From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Date:18 Oct 2000 20:29:33 GMT
Adding more bits to the pool should never hurt; the cryptographic
mixing ensures this. What _can_ hurt is adding predictable bits but
(erroneously) bumping up the entropy counter.
Yes; and writing to /de
>
> On Wed, Oct 18, 2000 at 05:20:43PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > > The only thing needed is to add the SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM flag to request_irq
> > > in the drivers.
> > >
> > > If nobody objects, I'll submit a patch that adds this to network drivers.
> >
> > Network timing is controllable remotel
Horst von Brand wrote:
>Adding stuff that adds no entropy (or at least doesn't add to the estimated
>entropy pool) is just a waste of effort, AFAIKS.
Adding stuff that has no entropy is a waste of effort.
Adding stuff that probably has entropy, but where you don't bump
the entropy counter, *doe
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner) said:
> Jeff Garzik wrote:
> >Then you make your local random pool vulnerable to external
> >manipulation, to a certain extent...
> Adding more bits to the pool should never hurt; the cryptographic
> mixing ensures this. What _can_ hurt is adding predictable bit
Jeff Garzik wrote:
>Then you make your local random pool vulnerable to external
>manipulation, to a certain extent...
Adding more bits to the pool should never hurt; the cryptographic
mixing ensures this. What _can_ hurt is adding predictable bits but
(erroneously) bumping up the entropy counte
On Wed, 18 Oct 2000, Sandy Harris wrote:
> So methinks the questions are whether /dev/random can get one bit of
> unknowable-by-the-enemy entropy per packet passing through a gateway
> and whether it would estimate entropy sufficiently conservatively in
> this case. If both answers are yes, please
Sandy Harris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
[...]
> I'd still like to see the patch applied, though. I'd like /dev/random
> to work well "out of the box" on the FreeS/WAN gateways people are
> building out of older surplus hardware.
The question at hand is more "looks like it works well", and it is
Jeff Garzik wrote:
>
> "Oliver M . Bolzer" wrote:
> >
> > Hi!
> >
> > Recently I needed a lot of entroy for cryptographic purposes on a
> > server and took a look at where the entroy for drivers/char/random.c
> > was coming from, as the server didn't have any activly used mouse/keyboard.
> >
> >
On Wed, Oct 18, 2000 at 05:20:43PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > The only thing needed is to add the SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM flag to request_irq
> > in the drivers.
> >
> > If nobody objects, I'll submit a patch that adds this to network drivers.
>
> Network timing is controllable remotely
Read Bruce Sch
> The only thing needed is to add the SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM flag to request_irq
> in the drivers.
>
> If nobody objects, I'll submit a patch that adds this to network drivers.
Network timing is controllable remotely
Alan
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"Oliver M . Bolzer" wrote:
>
> Hi!
>
> Recently I needed a lot of entroy for cryptographic purposes on a
> server and took a look at where the entroy for drivers/char/random.c
> was coming from, as the server didn't have any activly used mouse/keyboard.
>
> Anyway, I noticed that only 3 drivers
"Oliver M . Bolzer" wrote:
> Hi!
>
> Recently I needed a lot of entroy for cryptographic purposes on a
> server and took a look at where the entroy for drivers/char/random.c
> was coming from, as the server didn't have any activly used mouse/keyboard.
>
> Anyway, I noticed that only 3 drivers wer
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