Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR metadata

2020-01-10 Thread Justin Richer
I just want to add that the requirement to validate the request at PAR the same way as you would at the auth endpoint is something that I want to see relaxed, and I hope it doesn’t make it through to the final standard. Also keep in mind that this is barely started as a WG document so any requ

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR metadata

2020-01-07 Thread Brian Campbell
A little more context about that proposed wording is in a github issue at https://github.com/oauthstuff/draft-oauth-par/issues/38, which is different driver than allowing a PAR endpoint to stash the encrypted request object rather than decrypting/validating it. But it's kind of the same concept at

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR metadata

2020-01-07 Thread Vladimir Dzhuvinov
On 07/01/2020 00:22, Filip Skokan wrote: > We've been discussing making the following change to the language > > The AS SHOULD validate the request in the same way as at the > authorization endpoint. The AS MUST ensure that all parameters to > the authorization request are still valid a

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR metadata

2020-01-07 Thread Vladimir Dzhuvinov
Just to comment that with a lightweight PAR (stash-only) endpoint one of the nice benefits of PAR will be lost - to pre-validate the request (client_id, redirect_uri, etc) as much as possible before a front-end call is made and the user is sent to the authZ endpoint. Vladimir On 06/01/2020 23:59,

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: PAR metadata

2020-01-06 Thread Filip Skokan
We've been discussing making the following change to the language The AS SHOULD validate the request in the same way as at the authorization > endpoint. The AS MUST ensure that all parameters to the authorization > request are still valid at the time when the request URI is used. > This would all