RE: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Keith Medcalf
Without a concomitant increase in "trustworthy", assigning greater levels of trust is fools endeavour. Whatever this trusted network initiative is, I take that it was designed by fools or government (the two are usually indistinguishable) for the purpose of creating utterly untrustworthy netw

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread jim deleskie
Keith, I agree, we can't even get everyone including some LARGE ( I'll avoid Tier's because people get stupid around that too) networks to filter customers based on assigned netblocks. -jim On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 9:44 AM, Keith Medcalf wrote: > > Without a concomitant increase in "trustwort

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Roland Dobbins
On 25 May 2015, at 19:44, Keith Medcalf wrote: Whatever this trusted network initiative is, I take that it was designed by fools or government (the two are usually indistinguishable) for the purpose of creating utterly untrustworthy networks. AFAICT, the 'Trusted Network Initiative' largel

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Roland Dobbins
On 25 May 2015, at 19:49, jim deleskie wrote: I agree, we can't even get everyone including some LARGE ( I'll avoid Tier's because people get stupid around that too) networks to filter customers based on assigned netblocks. Customer of my customer [of my customer, of my customer . . . ]. It

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Steve via NANOG
Application layer DDoS attacks , in most (all?) cases require a valid TCP/IP connection, therefore are not spoofed and BCP38 is irrelevant Sent from Steve's iPhone > On May 25, 2015, at 8:00 AM, nanog-requ...@nanog.org wrote: > > Send NANOG mailing list submissions to >nanog@nanog.org >

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Roland Dobbins
On 25 May 2015, at 20:31, Steve via NANOG wrote: Application layer DDoS attacks , in most (all?) cases require a valid TCP/IP connection DNS query-floods are a notable exception. --- Roland Dobbins

Re: Peering and Network Cost

2015-05-25 Thread joel jaeggli
On 5/23/15 10:23 AM, Jay Ashworth wrote: > - Original Message - >> From: "Dave Taht" > >> Two things I am curious about are 1) What is the measured benefit of >> moving a netflix server into your local ISP network >> >> and 2) does anyone measure "cross town latency". If we lived in a >>

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Randy Bush
>> Application layer DDoS attacks , in most (all?) cases require a valid >> TCP/IP connection > DNS query-floods are a notable exception. may i remind you of the dns query flood i had which you helped research? udp and tcp, from the same sources. randy

Re: [SECURITY] Application layer attacks/DDoS attacks

2015-05-25 Thread Roland Dobbins
On 26 May 2015, at 4:27, Randy Bush wrote: may i remind you of the dns query flood i had which you helped research? udp and tcp, from the same sources. Yes - we determined that the TCP-based queries were a result of RRL, which is optimized to help with spoofed reflection/amplification at