Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs

2021-08-09 Thread Brian Campbell
Hi Dmitry, I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401 response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most straightforw

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Domingos Creado
Hi All, I think those are valid points, but they can be better addressed on identity management forums like idsa or idpro. https://www.idsalliance.org/ https://idpro.org/ On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 5:55 PM Warren Parad wrote: > I definitely see that there is room for a potential attack depending

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Warren Parad
I definitely see that there is room for a potential attack depending on the internal implementation. Wouldn't that be only relevant internally to the auth server though? Would adding a feature flag to the discovery document or visibility into configuration help reduce the attack surface? Perhaps, I

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Kevat Shah
@wpa...@rhosys.ch - Using forgot password and registration verification links or codes could be used as vectors of attack. One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is this: after a user verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another page where they enter more information (suc

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Warren Parad
I think it would be prudent to potentially ask *why?* What problem is necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular features? There could be, but without understanding, knowing how best to tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right context. Warren Parad Founde

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Tim Cappalli
I think the first step would be finding the appropriate IETF group. I don't think this is in scope for OAuth-WG as this topic seems to be about account management and user credentials. From: Kevat Shah Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 16:14 To: mich...@palage.com Cc

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Kevat Shah
How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure conformity of standards? On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM wrote: > Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) > (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt ) which I think was the > subject of Kevat’s original

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread michael
Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt ) which I think was the subject of Kevat's original email. So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF and W3C? From: OAuth On Behalf Of T

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Tim Cappalli
I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C. There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc. From: Kevat Shah Sent: Monday,

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Kevat Shah
That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C standards don't exist? - Kevat On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli wrote:

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

2021-08-09 Thread Tim Cappalli
I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF. tim From: OAuth on behalf of Kevat Shah Sent: Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37 To: oauth@ietf.org Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers Some people who received this message don't often ge