RE: Filter on IXP

2014-03-03 Thread Vitkovský Adam
lto:n...@foobar.org] Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 2:01 PM To: Vitkovský Adam; Jérôme Nicolle; nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Filter on IXP On 02/03/2014 12:45, Vitkovský Adam wrote: >> On the other hand, if a member provides transit, he will add its >> customer prefixes to RaDB / RIPEdb

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-03-02 Thread Royce Williams
On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 4:00 AM, Nick Hilliard wrote: > There are many places where automated RPF makes a lot of sense. An IXP is > not one of them. That make sense. Everyone is rightly resistant to automated filtering. But could we automate getting the word out instead? Can obvious BCP38 clu

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-03-02 Thread Nick Hilliard
On 02/03/2014 12:45, Vitkovský Adam wrote: >> On the other hand, if a member provides transit, he will add its >> customer prefixes to RaDB / RIPEdb with appropriate route >> objects and the ACL will be updated accordingly. Shouldn't break there. > > And that's a really nice side effect. and i

RE: Filter on IXP

2014-03-02 Thread Vitkovský Adam
oses. I'm not well versed with RIPE myself so I'm not sure whether there's a way to handle this situation. adam -Original Message- From: Jérôme Nicolle [mailto:jer...@ceriz.fr] Sent: Friday, February 28, 2014 6:03 PM To: Nick Hilliard; nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Filter

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Jérôme Nicolle
Le 28/02/2014 17:52, Nick Hilliard a écrit : > this will break horribly as soon as you have an IXP member which provides > transit to other multihomed networks. It could break if filters are based on announced prefixes. That's preciselly why uRPF is often useless. On the other hand, if a member p

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
On Feb 28, 2014, at 11:52 , Nick Hilliard wrote: > On 28/02/2014 15:42, Jérôme Nicolle wrote: >> Instead, IXPs _could_ enforce BCP38 too. Mapping the route-server's >> received routes to ingress _and_ egress ACLs on IXP ports would mitigate >> the role of BCP38 offenders within member ports. It's

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Nick Hilliard
On 28/02/2014 15:42, Jérôme Nicolle wrote: > Instead, IXPs _could_ enforce BCP38 too. Mapping the route-server's > received routes to ingress _and_ egress ACLs on IXP ports would mitigate > the role of BCP38 offenders within member ports. It's almost like uRPF > in an intelligent and useable form.

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Jérôme Nicolle
Hi Randy, Le 28/02/2014 17:15, Randy Bush a écrit : > clearly you have not been reading this list for very long Well... Busted. All things considered, there surelly has been more stupid proposals. -- Jérôme Nicolle +33 6 19 31 27 14

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Jérôme Nicolle
Le 28/02/2014 17:00, Jay Ashworth a écrit : >> From: "Jérôme Nicolle" >> Instead, IXPs _could_ enforce BCP38 too. Mapping the route-server's >> received routes to ingress _and_ egress ACLs on IXP ports would mitigate >> the role of BCP38 offenders within member ports. It's almost like uRPF >> in a

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Randy Bush
>> It would be really cool if peering exchanges could police ntp on >> their connected members. > Well, THIS looks like the worst idea ever. while i agree that this is an extremely stupid idea, clearly you have not been reading this list for very long randy

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Jay Ashworth
- Original Message - > From: "Jérôme Nicolle" > Le 23/02/2014 01:43, Chris Laffin a écrit : > > It would be really cool if peering exchanges could police ntp on > > their connected members. > > Well, THIS looks like the worst idea ever. Wasting ASIC ressources on > IXP's dataplanes is a

Re: Filter on IXP

2014-02-28 Thread Jérôme Nicolle
Hi Chris, Le 23/02/2014 01:43, Chris Laffin a écrit : > It would be really cool if peering exchanges could police ntp on their > connected members. Well, THIS looks like the worst idea ever. Wasting ASIC ressources on IXP's dataplanes is a wet-dream for anyone willing to kill the network. IXP's