AW: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Joachim Lindenberg
Hello Bill, you could as well just turn off encryption. If you don´t care to whom you disclose information, why not allow anyone to read it? Are you also not using a trusted certificate or even no certificate for your public web site? Seriously, I know this is discussion 10+ years. Is it better t

AW: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Joachim Lindenberg
Hello Victor, thanks for the insights. Based on my experience, the mail domain is almost never in the SANs of a certificate, not even with self-hosted domains like mine. In other words, secure is likely to cause a lot more manual configuration than verify. I´d definitely appreciate if mail.cloud

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On 10 Jan 2022, at 10:07 pm, Joachim Lindenberg > wrote: > > thanks for the insights. Based on my experience, the mail domain is almost > never in the SANs of a certificate, not even with self-hosted domains like > mine. In other words, secure is likely to cause a lot more manual > configur

Default TLS protocols

2022-01-10 Thread Kveta Kladov
RFC 8996 deprecated TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 . Would you consider to update default values for smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols smtp_tls_protocols, smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols smtpd_tls_protocols so that TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are disabled by default ?

AW: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Joachim Lindenberg
Hello Viktor, all, as I wrote in another mail: ... Email authentication requires two steps... * DNSSEC * trustworthy certificates (either trusted root or DANE) and validation .. unless we want to resort to manually configuring trust (obviously entries in /etc/hosts are less likely to be manipulat

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Jaroslaw Rafa
Dnia 10.01.2022 o godz. 09:35:49 Joachim Lindenberg pisze: > Are you also not using a trusted certificate or even no certificate for > your public web site? Did you notice the recent thread on this list about http://www.postfix.org website (NOT https) where Viktor and others explained why there is

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Jaroslaw Rafa
Dnia 10.01.2022 o godz. 12:54:46 Joachim Lindenberg pisze: > Maybe some background (all summarization errors and judgments mine): > German data protection authorities level define kind of four compliance > levels for email encryption > 0 - no encryption and thus definitely illegal > 1 - encryption

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 09:35:49AM +0100, Joachim Lindenberg wrote: > You could as well just turn off encryption. If you don´t care to whom > you disclose information, why not allow anyone to read it? https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7435 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 12:54:46PM +0100, Joachim Lindenberg wrote: > German data protection authorities level define kind of four > compliance levels for email encryption > > 0 - no encryption and thus definitely illegal > 1 - encryption (not clearly specified whether certs need to be validated)

Re: Default TLS protocols

2022-01-10 Thread Matus UHLAR - fantomas
On 10.01.22 12:50, Kveta Kladov wrote: RFC 8996 deprecated TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 . Would you consider to update default values for smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols smtp_tls_protocols, smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols smtpd_tls_protocols so that TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are disabled by default ? for mandat

Re: Default TLS protocols

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 12:50:49PM +0100, Kveta Kladov wrote: > RFC 8996 deprecated TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 . > > Would you consider to update default values for > > smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols > smtp_tls_protocols, > smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols > smtpd_tls_protocols > > so that TLS 1.0 and TLS

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Łukasz Wąsikowski
W dniu 2022-01-10 o 13:02, Jaroslaw Rafa pisze: There are many sites like this, that contain only publicly available information. No login, no purchases, no personal data collected. What is the benefit of using HTTTPS in that case? (Except of protecting you from possible spying, but what will

Re: Re: Default TLS protocols

2022-01-10 Thread Kveta Kladov
> RFC 8996 deprecated TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 . > > Would you consider to update default values for > > smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols > smtp_tls_protocols, > smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols > smtpd_tls_protocols > > so that TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are disabled by default ? There's no clear ben

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Jaroslaw Rafa
Dnia 10.01.2022 o godz. 13:44:56 Łukasz Wąsikowski pisze: > > I can think of many cases where information about which site you are > visiting is important, even if there is nothing private on those > sites. > > Do you want your ISP to sell your health insurance company > information that you are

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Wietse Venema
?ukasz W?sikowski: > > W dniu 2022-01-10 o?13:02, Jaroslaw Rafa pisze: > > > There are many sites like this, that contain only publicly available > > information. No login, no purchases, no personal data collected. What is the > > benefit of using HTTTPS in that case? (Except of protecting you fr

Re: Default TLS protocols

2022-01-10 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
On 1/10/22 07:23, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 12:50:49PM +0100, Kveta Kladov wrote: > >> RFC 8996 deprecated TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 . >> >> Would you consider to update default values for >> >> smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols >> smtp_tls_protocols, >> smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols

TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread Alex
Hi, I have a postfix-3.5.10 system and having a little trouble configuring it to ensure I'm not including any vulnerable ciphers. I had previously posted about this issue in September, and thought I followed the instructions I was given, but a recent security scan (onsecurity) shows port 25 is sti

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread Alex
Hi, here is some follow-up info I received that provides more details on what the vulnerability scan is reporting: Testing cipher categories NULL ciphers (no encryption) not offered (OK) Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication)offered (NOT ok) Export ciphers (w/o A

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread David Bürgin
This question is answered regularly on this list. http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#server_cipher > By default anonymous ciphers are enabled. … One can't force a remote > SMTP client to check the server certificate, so excluding anonymous > ciphers is generally unnecessary.

multi instance and always_bcc

2022-01-10 Thread Zsombor B
Hi, We'd like to debug some emails sent through a multi instance withouth having any impact on the mail flow so I have added always_bcc=de...@whatever.com to the main.cf of that instance and reloaded it. But instead of sending copies of the emails to the debug address, postfix relays both

Re: multi instance and always_bcc

2022-01-10 Thread Dominic Raferd
My understanding is that always_bcc does not work: - if receive_override_options includes no_address_mappings; or - after Postfix has forwarded mail internally; or - for mails generated by Postfix itself On 10/01/2022 16:28, Zsombor B wrote: We'd like to debug some emails sent through a multi in

Re: multi instance and always_bcc

2022-01-10 Thread Wietse Venema
Zsombor B: > Hi, > > > > We'd like to debug some emails sent through a multi instance withouth > having any impact on the mail flow so I have added > always_bcc=de...@whatever.com to the main.cf of that instance and > reloaded it. > > But instead of sending copies of the emails to the debug

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread Bill Cole
On 2022-01-10 at 11:08:49 UTC-0500 (Mon, 10 Jan 2022 11:08:49 -0500) Alex is rumored to have said: Hi, I have a postfix-3.5.10 system and having a little trouble configuring it to ensure I'm not including any vulnerable ciphers. I had previously posted about this issue in September, and though

[OT] "private" emails aliases

2022-01-10 Thread @lbutlr
Is there an existing system out there that integrates with postfix that makes it simple for a user to add 'private' email addresses that are aliased to their real email and also to then bitbucket the email? What I am thinking about is something where a user can request a new alias and get back

Re: [OT] "private" emails aliases

2022-01-10 Thread Benny Pedersen
On 2022-01-10 18:25, @lbutlr wrote: I can think of some (messy) ways to do this, but before I start cobbling something together, I am hoping this is something someone has already done. why external ? in main.cf: mydestination = localhost virtual_alias = hash:/path/to/virtual_alias in virtua

Re: [OT] "private" emails aliases

2022-01-10 Thread Damian
I can think of some (messy) ways to do this, but before I start cobbling something together, I am hoping this is something someone has already done. Are you asking for software or ideas?

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Fred Morris
Hello, You utilized HTTP as an example on a mailing list concerned with SMTP, we'll see how that goes below. On Mon, 10 Jan 2022, Jaroslaw Rafa wrote: [...] There are many sites like this, that contain only publicly available information. No login, no purchases, no personal data collected. Wh

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
On 1/10/22 07:02, Jaroslaw Rafa wrote: > Dnia 10.01.2022 o godz. 09:35:49 Joachim Lindenberg pisze: >> Are you also not using a trusted certificate or even no certificate for >> your public web site? > > Did you notice the recent thread on this list about http://www.postfix.org > website (NOT http

All links are broken for postfix-3.7-20220103

2022-01-10 Thread Pavel Yakovlev
Hello http://ftp.porcupine.org/mirrors/postfix-release/index.html All links are broken (404) for postfix-3.7-20220103 And this happens constantly once every 2-3 months for the experimental release. -- Pavel

Re: All links are broken for postfix-3.7-20220103

2022-01-10 Thread Wietse Venema
Pavel Yakovlev: > Hello > > http://ftp.porcupine.org/mirrors/postfix-release/index.html > > All links are broken (404) for postfix-3.7-20220103 > > And this happens constantly once every 2-3 months for the experimental > release. Updated. Wietse

Re: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Łukasz Wąsikowski
W dniu 2022-01-10 o 15:33, Wietse Venema pisze: There are many sites like this, that contain only publicly available information. No login, no purchases, no personal data collected. What is the benefit of using HTTTPS in that case? (Except of protecting you from possible spying, but what will b

AW: TLS enforcement options?

