Re: [IPsec] CRL checking when selecting a certifcate

2009-09-04 Thread Tero Kivinen
David Wierbowski writes: > > Tero, thanks for the comments and the clarification on how to read a lower > case must. I do have a few more comments. > > >So implementations cannot just search uppercase "MUST/SHOULD/MAY" > >texts and assume it is enough to make sure those are correct. It also > >n

Re: [IPsec] Ikev2 HA message Id Issue

2009-09-04 Thread Tero Kivinen
pasi.ero...@nokia.com writes: > > If dpd is enabled then ikev2 counters keep updated frequently. > > This depends on how often you do DPD... Obviously, you want dead > IKE_SAs to go away eventually, but e.g. 30 minute DPD interval would > be sufficient for that. If your DPD interval was close to

Re: [IPsec] Questions to IKEv2bis draft: IVs of retransmitted packets

2009-09-04 Thread naoyoshi ueda
Hello Tero, Thank you for your clear answer. It cleared up my questions. Thanks, Naoyoshi Ueda 2009/9/2 Tero Kivinen : > naoyoshi ueda writes: >> According to ikev2bis-04 section 2.1: >> >   A retransmission from the initiator >> >   MUST be bitwise identical to the original request.  That is, >

Re: [IPsec] Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases

2009-09-04 Thread David Wierbowski
>Yes, I will soften the language a bit, but I won't mention a DELETE payload. If some implementations do it. >others may come to expect it. We don't want to encourage that by suggesting that it's a good idea. Yoav, Why is it a a bad idea to include a DELETE payload in this case? Dave Wierbowski_

Re: [IPsec] Questions to IKEv2bis draft: IVs of retransmitted packets

2009-09-04 Thread naoyoshi ueda
Hello Jeff, Sorry, I withhold the product's name because of my business commitments. However, I just say that it is not an ordinary network device like VPN gateway. Regards, Naoyoshi Ueda 2009/9/3 Jeff Sun : > All in all, the qualifications of being a true retransmitted IKE > request/response m

Re: [IPsec] Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases

2009-09-04 Thread Keith Welter
>>> In an IKE_AUTH >>>exchange, or in the subsequent INFORMATIONAL exchnage, only the >>>following notifications cause the IKE SA to be deleted or not >>>created, without a DELETE payload: >>>o UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD >>>o INVALID_SYNTAX >>>o AUTHENTICATION_FAILED >>

[IPsec] Fw: Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases

2009-09-04 Thread Keith Welter
> >>> In an IKE_AUTH > >>>exchange, or in the subsequent INFORMATIONAL exchnage, only the > >>>following notifications cause the IKE SA to be deleted or not > >>>created, without a DELETE payload: > >>>o UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD > >>>o INVALID_SYNTAX > >>>o AUTHENTICA

Re: [IPsec] Fw: Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases

2009-09-04 Thread Yoav Nir
Then I should have explained better. If an initiator sees an error in the response, the exchange is already over, so the only way it can notify the responder of the error, is to create a new INFORMATIONAL exchange with an error notification. All the text here discusses the one INFORMATIONAL exc

Re: [IPsec] Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases

2009-09-04 Thread Yoav Nir
On Sep 4, 2009, at 5:53 PM, David Wierbowski wrote: >Yes, I will soften the language a bit, but I won't mention a DELETE payload. >If some implementations do it. >others may come to expect it. We don't want to encourage that by suggesting >that it's a good idea. Yoav, Why is it a a bad idea t

Re: [IPsec] Fw: Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases

2009-09-04 Thread Keith Welter
> Re: [IPsec] Fw: Issue #26: Missing treatment of error cases > > Then I should have explained better. > > If an initiator sees an error in the response, the exchange is already over, so the > only way it can notify the responder of the error, is to create a new INFORMATIONAL > exchange with a