Re: [TLS] Does the ServerHello really need unencrypted extensions at all?

2015-07-20 Thread Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
On Sat, 2015-07-18 at 21:22 -0400, Dave Garrett wrote: > There's two issues (basically duplicates) for this topic, as well as > an inline TODO. > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/66 > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/72 > https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/#server-hello > > Th

[TLS] crypto computations & lifetimes clarifications (was: TLS 1.3 - method to request uncached shared secrets)

2015-07-20 Thread Dave Garrett
On Monday, July 20, 2015 12:27:42 am Eric Rescorla wrote: > I think perhaps you have misunderstood the forward secrecy properties of the > current draft. Unlike TLS 1.2 and previous, the current draft has a separate > resumption master secret which is independently derived from the master > secret

Re: [TLS] crypto computations & lifetimes clarifications (was: TLS 1.3 - method to request uncached shared secrets)

2015-07-20 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Dave Garrett wrote: > On Monday, July 20, 2015 12:27:42 am Eric Rescorla wrote: > > I think perhaps you have misunderstood the forward secrecy properties of > the > > current draft. Unlike TLS 1.2 and previous, the current draft has a > separate > > resumption mas

Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01.txt

2015-07-20 Thread Hubert Kario
On Tuesday 14 July 2015 17:23:44 Simon Josefsson wrote: > Hubert Kario writes: > > On Sunday 12 July 2015 16:39:37 Simon Josefsson wrote: > >> Hubert Kario writes: > >> > As is described in secion 5.1. of RFC 4492, and then reiterated in > >> > section 2.2. of this draft - the elliptic_curves (a.

Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01.txt

2015-07-20 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 12:55:37PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Tuesday 14 July 2015 17:23:44 Simon Josefsson wrote: > > > > Compare how we "reuse" the ECDHE ciphersuite values to refer to > > Curve25519 (instead of defining new ciphersuites for Curve25519), and > > how we are "reusing" the "unc

Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01.txt

2015-07-20 Thread Hubert Kario
On Monday 20 July 2015 14:39:03 Ilari Liusvaara wrote: > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 12:55:37PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote: > > On Tuesday 14 July 2015 17:23:44 Simon Josefsson wrote: > > > Compare how we "reuse" the ECDHE ciphersuite values to refer to > > > Curve25519 (instead of defining new ciphersu

Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP

2015-07-20 Thread Schmidt , Jörn-Marc
>> TLS-pwd already supports both of these. It also supports ECC too, >> which is problematic with the current SRP protocol. >In the language of the CFRG draft, TLS-pwd is “balanced” where SRP is “augmented”, >so they’re not really equivalent, correct? Correct. >This is possible, but you’d need

Re: [TLS] New cipher suites for SRP

2015-07-20 Thread Jeffrey Walton
>>This is possible, but you’d need to have the client and server negotiate > based on >>what they have. For example, if the server has a SRP verifier from the > current >>protocol, but the client has a stored PBKDF2 hash of the password for that > server, >>they cannot communicate and would need t

Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01.txt

2015-07-20 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 01:42:01PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Monday 20 July 2015 14:39:03 Ilari Liusvaara wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 12:55:37PM +0200, Hubert Kario wrote: > > > > There are other shortcomings tho: > > - If Ed25519 is supported, one also needs to support Curve25519. >

Re: [TLS] sect571r1

2015-07-20 Thread Hubert Kario
On Wednesday 15 July 2015 22:42:54 Dave Garrett wrote: > On Wednesday, July 15, 2015 09:42:51 pm Dan Brown wrote: > > What about sect571k1, a Koblitz curve, aka NIST curve K-571? (By the way > > it has no unexplained constants...). Has it been removed already, or does > > the question also refer K-

[TLS] Commentary on the client authentication presentation slides

2015-07-20 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
Some commentary on client authentication slides (there is no linked draft nor other material yet). - Mechanism like proposed looks dangerous when combined with HTTP/2. Multiplexed protocols are in general not safe to authenticate without application-layer signaling (which can be implicit via s

Re: [TLS] crypto computations & lifetimes clarifications (was: TLS 1.3 - method to request uncached shared secrets)

2015-07-20 Thread Hugo Krawczyk
​​ On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 12:10 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Dave Garrett > wrote: > >> On Monday, July 20, 2015 12:27:42 am Eric Rescorla wrote: >> > I think perhaps you have misunderstood the forward secrecy properties >> of the >> > current draft. Unlike

Re: [TLS] crypto computations & lifetimes clarifications (was: TLS 1.3 - method to request uncached shared secrets)

2015-07-20 Thread Dave Garrett
On Monday, July 20, 2015 01:31:15 pm Hugo Krawczyk wrote: > Your question boils down to: Why is finished_secret derived from SS only > and not from ES? > > First note that the issue only arises in the known_configuration case since > in other cases ES and SS are the same. > For the known_configura

Re: [TLS] New version of draft-lonc-tls-certieee1609-01.txt

2015-07-20 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Thu 2015-07-09 15:43:16 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > This draft uses the rfc6091 cert_type extension. If that is not > intentional, rfc6091 was made obsolete by rfc7250 which uses the > server_certificate_type and client_certificate_type extensions (even > though the text doesn't men