Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-05-01 Thread Doug Barton
On 04/30/2013 05:28 PM, Thomas St-Pierre wrote: The large majority of the servers being used in the attacks are not open resolvers. Just DNS servers that are authoritative for a few domains, and the default config of the dns application does referrals to root for anything else. It sounds like y

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-05-01 Thread Alain Hebert
Well, I was going more for a public list of ISP that refuse to BCP38 their networks. But that's just me =D On point: (If your corporation is massive enough) Basically: . Mirror DST Port 53; . Write some software to stats who's spamming the same DST IP with the same quer

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-05-01 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On May 1, 2013, at 5:42 PM, Jeff Wheeler wrote: > The public list of smurf amplifiers turned out to be the only way to really > deal with it. It certainly helped; but the real solution was to get Cisco, et. al. to disable directed broadcasts by default. ---

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-05-01 Thread Jeff Wheeler
On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 8:35 PM, Jared Mauch wrote: > Please provide advice and insights as well as directing customers to the > openresolverproject.org website. We want to close these down, if you need an > accurate list of IPs in your ASN, please email me and I can give you very > accurate da

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On May 1, 2013, at 7:42 AM, Thomas St-Pierre wrote: > As for BCP38, I would love to stop the spoofed packets, however with them > coming from our upstreams, (Level3, Cogent, Tata, etc) I don't see how we can. Contact them on a case-by-case basis to report the spoofed traffic used to stimulate

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Thomas St-Pierre
NANOG list mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> Subject: Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 5:28 PM, Thomas St-Pierre mailto:tstpie...@iweb.com>> wrote: On 13-04-30 7:57 PM, "Dobbins, Roland" mailto:rdobb...@arbor.net>> wrote: >On May 1, 2013, at 6:43 AM

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Jared Mauch
Please look at something like rate limiting. Please look at preventing these spoofed packets from entering your network and report the issue. Please provide advice and insights as well as directing customers to the openresolverproject.org website. We want to close these down, if you need an ac

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Damian Menscher
On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 5:28 PM, Thomas St-Pierre wrote: > On 13-04-30 7:57 PM, "Dobbins, Roland" wrote: > >On May 1, 2013, at 6:43 AM, Thomas St-Pierre wrote: > > > >> We've been sending emails to our clients but as the servers are not > >>managed by us, there's not much we can do at that level

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Thomas St-Pierre
Hi! On 13-04-30 7:57 PM, "Dobbins, Roland" wrote: > >On May 1, 2013, at 6:43 AM, Thomas St-Pierre wrote: > >> We've been sending emails to our clients but as the servers are not >>managed by us, there's not much we can do at that level. > >Sure, there is - shut them down if they don't comply.

Re: Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On May 1, 2013, at 6:43 AM, Thomas St-Pierre wrote: > We've been sending emails to our clients but as the servers are not managed > by us, there's not much we can do at that level. Sure, there is - shut them down if they don't comply. Most ISPs have AUP verbiage which would apply to a situat

Mitigating DNS amplification attacks

2013-04-30 Thread Thomas St-Pierre
Hi! I was wondering if anyone had any experience with dealing with open resolvers as a web hoster? We currently have some 40,000 ip's that respond to DNS in our AS, the majority of which are not "open" but do reply with a referral to the root zones. We've been sending emails to our clients but