On Fri, 2024-05-17 at 08:13 +0300, Hank Nussbacher wrote:
> On 17/05/2024 5:45, Karl Auer wrote:
> > https://support.google.com/a/answer/81126
>
> I think some may have missed these announcements:
>
> https://labs.ripe.net/author/fergalc/enhancing-email-delivery-at-the-ripe-ncc/
>
> https://blog
Sigh, industry hasn't solved spoofing and routing insecurity in two
decades. If it was easy, everyone would have fixed it by now.
Industry has been saying 'don't regulate us' for decades.
Just because they were presented with the information doesn't mean they
understand.
Just because they understand doesn't mean they execute based on that
information.
-
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com
Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com
- O
>
> Just because they were presented with the information doesn't mean they
> understand.
It's our job as operators to get involved and help them understand as best
as can be done, so that the proposals are as well informed as possible.
> Just because they understand doesn't mean they execute b
The FCC's job isn't to solve technical problems.
Instead it is attempting to get CEOs, business managers and venture
capital firms to include these public policy requirements as part of their
business decision making. Impact business budgets and decision making to
fix public problems.
FCC
It would appear that ( as of yesterday ) some but not all BGP routes
between Cogent and TATA are gone.
>From my own observations it seems like all TATA Routes in APAC and
India are now not visible from cogent connections/customers.
There's also a report of a cogent support ticket response from re
lp is appreciated.
A sample MTR report, see between hops 7 and 8. Funnily enough this is
periodic and has a cycle of between 15 and 25 minutes.
%% START MTR TCP IPV4 en 20240517-16:10
Start: 2024-05-17T16:10:01+
HOST: rpki-fe-45-79-203-193.rrdp. Loss% Snt Last Avg Best Wrst StDe
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Global
IPv4 Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan.
The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG
UKNOF, TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG and the RIPE Routing WG.
Daily listings are sent to bg
vent any issues for RPs)
>
> I have a ticket open with Akamai but I'm not directly an NTT customer
> so any help is appreciated.
>
> A sample MTR report, see between hops 7 and 8. Funnily enough this is
> periodic and has a cycle of between 15 and 25 minutes.
>
> %% START
issues for RPs)
>
> I have a ticket open with Akamai but I'm not directly an NTT customer
> so any help is appreciated.
>
> A sample MTR report, see between hops 7 and 8. Funnily enough this is
> periodic and has a cycle of between 15 and 25 minutes.
>
> %% START MTR
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 2:02 PM Sean Donelan wrote:
>
> Sigh, industry hasn't solved spoofing and routing insecurity in two
> decades. If it was easy, everyone would have fixed it by now.
>
> Industry has been saying 'don't regulate us' for decades.
I hope the regulations are more outcome focu
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 9:55 AM Ben Cartwright-Cox via NANOG
wrote:
> Also poking around on RIPE Atlas suggests that for a non-zero amount
> of networks in India the C DNS Root Server that cogent runs is
> inaccessible: https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/71894623#probes
I don't understand why Co
Not even the first time tata and cogent separated. Will avoid public
details but I was on the keyboard at 6453 that time.
On Fri, May 17, 2024, 6:05 PM William Herrin wrote:
> On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 9:55 AM Ben Cartwright-Cox via NANOG
> wrote:
> > Also poking around on RIPE Atlas suggests th
>
> RPKI is not a good solution for all networks, especially those that are
> non-transit in nature and take reasonable mitigation actions like IRR
> prefix lists.
>
Some of the largest , most impactful route leaks have come from non-transit
networks reliant on IRR managed prefix lists.
On Fri, M
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 4:20 PM Tom Beecher wrote:
> RPKI is not a good solution for all networks, especially those that are
>> non-transit in nature and take reasonable mitigation actions like IRR
>> prefix lists.
>>
>
> Some of the largest , most impactful route leaks have come from
> non-trans
It appears that William Herrin said:
>I don't understand why Cogent is allowed to operate one of the root
>servers. Doesn't ICANN do any kind of technical background check on
>companies when letting the contract?
You must be new here. There is no contract for running root servers
and never has be
https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-verizon-and-a-bgp-optimizer-knocked-large-parts-of-the-internet-offline-today
Keep mind rpki only solves misorigination.
>
I'm very well aware that RPKI only solves misorigination. But
misorigination is a significant problem, so that's a good problem to be
solved.
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 4:28 PM John Levine wrote:
> It appears that William Herrin said:
> >I don't understand why Cogent is allowed to operate one of the root
> >servers. Doesn't ICANN do any kind of technical background check on
> >companies when letting the contract?
>
> There is no contract
On Fri, 17 May 2024, William Herrin wrote:
That said, ICANN generates the root zone including the servers
declared authoritative for the zone.
Nope.
So they do have an ability to
say: nope, you've crossed the line to any of the root operators.
Very very nope.
ICANN as the IANA Functions Op
On Fri, 17 May 2024, William Herrin wrote:
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 9:55 AM Ben Cartwright-Cox via NANOG
wrote:
Also poking around on RIPE Atlas suggests that for a non-zero amount
of networks in India the C DNS Root Server that cogent runs is
inaccessible: https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/7
Perhaps Cogent is permitted to operate a root server's infrastructure as an
on-going, real-time disaster scenario - demonstrating what happens to critical
DNS infrastructure when there's considerable routing loss.
Not much, it seems.
-joe
On 5/17/2024 at 5:06 PM, "William Herrin" wrote:
>
>I
> On May 18, 2024, at 03:53, John R. Levine wrote:
> On Fri, 17 May 2024, William Herrin wrote:
>> That said, ICANN generates the root zone including the servers
>> declared authoritative for the zone.
> Nope.
>
>> So they do have an ability to
>> say: nope, you've crossed the line to any of the
> On May 18, 2024, at 02:30, William Herrin wrote:
> So Cogent operates a root server because they bought PSI who ran a
> root server and ICANN has never chosen to throw down the gauntlet.
As John said, ICANN has nothing to do with who runs root servers. Last I knew,
NTIA still believed that
> On Fri, May 17, 2024, 6:05 PM William Herrin wrote:
> For those who haven't been around long enough, this isn't Cogent's
> first depeering argument. Nor their second.
They’re also still in the middle of one with NTT.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogent_Communications#Peering_disputes
On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 6:53 PM John R. Levine wrote:
> On Fri, 17 May 2024, William Herrin wrote:
> > That said, ICANN generates the root zone including the servers
> > declared authoritative for the zone.
>
> Nope.
Verisign maintains them under contract to ICANN and NTIA and under
direction fro
On 5/18/24 06:04, Jon Lewis wrote:
Cogent has been trying to establish themselves as a "tier 1" carrier
in markets outside their home turf, and Asia is one of the markets in
which the established operators are doing their best to keep Cogent out.
Back when I was helping to run a global a
On Sat, 18 May 2024 at 01:07, William Herrin wrote:
> I don't understand why Cogent is allowed to operate one of the root
> servers. Doesn't ICANN do any kind of technical background check on
> companies when letting the contract?
>
> For those who haven't been around long enough, this isn't Coge
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