AS13030 -> http://www.init7.net/en/status/
-Chris
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 10:10 AM, Siegel, David wrote:
> As a matter of pure competitive intelligence gathering (i.e. I do not mean
> this as a rhetorical question), which providers list peering issues on
> their portal? Particularly when they mi
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 7:27 PM, Nonaht Leyte wrote:
> As many here know, I spent 4 years on the receiving end of the
> abuse@savvisbox: when I was hired it was for multiple roles, but the
> abuse@was a primary. Savvis had a significant spam problem when I
> arrived, and
> until just a few months
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 5:46 PM, Anne P. Mitchell, Esq.
wrote:
>> so aside from the abusers his customers will tend to
>> be heavy on single-recipient administrative emails rather than mailing
>> lists.
>
> Then, if they are truly one-to-one administrative emails, that's
> rather odd if they are ge
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
> You still haven't explained how "the memories of those who are at the table"
> help, when the NSA plant has very good reasons to say they're not an NSA
> plant, and you haven't explained how you can show they *are* a plant.
That is a problem between NSA, which rec
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 6:27 PM, Nonaht Leyte wrote:
Any abuse department which outright rejects (or claims they are unable to
> process) an obfuscated ("munged") complaint is not to be trusted - period.
>
This is very credible from someone admitting to scrubbing reports, of
information required b
On Wed, 6 Nov 2013, Landon wrote:
Hello,
We (iWeb AS32613) are currently making great strides in getting out from
under the volume of reports received and getting on top of things.
How much trouble does your abuse department go to in order to obfuscate
headers when providing evidence of spammi
> If you send him a complaint scrubbed in the manner you describe, he
> won't have enough information to act. You'd basically be wasting both
> his time and yours.
As many here know, I spent 4 years on the receiving end of the
abuse@savvisbox: when I was hired it was for multiple roles, but the
ab
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 12:30 PM, Landon wrote:
> Hello,
>
How much trouble does your abuse department go to in order to obfuscate
> headers when providing evidence of spamming activity regardless of if it’s
> intentional/professional spammer activity or some kind of malware infection
> allowing
On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 10:51:08PM +, J.J. Mc Kenna wrote:
> Comcast to XO due to Comcast's TATA peering issue.
>
> Ongoing.
I'd love to see verifiable public data to back up that claim.
Kind regards,
Job
pgpkM0i4UwL6b.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Comcast to XO due to Comcast's TATA peering issue.
Ongoing.
J.J.
From: Siegel, David
Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2013 7:10 AM
To: Tassos Chatzithomaoglou; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: [GRAYMAIL] RE: Level3 and AT&T Latency
As a matter of pure competitive
> so aside from the abusers his customers will tend to
> be heavy on single-recipient administrative emails rather than mailing
> lists.
Then, if they are truly one-to-one administrative emails, that's rather odd if
they are generating a disproportionate number of spam complaints, dontcha
thin
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 5:16 PM, Anne P. Mitchell, Esq.
wrote:
> Because this is an issue inherent primarily with bulk mail,
> we remove all identifying information *except* the unsub link,
> which *should* have a unique identifying token embedded
> within, from which the sender *should* be able to
In message <5964ada4-8fcf-4fce-9e64-7474ccae5...@consultant.com>, Cutler James
R writes:
> Dynamic DNS providers will undoubtably endeavor to make money from
> and SRV entries for publicly-reachable services in SOHO and home
> networks. Dynamic DNS providers are normally not delegated author
> On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Landon wrote:
>> How much trouble does your abuse department go to in order to obfuscate
>> headers when providing evidence of spamming activity regardless of if it?s
>> intentional/professional spammer activity or some kind of malware infection
>> allowing a t
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 4:45 PM, William Herrin wrote:
> Incidentally, I'd suggest that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
> of cure. Simply block outbound tcp port 25 for new hosting customers
> on a "tell me if you want it open" basis.
>
>
Or to thwart those clever spammers, block inbound S
Direct access to the bootstrap loader should bypass any access
restrictions configured on the box. However, it sounds like the device
is not dropping into single-user mode.
I would suggest removing and wiping the CF card. Then boot from
alternative media (USB) and snapshot on to the blank ca
Hi sure
Please find screenshot...
@Mehmet - I checked that in daytime and didn't found anything specific
about that version. Sorry don't have it handy with me right now but will
check exact version again in morning and will update you.
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 10:33 PM, Rakesh M wrote:
> Can
Can you paste in the output after 'boot -s' , I came across several issues
while recovering Root Password, But never faced this :)
On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 2:41 AM, Anurag Bhatia wrote:
> Hello everyone!
>
>
> Greetings of the day.
