"Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fr...@siemens.com> writes: > The reason I'm asking is that in industrial communication it is often > sufficient to have source authentication and message integrity while > probes on the network are still able to monitor the traffic for > certain properties or verify allowed exchanges.
Hello Steffen, We've had a couple of discussions about this on the mailing list before. (See especially the "Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3" email thread starting with dm5pr11mb1419b782d2bef0e0a35e420df4...@dm5pr11mb1419.namprd11.prod.outlook.com). At this point, I don't think there's much of an appetite to be adding support for null-encryption cipher suites into TLS 1.3. In a quick summary of the 100+ message thread, the impression I got from the conversation was that the WG feels there's too much foot-gun potential from null cipher suites and that the risk was too high and the concerns brought up too late. Sincerely, -- Harlan Lieberman-Berg ~hlieberman _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
