Hi,
> > Most operators here have been against stir/shaken as a means to resolve the
> problems.
>
> What reasons?
>
That it is complex and would take too much time and money, that it is only
effective if done on international level and should only be done if decided on
a European level.
Withou
Dear Brian, et al.:
0) Thanks for sharing the Robocall situation in Italy. This confirms
that the RoboCall phenomenon is now universal, not just in US. Although,
from my experience, I am not surprised at all.
1) Based on my best understanding, I believe that the entire issue has
been han
On 10/7/22 12:45 AM, Brian Turnbow via NANOG wrote:
The federal law in 47 USC 227(e) says:
(1)In general
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person
outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States, in
connection with any voice service
> The federal law in 47 USC 227(e) says:
>
> (1)In general
>
> It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person
> outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States, in
> connection with any voice service or text messaging service, to cause any
>
It appears that Matthew Black said:
>-=-=-=-=-=-
>This might have been what I read years ago:
>
>Teltech Systems Inc. v. Bryant, 5th Cir., No. 12-60027
No, that just said that federal law preempts a Mississippi state law
that purported to regulate Caller ID.
The federal law in 47 USC 227(e) says
- On Oct 5, 2022, at 5:25 PM, Matthew Black matthew.bl...@csulb.edu wrote:
Hi Matthew,
> This might have been what I read years ago:
> Teltech Systems Inc. v. Bryant, 5th Cir., No. 12-60027
This case does not permit spoofing based on the First Amendment. In fact, the
court's
opinion explic
-courts/ca5/12-60027/12-60027-2012-12-10.html
matthew
From: Tom Beecher
Sent: Wednesday, October 05, 2022 7:42 AM
To: Matthew Black
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
CAUTION: This email was sent from an external source.
I thought that S
%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=2BxqML5s%2FfiO2qJqgjTwIscrNnb%2FakGsBmNz3p07fFs%3D&reserved=0>
>
>
> --
>
> *From: *"Shane Ronan"
> *To: *"Michael Th
Ronan" <mailto:sh...@ronan-online.com>
To: "Michael Thomas" <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org<mailto:nanog@nanog.org>
Sent: Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
The issue isn't whi
Very different, collecting it would mean contacting EVERY customer to collect
the data and then validating it all to ensure the customer was telling the
truth, down to the individual phone number level. Imagine if to validate
routes, you weren’t able to look at /24’s and higher but down to the i
On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 8:36 PM wrote:
>
> The FCC hasn’t enforced it because the burden on large carriers to collect
> that data would be insane. And it would be reduce the flexibility of large
> carriers to take on new traffic in disaster situations, which is one of the
> strongest points of t
The FCC hasn’t enforced it because the burden on large carriers to collect that
data would be insane. And it would be reduce the flexibility of large carriers
to take on new traffic in disaster situations, which is one of the strongest
points of the PSTN. It’s not like the carriers have the data
On 10/4/22 5:23 PM, Peter Beckman wrote:
On Tue, 4 Oct 2022, Michael Thomas wrote:
Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to
use what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the ingress
provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to
On Tue, 4 Oct 2022, Michael Thomas wrote:
Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to use
what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the ingress provider to
police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof whatever email
address I want. The FCC
I don’t think they are…
> On Oct 4, 2022, at 6:54 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>
>
>> On 10/4/22 3:08 PM, Shane Ronan wrote:
>> I'm talking about PSTN hops, which like I previously said still accounts for
>> a VERY significant amount of calls.
>>
>>
> But what percentage of the spam calls? I t
On 10/4/22 3:08 PM, Shane Ronan wrote:
I'm talking about PSTN hops, which like I previously said still
accounts for a VERY significant amount of calls.
But what percentage of the spam calls? I thought they were mainly coming
from voip/SIP?
Mike
want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.
>>
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>> -
>> Mike Hammett
>> Intelligent Computing Solutions
>> http://www.ics-il.com
>>
>> Midwest-IX
>> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>>
>> ---
ot;Shane Ronan"
<mailto:sh...@ronan-online.com>
*To: *"Michael Thomas" <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>
*Cc: *nanog@nanog.org
*Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough
(Robocalls)
The issue isn'
> provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof
>>>>> whatever email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Mike
>>>>>
>>>&
http://www.ics-il.com
Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com
*From: *"Shane Ronan"
<mailto:sh...@ronan-online.com>
*To: *"Michael Thomas" <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>
*Cc: *nanog@nanog.org
*
uld be mostly ignoring
>>> legacy signaling, IMO.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mike
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -
>>>> Mike Hammett
>>>> Intelligent Computing Solutions
>>>
allowing me to spoof whatever
>>> email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mike
>>>
>>>>
>>>> -
>>>> Mike Hammett
>>>> Intelligent Computing Solution
't,
>>> something else needed to be tried.
