On Thu, Jun 15, 2023 at 11:18 PM Alvaro Herrera wrote:
>
> On 2023-Jun-13, Amit Kapila wrote:
>
> > I'll push this tomorrow unless there are any suggestions or comments.
>
> Note the proposed commit message is wrong about which commit is to blame
> for the original problem -- it mentions e7e7da2f8
On 2023-Jun-13, Amit Kapila wrote:
> I'll push this tomorrow unless there are any suggestions or comments.
Note the proposed commit message is wrong about which commit is to blame
for the original problem -- it mentions e7e7da2f8d57 twice, but one of
them is actually c3afe8cf5a1e.
--
Álvaro Her
On Wednesday, June 14, 2023 10:11 AM Amit Kapila
wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2023 at 2:25 PM Amit Kapila wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 3:28 PM Zhijie Hou (Fujitsu)
> > wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > I can reproduce this via gdb following similar steps in [1].
> > >
> > > I think we need to m
On Tue, Jun 13, 2023 at 2:25 PM Amit Kapila wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 3:28 PM Zhijie Hou (Fujitsu)
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I can reproduce this via gdb following similar steps in [1].
> >
> > I think we need to move this call into a transaction as well and here is an
> > attempt
> > to do
On Tue, Jun 13, 2023 at 2:25 PM Amit Kapila wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 3:28 PM Zhijie Hou (Fujitsu)
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I can reproduce this via gdb following similar steps in [1].
> >
> > I think we need to move this call into a transaction as well and here is an
> > attempt
> > to do
On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 3:28 PM Zhijie Hou (Fujitsu)
wrote:
>
>
> I can reproduce this via gdb following similar steps in [1].
>
> I think we need to move this call into a transaction as well and here is an
> attempt
> to do that.
>
I am able to reproduce this issue following the steps mentioned
On Tuesday, April 4, 2023 1:57 AM Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 1, 2023 at 12:00 PM Alexander Lakhin
> wrote:
> > I've managed to reproduce it using the following script:
> > for ((i=1;i<=10;i++)); do
> > echo "iteration $i"
> > echo "
> > CREATE ROLE sub_user;
> > CREATE SUBSCRIPTION tests
On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 6:21 PM Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 8:19 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> > LGTM. Let's see if Robert or others have any comments, otherwise, I'll
> > push this early next week.
>
> LGTM too.
>
Pushed.
--
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 8:19 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> LGTM. Let's see if Robert or others have any comments, otherwise, I'll
> push this early next week.
LGTM too.
--
Robert Haas
EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 12:30 PM vignesh C wrote:
>
> On Fri, 21 Apr 2023 at 01:49, Robert Haas wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 1:08 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> > > Pushed. I noticed that we didn't display this new subscription option
> > > 'password_required' in \dRs+:
> > >
> > > postgres=#
On Fri, 21 Apr 2023 at 01:49, Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 1:08 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> > Pushed. I noticed that we didn't display this new subscription option
> > 'password_required' in \dRs+:
> >
> > postgres=# \dRs+
> >
> > List of subscriptions
> > Name | Owner | E
On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 1:08 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> Pushed. I noticed that we didn't display this new subscription option
> 'password_required' in \dRs+:
>
> postgres=# \dRs+
>
> List of subscriptions
> Name | Owner | Enabled | Publication | Binary | Streaming |
> Two-phase commit | Dis
On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 8:02 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 5:50 PM Robert Haas wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 10:56 PM Amit Kapila
> > wrote:
> > > Anyway, I don't think as such there is any problem
> > > with restarting the worker even when the subscription owner is
On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 5:50 PM Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 10:56 PM Amit Kapila wrote:
> > Anyway, I don't think as such there is any problem
> > with restarting the worker even when the subscription owner is a
> > superuser, so adjusted the check accordingly.
>
> LGTM.
>
Tha
On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 10:56 PM Amit Kapila wrote:
> Anyway, I don't think as such there is any problem
> with restarting the worker even when the subscription owner is a
> superuser, so adjusted the check accordingly.
LGTM. I realize we could do more sophisticated things here, but I
think it's
On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 8:21 PM Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 5:53 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> > I think additionally, we should check that the new owner of the
> > subscription is not a superuser, otherwise, anyway, this parameter is
> > ignored. Please find the attached to add this
On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 5:53 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> I think additionally, we should check that the new owner of the
> subscription is not a superuser, otherwise, anyway, this parameter is
> ignored. Please find the attached to add this check.
