Ok. Will add it as part of next update.
> On Jan 31, 2024, at 5:38 PM, Rahman wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> My only comment is we should be explicit about the action taken when we
> detect that the session has been compromised (no F received).
>
> Regards,
> Reshad.
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>> On Jan
Hi,My only comment is we should be explicit about the action taken when we detect that the session has been compromised (no F received).Regards,Reshad.Sent from my iPhoneOn Jan 31, 2024, at 11:06 AM, Jeffrey Haas wrote:Reshad,On Jan 30, 2024, at 12:28 AM, Rahman wrote:Jeff, goo
Reshad,
> On Jan 30, 2024, at 12:28 AM, Rahman wrote:
>
> Jeff, good catch.
>
> We can document both ways, ie we can let implementations decide which of the
> 2 methods below they prefer? Or is the concern that this will cause a DISCUSS?
Mahesh has proposed the fix for the next rev in this pu
On Jan 28, 2024, at 3:21 PM, Jeffrey Haas wrote:
> There's at least two possible ways to address this:
> 1. We simply don't worry about periodic re-auth for no-auth or NULL-auth.
> We thus don't protect against this attack. If you care about this attack,
> use Meticulous Keyed ISAAC and the attac
Jeff, good catch.
We can document both ways, ie we can let implementations decide which of the 2
methods below they prefer? Or is the concern that this will cause a DISCUSS?
Regards,
Reshad.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Jan 28, 2024, at 12:21 PM, Jeffrey Haas wrote:
>
> Optimizing Auth Authors