gmail.com wrote:
> [...] both sides calculate,
> PSK = [...]
> and the server sends back to the client the PSK (unencrypted [...])
The PSK never gets sent. As you say, both sides can calculate the s
That would work for me.
On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:12 AM Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>
> I guess we want Hold For Document Update?
>
> -Ben
>
> On Sun, May 05, 2019 at 03:36:20PM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8448,
> > "Example Handshake Traces
On Sat, May 4, 2019, at 23:01, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> WG decision is appreciated on this point and proposed text for RFC 7525.
>
> Proposed: When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using
> certificates with
>at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. In addition, the use
>