>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to
>>> use what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the ingress
>>> provider to police. It's the equivalen
DDoS traffic coming from legit/botted sources that is not spoofed is not DDoS
amplification. DDoS amplification requires spoofing. If everyone did
BCP38/84, there would be no DDoS amplification attacks.
-Rich
On 10/4/22, 1:14 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Robert Blayzor via NANOG"
wrote:
"
<mailto:na...@ics-il.net>, nanog@nanog.org
*Sent: *Tuesday, October 4, 2022 1:21:41 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the
authorization isn't "free".
On 10/4/22 09:19, Mike Hammett wrote:
Sorta like in the IP world, if everyone did BCP38/84, amplification
attacks wouldn't exist. Not everyone does, so...
Wouldn't exist? Maybe only in part, BCP38/84 does nothing for a majority
of DDoS amp attacks. Most traffic is coming from legit/botted sou
Back when P-Asserted-Identity was coming into being I screamed at the
top of my lungs that it was going to get abused. The reply was that the
telephone network was a closed system so it wasn't a problem. It turns
out that we were both sort of right. At that time, email submission
authentication
MO.
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
>
> -
> Mike Hammett
> Intelligent Computing Solutions
> http://www.ics-il.com
>
> Midwest-IX
> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>
> --
> *From: *"Shane Ronan"
> *To: *"Michael Thomas"
--
*From: *"Shane Ronan"
*To: *"Michael Thomas"
*Cc: *"Mike Hammett" , nanog@nanog.org
*Sent: *Tuesday, October 4, 2022 1:21:41 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the aut
*"Shane Ronan"
<mailto:sh...@ronan-online.com>
*To: *"Michael Thomas" <mailto:m...@mtcc.com>
*Cc: *nanog@nanog.org
*Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
The iss
hael Thomas"
*To: *"Mike Hammett" , "Shane Ronan"
*Cc: *nanog@nanog.org
*Sent: *Tuesday, October 4, 2022 1:18:24 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
I think the point the other Mike wa
To: "Michael Thomas"
Cc: "Mike Hammett" , nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Tuesday, October 4, 2022 1:21:41 PM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't
"free"
On 10/4/22 7:05 AM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
Phone spam pretty much always involves the knowledge and involvement of the
provider. There are no phone providers who don't know when one of their
customers are making millions of robocalls.
International toll fraud also always involves the collusion
On October 3, 2022 at 16:05 m...@mtcc.com (Michael Thomas) wrote:
> The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The
> problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You
> don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes
> customer
p://www.midwest-ix.com
>
> --
> *From: *"Shane Ronan"
> *To: *"Michael Thomas"
> *Cc: *nanog@nanog.org
> *Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
> *Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
>
>
ot;
To: "Mike Hammett" , "Shane Ronan"
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Tuesday, October 4, 2022 1:18:24 PM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
I think the point the other Mike was trying to
tions
http://www.ics-il.com
Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com
*From: *"Shane Ronan"
*To: *"Michael Thomas"
*Cc: *nanog@nanog.org
*Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwom
On Tue, 2022-10-04 at 08:05 -0600, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> Phone spam pretty much always involves the knowledge and involvement
> of the provider. There are no phone providers who don't know when one
> of their customers are making millions of robocalls.
>
> International toll fraud also always inv
Phone spam pretty much always involves the knowledge and involvement of the
provider. There are no phone providers who don't know when one of their
customers are making millions of robocalls.
International toll fraud also always involves the collusion of corrupt small
country telephone monopoli
To: "Mike Hammett"
Cc: "Shane Ronan" , nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Tuesday, October 4, 2022 8:24:07 AM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 6:20 AM Mike Hammett < na...@ics-il.net > wrote:
Sorta like
else needed to be tried.
>
>
>
> -
> Mike Hammett
> Intelligent Computing Solutions
> http://www.ics-il.com
>
> Midwest-IX
> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>
> ------
> *From: *"Shane Ronan"
> *To: *"Michael Thomas"
>
mett"
To: "Shane Ronan"
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Tuesday, October 4, 2022 8:07:55 AM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone
policed their customers, this wouldn&#x
ww.midwest-ix.com
- Original Message -
From: "Shane Ronan"
To: "Michael Thomas"
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I
The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which
'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with, because it's entirely
dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume
that my peer or my peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing.
I ca
The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The
problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You
don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes
customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission
authentication
We're talking about blocking other carriers.
On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" wrote:
On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise.
Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
Mike
>
> On 1
At 04:51 PM 03/10/2022, Michael Thomas wrote:
Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this?
Because those pushing STIR/SHAKEN though the bacronym was so cool
they just had to do it, even if it wasn't going to help... :-\
Mike
On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise.
Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
Mike
On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas"
wrote:
On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
> 'Fi
Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise.
On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas"
wrote:
On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
> 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice
> providers for flouting robocall rules
On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice
providers for flouting robocall rules
https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
[...]
“This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its obligations under
the law, it n
'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice providers
for flouting robocall rules
https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
[...]
“This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its obligations under the
law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone net
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