>
>
> I am kind of (badly) stuck with multiple routers and not a
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Landon wrote:
> We (iWeb AS32613) are currently making great strides in getting out from
> under the volume of reports received and getting on top of things.
Incidentally, I'd suggest that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure. Simply block outbound tcp p
Maybe you're not doing anything wrong and someone tweaked the routers and
marked the console as insecure, a previous owner maybe?
http://superuser.com/questions/85536/securing-freebsd-in-single-user-mode
http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=boot&sektion=8
HTH.
On 6 November 2013 21:11, Anu
On Nov 6, 2013, at 1:11 PM, Anurag Bhatia wrote:
> Hello everyone!
>
>
> Greetings of the day.
>
>
> I am kind of (badly) stuck with multiple routers and not able to recover
> the root password. It's Juniper M7i. I have followed the Juniper support
> page as given here -
> http://www.juniper
In message <5964ada4-8fcf-4fce-9e64-7474ccae5...@consultant.com>, Cutler James
R writes:
> On Nov 6, 2013, at 9:02 AM, Livingood, Jason
> wrote:
>
> > Reverse DNS for (typical) residential customer IPv6 addresses is dead,
> > people just haven't come to grips with it just yet.;-)
> >
> >
> > Wh
On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Landon wrote:
> How much trouble does your abuse department go to in order to obfuscate
> headers when providing evidence of spamming activity regardless of if it’s
> intentional/professional spammer activity or some kind of malware infection
> allowing a third part
Hello everyone!
Greetings of the day.
I am kind of (badly) stuck with multiple routers and not able to recover
the root password. It's Juniper M7i. I have followed the Juniper support
page as given here -
http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/en_US/junos/topics/task/configuration/authentication-root-
Hello,
We (iWeb AS32613) are currently making great strides in getting out from
under the volume of reports received and getting on top of things.
How much trouble does your abuse department go to in order to obfuscate
headers when providing evidence of spamming activity regardless of if it’s
int
On Wed, 06 Nov 2013 08:50:06 +0900, Masataka Ohta said:
> valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
>
> >>> How do you intend to *find* the agents
> >>> who were hired at a government agency's under-the-table request that
> >>> never had a written record that the company had access to?
> >>
> >> By memories o
As a matter of pure competitive intelligence gathering (i.e. I do not mean this
as a rhetorical question), which providers list peering issues on their portal?
Particularly when they might be a bit more of an ongoing nature vs. a concrete
outage?
Dave
-Original Message-
From: Tassos
On Nov 6, 2013, at 9:02 AM, Livingood, Jason
wrote:
> Reverse DNS for (typical) residential customer IPv6 addresses is dead,
> people just haven¹t come to grips with it just yetŠ ;-)
>
>
> When publicly-reachable services in home networks are created that may be
> a different matter of course.
Reverse DNS for (typical) residential customer IPv6 addresses is dead,
people just haven¹t come to grips with it just yetŠ ;-)
When publicly-reachable services in home networks are created that may be
a different matter of course. But it is hard to imagine an ISP
automatically or dynamically gene
On 11/5/13, 11:01 PM, "Mark Andrews" wrote:
>In message <20131106033003.gb6...@dyn.com>, Andrew Sullivan writes:
>> On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 07:57:59PM -0500, Phil Bedard wrote:
>> >
>> > I think every major residential ISP in the US has been doing this for
>>5+
>> > years now.
>>
>> Comcast doe
On 11/5/13, 7:57 PM, "Phil Bedard" wrote:
>I think every major residential ISP in the US has been doing this for 5+
>years now. I worked at one provider who made a pretty decent chunk of
>change off the monthly ad revenue and that was 6 years ago. People typo a
>lot of URLs.
There¹s less mon
You can find a fairly good overview at
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-livingood-dns-redirect-03
Comcast does not do this, see
http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/comcast-domain-helper-shuts-down
Jason Livingood (Comcast)
On 11/5/13, 3:38 PM, "Warren Bailey"
mailto:wbai...@satellite
Mark Andrews wrote:
>>> The DHCP reply packet is special as is is broadcasted.
>>
>> What?
>>
>> Rfc3315 is explicit on it:
>>
>> 18.2.8. Transmission of Reply Messages
>>
>> The Reply message MUST be unicast
>> through the interface on which the original message was received.
>
> Whi
In message <5279f5e1.9030...@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>, Masataka Ohta writes:
> Mark Andrews wrote:
>
> >> You misunderstand very basic points on why forward and reverse
> >> DNS checking is useful.
> >>
> >> If an attacker can snoop DHCP reply packet to a victim's CPE, the
> >> attacker can sn
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