On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't "free".
Since every http request in the universe requires a "database dip" and they are probably a billion times more common, that doesn't seem like a very compelling concern.
Mike
On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com> wrote: On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't be a problem. Since some don't, something else needed to be tried.Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to use what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the ingress provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof whatever email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago. Mike----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions http://www.ics-il.com Midwest-IX http://www.midwest-ix.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: *"Shane Ronan" <sh...@ronan-online.com> <mailto:sh...@ronan-online.com> *To: *"Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com> <mailto:m...@mtcc.com> *Cc: *nanog@nanog.org *Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM *Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls) The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with, because it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume that my peer or my peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing. I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark that a prefix should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does. Shane On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com> wrote: The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All it needed was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was always jurisdiction with the FCC. Mike On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote: > We're talking about blocking other carriers. > > On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com> wrote: > > On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote: > > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise. > > Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users? > > Mike > > > > > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas" <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband....@nanog.org on behalf of m...@mtcc.com> wrote: > > > > > > On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote: > > > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice > > > providers for flouting robocall rules > > > > > > https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/ > > > > > > [...] > > > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its obligations under > > > the law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone networks. Fines > > > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said in a > > > statement accompanying the announcement. “Providers that don’t follow > > > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers will now face swift > > > consequences.” > > > > > > It’s the first such enforcement action by the agency to reduce the > > > growing problem of robocalls since call ID verification protocols > > > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect this summer. > > > [...] > > > > Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this? > > > > Mike > > > >
