Re: use of add_interrupt_randomness in drivers missing in many drivers

[David Wagner]

Jeff Garzik  wrote:
>Then you make your local random pool vulnerable to external
>manipulation, to a certain extent...

Adding more bits to the pool should never hurt; the cryptographic
mixing ensures this.  What _can_ hurt is adding predictable bits but
(erroneously) bumping up the entropy counter.

So, if you're not sure whether those bits are unpredictable and random
or not, the right thing to do is to mix 'em into the pool, but don't
bump the entropy counter.  The greater your diversity of sources, the
less likely it is that you encounter a catastrophic randomness failure.
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