That would work for me. On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:12 AM Benjamin Kaduk <[email protected]> wrote: > > I guess we want Hold For Document Update? > > -Ben > > On Sun, May 05, 2019 at 03:36:20PM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote: > > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8448, > > "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3". > > > > -------------------------------------- > > You may review the report below and at: > > http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5720 > > > > -------------------------------------- > > Type: Technical > > Reported by: Martin Thomson <[email protected]> > > > > Section: GLOBAL > > > > Original Text > > ------------- > > 00 0d 00 20 00 1e 04 03 05 03 06 03 02 03 08 04 08 05 > > 08 06 04 01 05 01 06 01 02 01 04 02 05 02 06 02 02 02 > > > > > > > > Corrected Text > > -------------- > > 00 0d 00 18 00 16 04 03 05 03 06 03 02 03 08 04 08 05 > > 08 06 04 01 05 01 06 01 02 01 > > > > Notes > > ----- > > The traces all show DSA signature schemes in ClientHello messages. The use > > of these is prohibited by RFC 8446. To be compliant, these would be > > removed. > > > > Note that this isn't a simple substitution as implied above. The length > > fields on all of the messages would also need to be reduced by 8 in > > addition to making the substitution. The value of the PSK binders used in > > the resumption case in Section 4 would need to be recalculated also. > > > > Instructions: > > ------------- > > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please > > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or > > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party > > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. > > > > -------------------------------------- > > RFC8448 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-07) > > -------------------------------------- > > Title : Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3 > > Publication Date : January 2019 > > Author(s) : M. Thomson > > Category : INFORMATIONAL > > Source : Transport Layer Security > > Area : Security > > Stream : IETF > > Verifying Party : IESG
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