I don't see why we should check that. It makes this d
On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 9:15 PM Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 1:35 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> > Do we need to have a check for this new option "password_required" in
> > maybe_reread_subscription() where we "Exit if any parameter that
> > affects the remote connection was changed."?
On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 1:35 AM Amit Kapila wrote:
> Do we need to have a check for this new option "password_required" in
> maybe_reread_subscription() where we "Exit if any parameter that
> affects the remote connection was changed."? This new option is
> related to the remote connection so I tho
On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 9:35 PM Robert Haas wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 1:52 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-03-24 at 00:17 -0700, Jeff Davis wrote:
> > > The other patch you posted seems like it makes a lot of progress in
> > > that direction, and I think that should go in first. Th
On Sat, Apr 1, 2023 at 12:00 PM Alexander Lakhin wrote:
> I've managed to reproduce it using the following script:
> for ((i=1;i<=10;i++)); do
> echo "iteration $i"
> echo "
> CREATE ROLE sub_user;
> CREATE SUBSCRIPTION testsub CONNECTION 'dbname=db'
> PUBLICATION testpub WITH (connect = false);
Hi,
On April 1, 2023 9:00:00 AM PDT, Alexander Lakhin wrote:
>Hello Robert,
>
>31.03.2023 23:00, Robert Haas wrote:
>> That looks like a reasonable fix but I can't reproduce the problem
>> locally. I thought the reason why that machine sees the problem might
>> be that it uses -DRELCACHE_FORCE_R
Hello Robert,
31.03.2023 23:00, Robert Haas wrote:
That looks like a reasonable fix but I can't reproduce the problem
locally. I thought the reason why that machine sees the problem might
be that it uses -DRELCACHE_FORCE_RELEASE, but I tried that option here
and the tests still pass. Anyone idea
On Saturday, April 1, 2023 4:00 AM Robert Haas
Hi,
>
> On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 9:49 PM houzj.f...@fujitsu.com
> wrote:
> > It looks like the super user check is out of a transaction, I haven't
> > checked why it only failed on one BF animal, but it seems we can put
> > the check into the trans
On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 9:49 PM houzj.f...@fujitsu.com
wrote:
> It looks like the super user check is out of a transaction, I haven't checked
> why
> it only failed on one BF animal, but it seems we can put the check into the
> transaction like the following:
That looks like a reasonable fix but
On Friday, March 31, 2023 12:05 AM Robert Haas wrote:
Hi,
>
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 1:52 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-03-24 at 00:17 -0700, Jeff Davis wrote:
> > > The other patch you posted seems like it makes a lot of progress in
> > > that direction, and I think that should go in
On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 1:52 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> On Fri, 2023-03-24 at 00:17 -0700, Jeff Davis wrote:
> > The other patch you posted seems like it makes a lot of progress in
> > that direction, and I think that should go in first. That was one of
> > the items I suggested previously[2], so than
On Fri, 2023-03-24 at 00:17 -0700, Jeff Davis wrote:
> The other patch you posted seems like it makes a lot of progress in
> that direction, and I think that should go in first. That was one of
> the items I suggested previously[2], so thank you for working on
> that.
The above is not a hard objec
On Mon, 2023-03-27 at 14:06 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> I thought you were asking for those changes to be made before this
> patch got committed, so that's what I was responding to. If you're
> asking for it not to be committed at all, that's a different
> discussion.
I separately had a complaint
On Mon, 2023-03-27 at 10:46 -0700, Andres Freund wrote:
> > There are some big issues, like the security model for replaying
> > changes.
>
> That seems largely unrelated.
They are self-evidently related in a fundamental way. The behavior of
the non-superuser-subscription patch depends on the pre
> > (2) even adding the connection string security stuff
>
> I don't see how these points are related to the question of whether you
> should commit your non-superuser-subscription-owners patch or logical-
> repl-as-table-owner patch first.
I thought you were asking for th
role
>
> > (2) even adding the connection string security stuff
>
> I don't see how these points are related to the question of whether you
> should commit your non-superuser-subscription-owners patch or logical-
> repl-as-table-owner patch first.
>
>
> My perspec
see how these points are related to the question of whether you
should commit your non-superuser-subscription-owners patch or logical-
repl-as-table-owner patch first.
