o revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any
malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only use
them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One could
even argue that the grant for the original client should also be revoked in
this case as well, because it
Revoking the token seems to be the least
harmful one can do with a token.
For more information see:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
> rfc-edi...@rfc-editor
bearer tokens, we will simply skip the validation of the
client credentials.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 12:52 PM Torsten Lodderstedt
wrote:
>
> Hi Emond,
>
> I tend to agree with your assessment. Revoking bearer tokens without client
> authenticat
regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topicus KeyHub
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should NOT be
allowed (inline scripting, eval). This was already mentioned by Dominick
Baier. Also, it could benefit from a few examples (correct and wrong).
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topicus KeyHub
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changed as well. It is complex due to so little
> existing token lifetime/policy guidance to reference. Previous
> conversations went a bit circular IMHO because of a lack of ground rules.
I can understand. This also highly depend on your use case. Something that
might work for one application might be totally inappropriate for another.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
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the general form of a
client identifier. Many of the client identifiers we use are UUIDs. There is no
way to put this in the resource parameter on the authorize request. The
library we use to implement our OAuth2 endpoints is very strict in this.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Hi,
Thanks for your detailed reply. I've replied inline.
On maandag 6 mei 2019 22:42:09 CEST David Waite wrote:
> On May 6, 2019, at 1:42 PM, Emond Papegaaij
wrote:
> > For a browser-based app, we try to follow the recommendations set in
> > draft-
> > ietf-oauth-b
achieving this? As I cannot believe we
are the only ones facing this issue, maybe a recommendation can be put in the
spec?
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
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On zondag 5 mei 2019 15:54:48 CEST you wrote:
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 9:39 AM Emond Papegaaij
> > To summarize, I have to following questions:
> > - Is the 'OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange' specification still active?
>
> Yes with the caveats mentioned above. I will sa
on still active?
- Can 'audience' be added to 'Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0'?
- Can 'OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange' be updated to build on 'Resource Indicators
for OAuth 2.0' rather than redefining the same parameters?
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topicus KeyHub
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Hi Filip,
Yes, this was exactly what I was thinking about. Good to know I'm
working in the right direction. I must say that the spec reads really
well and is fairly straightforward to implement.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topicus KeyHub
On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 6:29 PM Filip Skokan
Hi all,
It seems the word 'no' is missing in section 5.2 of the OAuth 2.0 Device flow:
As the device code is not displayed to the user and thus there are
*NO* usability considerations on the length, a very high entropy code
SHOULD be used.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topi
s that may be
useful, such as: 'resource' from Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0 and
'include_granted_scopes' from OAuth 2.0 Incremental Authorization.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topicus KeyHub
On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 10:24 PM Brian Campbell
wrote:
>
> While probably
se. I would have expected a
standard OAuth 2.0 error response, probably with the following error codes:
invalid_request, invalid_client and invalid_scope.
Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij
Topicus KeyHub
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