2022-01-10 Thread Joachim Lindenberg
>So you're looking for DANE or else "verify" conditional on DNSSEC, that's not >a feature of Postfix, and many DNSSEC-signed domains have neither DANE, nor >certificates that verify. >Will you be making manual exceptions for them all? Yes, many happen to have >MX host with working WebPKI cert

Re: multi instance and always_bcc

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On 11 Jan 2022, at 3:43 am, Wietse Venema wrote: > > Recipients added with always_bcc, xxx_bcc_maps, etc., are treated > just like any other recipients. All recipients are subject to > content_filter, relayhost, etc. Fortunately, they're also subject to transport table lookups, so it is fairly

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 11:17:12AM -0500, Alex wrote: > > NULL ciphers (no encryption) not offered (OK) > Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication)offered (NOT ok) In addition to the text in TLS_README, see: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7672#section

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread PGNet Dev
for those following along, I find this a useful, summary reference Hands-on: implementing DANE in PostfixCryptographic security for mail transport https://www.sidn.nl/en/news-and-blogs/hands-on-implementing-dane-in-postfix

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread Alex
Hi, > > I have a postfix-3.5.10 system and having a little trouble configuring > > it to ensure I'm not including any vulnerable ciphers. I had > > previously posted about this issue in September, and thought I > > followed the instructions I was given, but a recent security scan > > (onsecurity)

Received-SPF: Softfail

2022-01-10 Thread Fourhundred Thecat
Hello, is it safe to ban senders that generate SPF Softfail ? policyd-spf: prepend Received-SPF: Softfail I have pasted full header here: https://ctxt.io/2/AABg5vIYEw What I am asking is, are there situations where legitimate sender (non-spam) would generate soft fail?

Re: Received-SPF: Softfail

2022-01-10 Thread Scott Kitterman
On Monday, January 10, 2022 11:00:43 PM EST Fourhundred Thecat wrote: > Hello, > > is it safe to ban senders that generate SPF Softfail ? > >policyd-spf: prepend Received-SPF: Softfail > > I have pasted full header here: https://ctxt.io/2/AABg5vIYEw > > What I am asking is, are there situat

After smtp authentication failed, is it possible to accecpt and send the email as anonymous?

2022-01-10 Thread JWD
Hi,all After smtp authentication failed, is it possible to accecpt and send the email as anonymous? JWD

Re: After smtp authentication failed, is it possible to accecpt and send the email as anonymous?

2022-01-10 Thread Ralph Seichter
* JWD: > After smtp authentication failed, is it possible to accecpt and send > the email as anonymous? Can you provide more details on what you are trying to achieve? Generally speaking, you can use permit_mynetworks in your smtpd restrictions to exempt local clients from SMTP authentication. H

Re: Received-SPF: Softfail

2022-01-10 Thread Fourhundred Thecat
> On 2022-01-11 05:00, Fourhundred Thecat wrote: Hello, is it safe to ban senders that generate SPF Softfail ?   policyd-spf: prepend Received-SPF: Softfail I have pasted full header here: https://ctxt.io/2/AABg5vIYEw What I am asking is, are there situations where legitimate sender (non-spa

Re: TLS ciphers

2022-01-10 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 07:15:46PM -0500, Alex wrote: > > The vulnerabilities I am aware of that justify sticking to v1.2/3 in > > web, IMAP, and database servers are not viable against SMTP because of > > the brief, non-repetitive, and largely unpredictable nature of the TLS > > sessions used by

Re: Re: After smtp authentication failed, is it possible to accecpt and send the email as anonymous?

2022-01-10 Thread JWD
There is a website, which sending email use smtp authentication only, can not use anonymous. Postfix is a mail gateway, and I don't want install a smtp authentication backend. Will permit_mynetworks parameter ignore smtp authentication, and accept the email? JWD From: Ralph Seichter Date:

Re: Received-SPF: Softfail

2022-01-10 Thread Benny Pedersen
On 2022-01-11 07:55, Fourhundred Thecat wrote: sorry, the previous link expired. Here is the header again: https://ctxt.io/2/AABgetU0Fw www-data@ co.uk amazon.ch good point its softfailed what would one do on reply

Re: After smtp authentication failed, is it possible to accecpt and send the email as anonymous?

2022-01-10 Thread Benny Pedersen
On 2022-01-11 08:21, JWD wrote: There is a website, which sending email use smtp authentication only, can not use anonymous. Postfix is a mail gateway, and I don't want install a smtp authentication backend. Will permit_mynetworks parameter ignore smtp authentication, and accept the email? log