[ Not replying for Paul, I'm sure he he'll post views separately ]
> On Mar 3, 2018, at 10:21 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> Paul, can you walk me through the security value of a proof of nonexistence
> here? Perhaps describe an attack that it stops.
My take is:
Non-existence proofs can clear a
Hi folks,
This is way outside the range of my DISCUSS, so maybe we should change the
thread title.
Paul, can you walk me through the security value of a proof of nonexistence
here? Perhaps describe an attack that it stops.
-Ekr
On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 7:09 PM, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Thu, 1
On Thu, 1 Mar 2018, Shumon Huque wrote:
I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the muchÂ
more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL commitment
and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed).
I think it is worth discus
Hi all,
In an off-list discussion on the wire format for DTLS CID Eric raised
the point that a DTLSShortCiphertext header is completely stuffed, and
it'd be impossible to grab another bit from the sequence number (already
down to 12 bits) to signal the presence of a CID.
I made a proposal for a s