My perspective is that logical replication is an unfinished feature
with an incomplete design. As I said earlier, that's why I bac
On Fri, Mar 24, 2023 at 9:24 AM Robert Haas wrote:
> > The other patch you posted seems like it makes a lot of progress in
> > that direction, and I think that should go in first. That was one of
> > the items I suggested previously[2], so thank you for working on that.
>
> Perhaps you could revie
On Fri, Mar 24, 2023 at 3:17 AM Jeff Davis wrote:
> The current patch (non-superuser-subscriptions) is the most user-facing
> aspect, and it seems wrong to commit it before we have the security
> model in a reasonable place. As you pointed out[1], it's not in a
> reasonable place now, so encouragi
On Wed, 2023-03-22 at 12:16 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> I've posted a
> patch for that at
> http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaSCkg9ww9oppPqqs+9RVqCexYCE6Aq=usypfnoode...@mail.gmail.com
> and AFAICT everyone agrees with the idea, even if the patch itself
> hasn't yet attracted any code reviews. But althoug
On Thu, Mar 23, 2023 at 1:41 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> Even if my changes don't happen, I would find it less confusing and
> more likely that users understand what they're doing.
I respectfully but firmly disagree. I think having two predefined
roles that are both required to create a subscription a
On Thu, 2023-03-23 at 11:52 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> What would this amount to concretely? Also adding a
> pg_connection_string predefined role and requiring both that and
> pg_create_subscription [to CREATE SUBSCRIPTION]
Yes.
> If so, I don't think that's a good idea. Maybe for some reason yo
On Wed, Mar 22, 2023 at 3:53 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> Is there any chance I can convince you to separate the privileges of
> using a connection string and creating a subscription, as I
> suggested[1] earlier?
What would this amount to concretely? Also adding a
pg_connection_string predefined role a
On Wed, 2023-03-22 at 12:16 -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> If nobody's too unhappy with the idea, I plan to commit this soon,
> both because I think that the feature is useful, and also because I
> think it's an important security improvement.
Is there any chance I can convince you to separate the pr
On Wed, Mar 8, 2023 at 2:47 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> Hm - it still feels wrong that we error out in case of failure, despite the
> comment to the function saying:
> * Returns NULL on error and fills the err with palloc'ed error message.
I've amended the comment so that it explains why it's done
Hi,
On 2023-02-07 16:56:55 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 4:02 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> > > + /* Is the use of a password mandatory? */
> > > + must_use_password = MySubscription->passwordrequired &&
> > > + !superuser_arg(MySubscription->owner);
> >
> > T
On Wed, Mar 1, 2023 at 7:34 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> ISTM that this would require annotating most functions in the system. There's
> many problems besides accessing database contents. Just a few examples:
>
> - dblink functions to access another system / looping back
> - pg_read_file()/pg_file_wr
Hi,
On 2023-02-28 08:37:02 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 7:37 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> > > Yeah. That's the idea I was floating, at least.
> >
> > Isn't that a hard problem; maybe impossible?
>
> It doesn't seem that hard to me; maybe I'm missing something.
>
> The existing SE
Hi,
On 2023-02-28 12:36:38 -0800, Jeff Davis wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-02-28 at 11:28 -0800, Andres Freund wrote:
> > I can only repeat myself in stating that SECURITY DEFINER solves none
> > of the
> > relevant issues. I included several examples of why it doesn't in the
> > recent
> > thread about "
On Wed, 2023-03-01 at 16:06 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> To be fair, it's possible that there's no solution to this class of
> problems that *doesn't* suck, but I think we should look a lot harder
> before coming to that conclusion.
Fair enough. The situation is bad enough that I'm willing to cons
On Wed, Mar 1, 2023 at 1:13 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> I don't think it's magic, as I said above. But I assume that your more
> general point is that if we take some responsibility away from the
> invoker and place it on the definer, then it creates room for new kinds
> of problems. And I agree.
>
> T
On Wed, 2023-03-01 at 10:05 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> For this reason, these expressions are, by
> default, restricted from doing .
The hard part is defining without resorting to a bunch of
special cases, and also in a way that doesn't break a bunch of stuff.
> You earlier
> mentioned that swi
On Wed, Mar 1, 2023 at 10:48 AM Stephen Frost wrote:
> > Yeah, or any other expressions. Basically impose restrictions when the
> > user running the code is not the same as the user who provided the
> > code.
