[TLS] Support of integrity only cipher suites in TLS 1.3

2017-04-03 Thread Fries, Steffen
Hi all, by reviewing the current TLS 1.3 draft I saw that already in version -02 the support for integrity only cipher suites has been removed in favor of AEAD cipher suites. Was there a specific reason to only support the encrypted cipher suites? The reason I'm asking is that in industrial co

Re: [TLS] Remove deprecated fields in TLS 1.3

2017-04-03 Thread Eric Rescorla
I agree with David. This seems like a low value change On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 9:36 AM, David Benjamin wrote: > On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 12:29 AM Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > >> On 04/02/2017 03:33 AM, Arnaud Venturi wrote: >> >> I could not think of any security or interoperability issue with this >>

Re: [TLS] [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04.txt

2017-04-03 Thread David Schinazi
Thanks for the update! I've reviewed -04 and I think the draft is ready to move forward. Regards, David Schinazi > On Mar 28, 2017, at 15:43, Daniel Migault wrote: > > Hi, > > Thank you Jim for the update. Here is the version resulting from the > discussion we had during the WG meeting yes

Re: [TLS] Support of integrity only cipher suites in TLS 1.3

2017-04-03 Thread Harlan Lieberman-Berg
"Fries, Steffen" writes: > The reason I'm asking is that in industrial communication it is often > sufficient to have source authentication and message integrity while > probes on the network are still able to monitor the traffic for > certain properties or verify allowed exchanges. Hello Steffen