I found when I started trying to put this into WWW-Authenticate header it ended
up with a lot of extensions and parsing. Link headers make sense to me in that
the client that needs to know where the authenticator for a site is can look at
the linking relationships, and a registry already exists
A WWW-Auth header is a server’s security statement about how to gain access.
A Link header is a server’s statement of a relationship to another URI.
I find the Links+WWW-Auth approach more complex, less intuitive, and not as
good a match for HTTP semantics.
Each WWW-Auth header in my approach
Hi Skylar,
Am 06.04.2011 18:02, schrieb Skylar Woodward:
Well, I should elaborate. The method of authorization is open to the client,
and in this case (Kiva), MAC tokens are being used. The client authenticates on
the access_token request by presenting a MAC authentication header. Creating
th
I agree that Link headers are much better fit for relaying discovery
information than a half HTTP authentication scheme. Overall, I find James’
proposal to be too complex and not intuitive to people familiar with existing
HTTP authentication schemes (it is novel and well thought, and it does wor
Chairs - see request inline.
Hi James,
The use case you proposed for an OAuth2 scheme is not about token
authentication at all but about relaying authorization server discovery
information only. This use case is completely within the realm of discovery,
and that is out of scope.
There is noth
In the SASL mechanism draft spec where we went with that is to use LINK
headers. See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-01 if
you want to take a look. WWW-Authenticate headers return the supported
authentication schemes and LINK headers tell you there are OAuth endpoints
We should define a "WWW-Authenticate: OAuth2 ..." response header - not to
encompass the MAC, Bearer, and any other generic HTTP authentication scheme,
but as a way for a server to tell the client that it can perform an OAuth2
get-a-token flow to gain access. When the sort of OAuth2 flow depends
Having thought about it over night and discussed it, I'm willing to drop my
objection the WWW-Authenticate response not being in the framework
specification, so as to close an open issue that could delay completion of the
specifications.
Eran, in return, I'd like to ask you to drop your objecti
fine with me, you can obtain the source from
https://github.com/tlodderstedt/oauth2/raw/master/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-securityconsiderations.xml
Am 07.04.2011 16:10, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav:
I think it would be best to publish -16 immediately with this text, mark it as
pending consensus, an
Please hold off on editorial feedback. Trying to figure out section numbers
after the move is just too annoying.
EHL
> -Original Message-
> From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Oleg Gryb
> Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 9:37 AM
> To: Torsten Lodders
Definitions
"they can seamlessly make use of it capabilities" - its?
2.3 "Application developers MUST NOT store access tokens in non-transient
memory".
What is non-transient memory? Is non-persistent cookie non-transient? Do we
know
how all browsers store their non-persistent cookies?
What if
I think it would be best to publish -16 immediately with this text, mark it as
pending consensus, and continue with a single document. This will make it
easier for new readers as well as for everyone else.
I will push it out in a couple of hours.
EHL
> -Original Message-
> From: oauth-
Hi James, sorry I didnt see your earlier suggestion.
And your text works for me - just looking for text that hints at
something beyond delegation
thanks
paul
On 4/6/11 11:15 PM, Manger, James H wrote:
Paul,
The draft-15.1 abstract is just the first sentence of the abstract I
suggested la
Hi all,
I just posted a new revision of the proposed text for the core draft's
security considerations section
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-securityconsiderations-02).
The text makes some strong statements wrt client secrets/authentication,
HTTPS, refresh tokens and ot
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