>
> Would this have carve-outs for things like "except if the user providing
> the code i
Greetings,
* Robert Haas (robertmh...@gmail.com) wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 4:01 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> > Or default expressions, I presume. If we at least agree on this point,
> > then I think we should try to find a way to treat these other hunks of
> > code in a secure way (which I think
On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 4:01 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> You're suggesting using the SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION flag, along
> with the new security flags, but not switch to the table owner, right?
Correct.
> Or default expressions, I presume. If we at least agree on this point,
> then I think we s
Greetings,
* Jeff Davis (pg...@j-davis.com) wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-02-28 at 08:37 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> > The existing SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION flag basically prevents
> > you
> > from tinkering with the session state.
>
> Currently, every time we set that flag we also run all the code
On Tue, 2023-02-28 at 08:37 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> The existing SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION flag basically prevents
> you
> from tinkering with the session state.
Currently, every time we set that flag we also run all the code as the
table owner.
You're suggesting using the SECURITY_RESTRI
On Tue, 2023-02-28 at 11:28 -0800, Andres Freund wrote:
> I can only repeat myself in stating that SECURITY DEFINER solves none
> of the
> relevant issues. I included several examples of why it doesn't in the
> recent
> thread about "blocking SECURITY INVOKER". E.g. that default arguments
> of
> SE
Hi,
On 2023-02-22 09:18:34 -0800, Jeff Davis wrote:
> I can't resist mentioning that these are all SECURITY INVOKER problems.
> SECURITY INVOKER is insecure unless the invoker absolutely trusts the
> definer, and that only really makes sense if the definer is a superuser
> (or something very close
On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 7:37 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> > Yeah. That's the idea I was floating, at least.
>
> Isn't that a hard problem; maybe impossible?
It doesn't seem that hard to me; maybe I'm missing something.
The existing SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION flag basically prevents you
from tinkeri
Greetings,
* Jeff Davis (pg...@j-davis.com) wrote:
> Not all steps would be breaking changes, and a lot of those steps are
> things we should do anyway. We could make it easier to write safe
> SECURITY DEFINER functions, provide more tools for users to opt-out of
> executing SECURITY INVOKER code,
Greetings,
* Jeff Davis (pg...@j-davis.com) wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-02-27 at 14:10 -0500, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > I do think there are some use-cases for it, but agree that it'd be
> > better to encourage more use of SECURITY DEFINER and one approach to
> > that might be to have a way for users to
On Mon, 2023-02-27 at 16:13 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 1:25 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> > I think you are saying that we should still run Alice's code with
> > the
> > privileges of Bob, but somehow make that safe(r) for Bob. Is that
> > right?
>
> Yeah. That's the idea I was
On Mon, 2023-02-27 at 14:10 -0500, Stephen Frost wrote:
> I do think there are some use-cases for it, but agree that it'd be
> better to encourage more use of SECURITY DEFINER and one approach to
> that might be to have a way for users to explicitly say "don't run
> code
> that isn't mine or a supe
On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 1:25 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> I think you are saying that we should still run Alice's code with the
> privileges of Bob, but somehow make that safe(r) for Bob. Is that
> right?
Yeah. That's the idea I was floating, at least.
> That sounds hard, and I'm still stuck at the "w
Greetings,
* Jeff Davis (pg...@j-davis.com) wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-02-27 at 10:45 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> > Suppose Alice owns a table and attaches a trigger to it. If
> > Bob inserts into that table, I think we have to run the trigger,
> > because Alice is entitled to assume that, for example
On Mon, 2023-02-27 at 10:45 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> Suppose Alice owns a table and attaches a trigger to it. If
> Bob inserts into that table, I think we have to run the trigger,
> because Alice is entitled to assume that, for example, any BEFORE
> triggers she might have defined that block c
On Wed, Feb 22, 2023 at 12:18 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> There are two questions:
>
> 1. Is the security situation with logical replication bad? Yes. You
> nicely summarized just how bad.
>
> 2. Is it the same situation as accessing a table owned by a user you
> don't absolutely trust?
