Re: hosted PBX/VOIP thru VPN?

On Nov 11, 2008, at 6:17 PM, Lorell Hathcock wrote: All: My customer wants to try to improve performance to his ATAs by creating a VPN from his network to the VOIP provider's network through the internet. I have to admit, the idea caught me flat footed. At the outset, it seems like we

Re: [funsec] McColo: Major Source of Online Scams and Spams Knocked Offline (fwd)

Since 11/5, my spam load has dropped from about 400,000 attempts per day to less than 40,000 ! And most of this I had noted was comming from what looked like compromised web hosts - eg: same host/domain name representing 10 or 20 addresses in any given range). I am shocked at the sudden and

RE: hosted PBX/VOIP thru VPN?

Yes, dissuade him. If anything a VPN will add latency unless possibly gear is replaced to provide the VPN that is significantly greater than current. But... if a provider en-route decided to "slow down" competing voice traffic, the VPN would hide it from the filters which might make it seem like

[funsec] McColo: Major Source of Online Scams and Spams Knocked Offline (fwd)

-- Forwarded message -- Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 18:22:42 -0800 From: Paul Ferguson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [funsec] McColo: Major Source of Online Scams and Spams Knocked Offline -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Via Security Fix. [snip]

Re: hosted PBX/VOIP thru VPN?

On 12/11/2008, at 3:17 PM, Lorell Hathcock wrote: All: My customer wants to try to improve performance to his ATAs by creating a VPN from his network to the VOIP provider's network through the internet. Thoughts? Should I try to dissuade him from this if performance is his main motiva

hosted PBX/VOIP thru VPN?

All: My customer wants to try to improve performance to his ATAs by creating a VPN from his network to the VOIP provider's network through the internet. I have to admit, the idea caught me flat footed. At the outset, it seems like we would want to do it just to improve security for end use

Cable re-management

Hi, I wondered if any of the NANO's (Specifically NYCNANO's) have ever brought in another company, or offered as a service to the general world cable re-management. I know Hugh O'Kane is a big place that does it, but I'm looking for said services in NYC. I have client datatel closets that

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hello, As several people have already observed here, AS 16735 announced almost the whole Internet last night to two of its peers (AS 27664, 174213 routes and AS 22548, 111231 routes). These routes were not propagated to the global Internet--and as

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

Hi Bill, On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 07:00:47PM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote: > On Tue, 11 Nov 2008, Mark Tinka wrote: > > Anyone know how we can contact AS16735 and their upstream > > AS27664. We think they are hijacking a number of our > > prefixes (AS24218- and AS17992-originated)

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

Hi! That's not true, as not all our prefixes were hijacked nor leaked, since they were originating them. If they were leaking them you might be able to see further AS's on the AS-PATH, incluiding the legitimate AS for originating those prefixes. We have seen issues like this also when a cus

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

That's not true, as not all our prefixes were hijacked nor leaked, since they were originating them. If they were leaking them you might be able to see further AS's on the AS-PATH, incluiding the legitimate AS for originating those prefixes. My point here is also about peers and upstreams to s

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

Hi! 94.46.0.0/16 194.88.142.0/23 194.11.23.0/24 82.102.0.0/18 195.246.238.0/23 194.107.127.0/24 81.92.192.0/19 193.227.238.0/23 We are trying to contact them in order to get some feedback, and some good explanation for this. The obviously were leaking full routing, are we all gonna annno

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

> > Hi! > > > We were hijacked aswell, by 27664 16735 > > > > Our affected prefixes were: > > > > 94.46.0.0/16 > > 194.88.142.0/23 > > 194.11.23.0/24 > > 82.102.0.0/18 > > 195.246.238.0/23 > > 194.107.127.0/24 > > 81.92.192.0/19 > > 193.227.238.0/23 > > > > We are trying to contact them in order

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

Possibly silly question: If a small ISP is leaking a full table and you cannot reach them, why not contact their upstreams? Can't really check a router from here, but I saw (for instance) Verio mentioned. I am certain as2914 runs a 24/7 NOC and is responsive. -- TTFN, patrick

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

Hi! We were hijacked aswell, by 27664 16735 Our affected prefixes were: 94.46.0.0/16 194.88.142.0/23 194.11.23.0/24 82.102.0.0/18 195.246.238.0/23 194.107.127.0/24 81.92.192.0/19 193.227.238.0/23 We are trying to contact them in order to get some feedback, and some good explanation for this.

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

Howdy, We were hijacked aswell, by 27664 16735 Our affected prefixes were: 94.46.0.0/16 194.88.142.0/23 194.11.23.0/24 82.102.0.0/18 195.246.238.0/23 194.107.127.0/24 81.92.192.0/19 193.227.238.0/23 We are trying to contact them in order to get some feedback, and some good explanation for thi

Re: Potential Prefix Hijack

> > On Tue, 11 Nov 2008, Mark Tinka wrote: > > Anyone know how we can contact AS16735 and their upstream > > AS27664. We think they are hijacking a number of our > > prefixes (AS24218- and AS17992-originated). > > Have you tried CERT-BR? Uh... I was about to say "they're usu

RE: Potential Prefix Hijack

We too saw this issue. 2008-11-11 01:56:36 GMT they took over one of our /20's ... Paul Kelly Technical Director Blacknight Internet Solutions ltd Hosting, Colocation, Dedicated servers IP Transit Services Tel: +353 (0) 59 9183072 Lo-call: 1850 929 929 DDI: +353 (0) 59 9183091 e-mail: [EMAIL PRO