On 10/10/2019 17:02, Justin Richer wrote:
They are in that registry as the “token endpoint response” error codes.
RFC8628 adds new ones.
I think that 6749 failed to put in the base ones.
— Justin
That would explain my confusion.
Errata-worthy?
/Ludwig
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e one?
Regards,
Ludwig
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,
Ludwig
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/ace/documents/
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:
in figure 3 you seem to be using the "jwk" claim to include the
pop-key in the token. Any reason for not using the "cnf" claim from
RFC 7800?
/Ludwig
My bad, figure 3 is not a token (although it looks like one) it's the
token request (encapsulated in a J
https://github.com/webhamster/draft-dpop
- Daniel
A quick nit:
in figure 3 you seem to be using the "jwk" claim to include the pop-key
in the token. Any reason for not using the "cnf" claim from RFC 7800?
/Ludwig
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owever the
audience claim is defined to be "StringOrURI" so if someone defines an
audience identified by a String that is not an URI how does a client ask
for that with the resource parameter?
Or in short: Why don't you make your resource parameter mirror the "aud"
claim?
For example my intent
was to use "aud" and "req_aud" for group identifiers
("temperatureSensorGroup4711") and other non-uri strings
(hash-of-public-key), which I cannot do with "resource". We therefore
decided to keep the "req_aud" parameter in d
it is important in some usecases that the client no
longer uses the pop-key material when the token has expired.
/Ludwig
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earlier or later).
That is my understanding as well, I would however have expected that
this parameter would be aligned with the 'exp' claim of the token.
/Ludwig
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Ludwig Seitz, PhD
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ore narrow to me (which is why I created
'profile'). If we could extend the definition of 'alg' a bit, I'd be OK
to remove 'profile' from the ACE draft (provided the OAuth draft moves
forward in a timely manner).
/Ludwig
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Ludwig Seitz, PhD
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so that pre-configuring clients
with metadata about the RS is difficult. Do you have a better idea how
to solve these cases?
/Ludwig
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group and
therefore the target audience of that token.
Regards,
Ludwig
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e
future status of the pop drafts would be.
I'm absolutely willing to remove the text again and reference an OAuth
WG document instead, if I feel it will not significantly delay the
progress of the ACE draft.
Hope this information helps in the decision making.
Regards,
Ludwig
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Lud
nd to
the Raw RSA key of C?So RS would never need to be told about C's key,
because the AS would have told it "key XYZ can access resource ABC" in the
OAuth token.
Yes if the PoP token uses a public key as PoP key. C could even generate
an ephemeral key-pair just for this token
are. Is this some work that
the WG is planning to do?
/Ludwig
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Thank you Michael! Comments inline.
/Ludwig
On 02/04/2016 03:31 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
Ludwig Seitz wrote:
> Assuming we are using (D)TLS to secure the connection between C and RS,
> assuming further that we are using proof-of-possession tokens [2],
> i.e. toke
c PoP keys as client-authentication key as in
RFC7250.
Regards,
Ludwig
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz/
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-02
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