>
> Regardless
On 2/22/23 14:12, Mark Dilger wrote:
On Feb 22, 2023, at 10:49 AM, Jeff Davis wrote:
On Wed, 2023-02-22 at 09:27 -0800, Mark Dilger wrote:
Another option is to execute under the intersection of their
privileges, where both the definer and the invoker need the
privileges in order for the action
> On Feb 22, 2023, at 10:49 AM, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2023-02-22 at 09:27 -0800, Mark Dilger wrote:
>> Another option is to execute under the intersection of their
>> privileges, where both the definer and the invoker need the
>> privileges in order for the action to succeed. That wou
On Wed, 2023-02-22 at 09:27 -0800, Mark Dilger wrote:
> Another option is to execute under the intersection of their
> privileges, where both the definer and the invoker need the
> privileges in order for the action to succeed. That would be more
> permissive than the proposed SECURITY NONE, while
> On Feb 22, 2023, at 9:18 AM, Jeff Davis wrote:
>
> Another option is having some kind SECURITY NONE that would run the
> code as a very limited-privilege user that can basically only access
> the catalog. That would be useful for running default expressions and
> the like without the definer
On Mon, 2023-02-06 at 14:40 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2023 at 2:18 PM Andres Freund
> wrote:
> > It's decidedly not great, yes. I don't know if it's quite a CVE
> > type issue,
> > after all, the same is true for any other type of query the
> > superuser
> > executes. But at the v
On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 4:02 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> On 2023-01-30 15:32:34 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> > I had a long think about what to do with ALTER SUBSCRIPTION ... OWNER
> > TO in terms of permissions checks.
>
> As long as owner and run-as are the same, I think it's strongly
> preferrable
On Mon, Feb 6, 2023 at 2:18 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> It's decidedly not great, yes. I don't know if it's quite a CVE type issue,
> after all, the same is true for any other type of query the superuser
> executes. But at the very least the documentation needs to be better, with a
> big red box mak
need some more fundamental ways to deal with this issue, including
but not restricted to the replication context. Some potentially relevant
discussion is in this thread:
https://postgr.es/m/75b0dbb55e9febea54c441efff8012a6d2cb5bd7.camel%40j-davis.com
I don't agree with Jeff's proposal, but I
the table to be
re-run on rows in the table at any table when somebody does a REINDEX.
And then, in master, where there's some provision for non-superuser
subscription owners, we maybe need to re-think the privileges required
to replicate into a table in the first place. I don't
Hi,
On 2023-02-02 09:28:03 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> I don't know what you mean by this. DML doesn't confer privileges. If
> code gets executed and runs with the replication user's credentials,
> that could lead to privilege escalation, but just moving rows around
> doesn't, at least not in the
On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 3:37 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> The general point is that IMO is that in many setups you should use a
> user with fewer privileges than a superuser. It doesn't really matter
> whether we have an ad-hoc restriction for system catalogs. More often
> than not being able to modi
On Wed, Feb 1, 2023 at 1:09 PM Mark Dilger wrote:
> > On Feb 1, 2023, at 6:43 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
> > The thing I'm
> > struggling to understand is: if you only want to replicate into tables
> > that Alice can write, why not just make Alice own the subscription?
> > For a run-as user to make s
Hi,
On 2023-01-30 15:32:34 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> I had a long think about what to do with ALTER SUBSCRIPTION ... OWNER
> TO in terms of permissions checks. The previous version required that
> the new owner have permissions of pg_create_subscription, but there
> seems to be no particular rea
Hi,
On 2023-02-01 09:43:39 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 7:01 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> > I don't really understand that - the run-as approach seems like a
> > necessary piece of improving the security model.
> >
> > I think it's perfectly reasonable to want to replicate fro
> On Feb 1, 2023, at 6:43 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
> The thing I'm
> struggling to understand is: if you only want to replicate into tables
> that Alice can write, why not just make Alice own the subscription?
> For a run-as user to make sense, you need a scenario where we want the
> replication
On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 7:01 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> I don't really understand that - the run-as approach seems like a
> necessary piece of improving the security model.
>
> I think it's perfectly reasonable to want to replicate from one system
> in another, but to not want to allow logical repl
Hi,
On 2023-01-30 10:44:29 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On a technical level, I think that the idea of having a separate
> objection for the connection string vs. the subscription itself is
> perfectly sound, and to repeat what I said earlier, if someone wants
> to implement that, cool. I also agre
> On Jan 30, 2023, at 1:29 PM, Robert Haas wrote:
>
> I feel like you're accusing me of removing functionality that has
> never existed. A subscription doesn't run as the subscription creator.
> It runs as the subscription owner. If you or anyone else had added the
> capability for it to run a
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 3:27 PM Mark Dilger
wrote:
> That was an aspirational example in which there's infinite daylight between
> the publisher and subscriber. I, too, doubt that's ever going to be
> possible. But I still think we should aspire to some extra daylight between
> the two. Perh
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:00 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> > Or, another thought, maybe this should be checking for CREATE on the
> > current database + also pg_create_subscription. That seems like it
> > might be the right idea, actually.
