Hi David,
At 16:10 06-09-2013, David Morris wrote:
Seriously though, NSA makes a nice villan, but much of our hardware is
manufactured in counties with fewer restraints than the NSA when it
comes the right to privacy, etc. Wouldn't suprise me that my major
brand router has sniffers from more than
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 3:21 AM, SM wrote:
> Hi David,
> At 16:10 06-09-2013, David Morris wrote:
>
>> Seriously though, NSA makes a nice villan, but much of our hardware is
>> manufactured in counties with fewer restraints than the NSA when it
>> comes the right to privacy, etc. Wouldn't suprise
> From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Roger_J=F8rgensen?=
> Isn't the payload the important part to protect?
Ecrypting only the headers was a suggestion for the case where the routers
don't have enough spare crunch to encrypt the entire payload of every packet.
Whether that would do anything useful, o
>The other countries concerned did not employ torture as the US did under
President Bush.
You mean like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia
-J
Probably best if we keep the politics off the IETF list.
Noel
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:27 AM, Noel Chiappa wrote:
> Probably best if we keep the politics off the IETF list.
>
> Noel
>
I grew up in politics. There is a method to my approach here.
I know that the IETF list is watched. I am making it clear that I am a
personal political opponent of C
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:07 AM, Jorge Amodio wrote:
>
> >The other countries concerned did not employ torture as the US did under
> President Bush.
>
> You mean like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia
>
My original comment was limited to adversaries with potential intercept
capabil
On Sunday, September 08, 2013 11:13:44 Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
...
> might be the type of people who put confederate flags on their cars.
...
Since Bull Run is the Union name for the battle, probably not (It'd have been
Manassas from a Confederate perspective).
Scott K
P. S. We are rathe
At 07:07 08-09-2013, Jorge Amodio wrote:
You mean like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia
There were people from Pakistan who participated in the IETF. I
recall an email exchange where a person from that country received an
unpleasant comment from someone who is part of the IETF
On 9/8/13 10:37 AM, SM wrote:
> At 07:07 08-09-2013, Jorge Amodio wrote:
>> You mean like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia
>
> There were people from Pakistan who participated in the IETF. I recall
> an email exchange where a person from that country received an
> unpleasant commen
--On Friday, September 06, 2013 19:50 -0800 Melinda Shore
wrote:
> On 9/6/13 7:45 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
>> They have different problems, but are inherently less
>> reliable than web of trust GPG signing. It doesn't scale
>> well, but when done in a defined context for defined
>> purpose
On 09/09/2013 03:03, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:27 AM, Noel Chiappa wrote:
>
>> Probably best if we keep the politics off the IETF list.
>>
>> Noel
>>
>
> I grew up in politics. There is a method to my approach here.
Nevertheless, it is the wrong method here.
ietf-boun...@ietf.org wrote on 09/08/2013 08:14:07 AM:
> From: Phillip Hallam-Baker
>
> Another worrying aspect of BULLRUN is that it is named after a
> victory for the confederate side in the US civil war.
But the battles are only called the (First or Second) Battle of Bull Run
by the NORTH
Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Could we do smime as well?
> If we had a list of smime cert fingerprints it can be used for trust
> reinforcement
Sure, but how does one establish any kind of web of trust in smime?
I have to gather everyone's certificate, and I get no transitivity.
I have removed the attribution of this comment on purpose, because it applies
to multiple people, and I want to attack a behaviour, not a person:
>> This is what I mean by "a high bar." Signing someone's PGP key should
mean
>> "I know this person as X," not "this person is X."
> D
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12325.html
That's a pretty damning indictment of the development of IPSec from John
Gilmore.
Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood
On Sep 8, 2013, at 5:33 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
> To all the people who posted to this thread about how they don't know what
> a PGP key signature means, and who did not PGP or S/MIME their email:
What's the upside to signing my email? I know why I want everybody I know to
sign my email,
Here are some thoughts on reports related to wide-spread monitoring and
potential impacts on Internet standards, from me and Stephen Farrell:
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
Comments appreciated, as always.
Jari & Stephen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 9/8/13 3:50 PM, Ted Lemon wrote:
> On Sep 8, 2013, at 5:33 PM, Michael Richardson
> wrote:
>> To all the people who posted to this thread about how they don't
>> know what a PGP key signature means, and who did not PGP or
>> S/MIME their email:
>
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 9/8/13 5:09 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
>
> On 9/8/2013 6:21 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>> On 9/8/13 3:50 PM, Ted Lemon wrote:
>>>
>>> What's the upside to signing my email? I know why I want
>>> everybody I know to sign my email, but what's the
Subject: Re: pgp signing in van Date: Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 09:50:19PM +
Quoting Ted Lemon (ted.le...@nominum.com):
> On Sep 8, 2013, at 5:33 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
> > To all the people who posted to this thread about how they don't know what
> > a PGP key signature means, and who did
--On Friday, September 06, 2013 17:11 +0100 Tony Finch
wrote:
> John C Klensin wrote:
>>
>> Please correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me that
>> DANE-like approaches are significantly better than traditional
>> PKI ones only to the extent to which:
>...
> Yes, but there are some compens
Will the discussion include the pervasive data mining from companies
exploiting our Internet use for marketing and targeted advertising purposes
?
-J
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 4:53 PM, IETF Chair wrote:
> Here are some thoughts on reports related to wide-spread monitoring and
> potential impacts
On 09/09/2013 01:24 AM, Jorge Amodio wrote:
> Will the discussion include the pervasive data mining from companies
> exploiting our Internet use for marketing and targeted advertising purposes
> ?
IMO the discussion should of course include that as one part
of a larger thing.
Corporate privacy-
Hi Joel,
At 11:59 08-09-2013, joel jaeggli wrote:
Should your tools, the contents of your mind, and the various effects
and context of your personal communication become instruments of
state-power? Because the tools we've built are certainly capable of that.
Yes. That's not a good motivation t
There is no upside.
By signing your mail you lose plausible deniability, remove legal doubt as to
what you said...
Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood/
From: ietf-boun...@ietf.org [ietf-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ted Lemon
[ted.le...@nominum.com]
On 9/8/13 4:36 PM, SM wrote:
> Hi Joel,
> At 11:59 08-09-2013, joel jaeggli wrote:
>> Should your tools, the contents of your mind, and the various effects
>> and context of your personal communication become instruments of
>> state-power? Because the tools we've built are certainly capable of that
...and a rebuttal from Jeff Schiller.
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12497.html
Pass the popcorn.
Lloyd Wood
http://sat-net.com/L.Wood/
From: ietf-boun...@ietf.org [ietf-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
l.w...@surrey.ac.uk [l.w.
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