>
> Yes, that seems like a good idea.
Done in this version. I
> On Jan 30, 2023, at 11:30 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
>
> CREATE SUBSCRIPTION
> provides no tools at all for filtering the data that the subscriber
> chooses to send.
>
> Now that can be changed, I suppose, and a run-as user would be one way
> to make progress in that direction. But I'm not sure
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 1:46 PM Mark Dilger
wrote:
> I have a grim view of the requirement that publishers and subscribers trust
> each other. Even when they do trust each other, they can firewall attacks by
> acting as if they do not.
I think it's OK if the CREATE PUBLICATION user doesn't par
> On Jan 30, 2023, at 9:26 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
>
> So basically this doesn't really feel like a valid scenario to me.
> We're supposed to believe that Alice is hostile to Bob, but the
> superuser doesn't seem to have thought very carefully about how Bob is
> supposed to defend himself again
> On Jan 30, 2023, at 9:26 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
>
> First, it doesn't seem to make a lot of sense to have one person
> managing the publications and someone else managing the subscriptions,
> and especially if those parties are mutually untrusting. I can't think
> of any real reason to set t
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 11:11 AM Mark Dilger
wrote:
> > On Jan 30, 2023, at 7:44 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
> >
> > And if we suppose that
> > that already works and is safe, well then what's the case where I do
> > need a run-as user?
>
> A) Alice publishes tables, and occasionally adds new tables t
> On Jan 30, 2023, at 7:44 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
>
> And if we suppose that
> that already works and is safe, well then what's the case where I do
> need a run-as user?
A) Alice publishes tables, and occasionally adds new tables to existing
publications.
B) Bob manages subscriptions, and p
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 5:56 PM Mark Dilger
wrote:
> If the owner cannot modify the subscription, then the owner degenerates into
> a mere "run-as" user. Note that this isn't how things work now, and even if
> we disallowed owners from modifying the connection string, there would still
> be ot
> On Jan 27, 2023, at 1:35 PM, Robert Haas wrote:
>
>> I started out asking what benefits it provides to own a subscription one
>> cannot modify. But I think it is a good capability to have, to restrict the
>> set of relations that replication could target. Although perhaps it'd be
>> better
Hi,
On 2023-01-27 16:35:11 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> > Maybe a daft question:
> >
> > Have we considered using a "normal grant", e.g. on the database, instead of
> > a
> > role? Could it e.g. be useful to grant a user the permission to create a
> > subscription in one database, but not in anot
On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 4:09 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> Hm, compared to postgres_fdw, the user has far less control over what's
> happening using that connection. Is there a way a subscription owner can
> trigger evaluation of near-arbitrary SQL on the publisher side?
I'm not aware of one, but wha
Hi,
On 2023-01-27 14:42:01 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> At first, I found it a bit tempting to see this as a further
> indication that the force-a-password approach is not the right idea,
> because the test case clearly memorializes a desire *not* to require a
> password in this situation. However,
On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 8:46 PM Andres Freund wrote:
> > If we already had (or have) that logic someplace else, it would
> > probably make sense to reuse it
>
> We hve. See at least postgres_fdw's check_conn_params(), dblink's
> dblink_connstr_check() and dblink_security_check().
In the patch I p
On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 12:36 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-01-26 at 09:43 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> > I have no issue with that as a long-term plan. However, I think that
> > for right now we should just introduce pg_create_subscription. It
> > would make sense to add pg_create_connection
On Thu, 2023-01-26 at 09:43 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> I have no issue with that as a long-term plan. However, I think that
> for right now we should just introduce pg_create_subscription. It
> would make sense to add pg_create_connection in the same patch that
> adds a CREATE CONNECTION command (
On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 10:45 PM Jeff Davis wrote:
> I propose that we have two predefined roles: pg_create_subscription,
> and pg_create_connection. If creating a subscription with a connection
> string, you'd need to be a member of both roles. But to create a
> subscription with a server object,
On Tue, 2023-01-24 at 17:00 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> It seems to me that the relevant
> question isn't "are the servers tightly coupled?" but rather "could
> some user make a mess if we let them use any arbitrary connection
> string?".
The split I created is much easier for an admin to answer:
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