instream - it's not
easy :/ (not mentioning doing it for multiple kernels + waiting for upgrade of
libcs or
doing workarounds). So beign probaly the easiest way it's not easy way at all.
Some project are
distributing userland piece of code with
re are fine.
Perhaps instead of serving extreme form of relativism is better to not
anwser at all.
I think that informative and didactic value of such response is negligible.
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Kind regards,
Milo
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http://
ferent alternatives? Ok, got it. Thanks. :)
>
>
> Doug
>
You are missing a slight difference between discussing alternatives and
- more or less - advertising proprietary software on "GPL-powered"
project's mailing list.
--
Regards,
Milo
_
log.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-damage-disclosure
http://www.links.org/?p=1196
... And many, many more examples. There were discussions about x509 and
CA's credibility or ability to perform their tasks. Not much to add here
I think.
--
Regards,
Milo
___
and
effort (if any) in some kind of approach/tools/procedures because you
believe there will be no incident in which they'll provided you protection.
Giving users easier-then-hacking-through-sources way of setting bigger
key size isn't a crime.
I think I should give Werner much faster phone now ;) (on my own using
8192-bit RSA key takes about 2-4 seconds to successfully auth; phone was
made in 2010 and is simply _average_ smartphone)
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Milo
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On 05/04/2012 05:13 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 05/04/2012 10:17 AM, Milo wrote:
>> Well, many expect rise of the quantum computing during lives of most
>> of us. This can trash most (if not all) asymmetric algorithms
>> (Shor's algorithm)
>
> No. It can tr
On 05/05/2012 01:57 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 05/04/2012 04:35 PM, Milo wrote:
>> Yes - niche, proof-of-concept, poorly analyzed ciphers. Let's talk
>> about those widely used and considered mainstream. Those are our
>> biggest concern.
>
> McEliece is almos
On 05/05/2012 10:13 AM, Faramir wrote:
> El 04-05-2012 10:17, Milo escribió:
>> Hello Robert, Hello all.
> ...
>>> How many petabytes are sent across the wire each day? Do you
>>> really think people will be storing all of today's traffic for
>>> twen
On 05/05/2012 12:08 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 04/05/12 22:35, Milo wrote:
>> You can't tell consumer or end-user that he can't use 256-bit, symmetric
>> cipher for his (even!) porn stash because this is some kind of faux pas
>> and he is iconoclast because of
On 05/05/2012 01:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 05/05/12 12:49, Milo wrote:
>> 1) You are responding to citation regarding symmetric crypto with
>> widely used key length.
>
> (...)
>
>
>>>> One more time - this is not up to you or software authors
On 05/05/2012 02:20 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 5/5/12 4:37 AM, Milo wrote:
>> This is futile. I'm reminding you that you are giving one example of
>> rarely used algo (so _niche_ and _out_of_mainsteam_) to back your
>> statement "that there is good amount of t
On 05/05/2012 03:13 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 5/5/12 8:57 AM, Milo wrote:
>> "Derivatives of Shor's algorithm are widely conjectured to be effective
>> against all mainstream public-key algorithms including RSA,
>> Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptog
On 05/05/2012 04:26 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 5/5/12 10:17 AM, Milo wrote:
>> "(...) This improves the strength of the algorithm when using keying
>> option 2, and _provides_ _backward_compatibility_ with DES with keying
>> option 3."
>
> One-key 3DES
On 05/05/2012 04:17 PM, Milo wrote:
> (...)
>
> You are mixing two topics:
>
> Need of security margin better then provided by one of common, widely
> used asymmetric algorithms using 4k key
I was rather thinking about 4k RSA key or "security equivalent provided
by one
If I look at the debug messages emitted by the OpenSSH client, I'm
> under the impression that key exchange is already completed before
> authentication with RSA starts.
Hm, shouldn't authentication happen before exchanging key for
symmetric part of encryption during the SSH sess
86-644.6.3-1ubuntu5+5ubuntu1
mingw-w64 2.0.1-1
mingw-w64-dev 2.0.1-1
mingw-w64-tools 2.0.1-1
mingw32-runtime 3.15.2-0ubuntu1
(...)
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Regards,
g some level of integration with gnupg.
Please follow vim docs for details.
> --Paul
>
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>
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Regards,
Milo
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Peter.
On 09/09/2012 08:39 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 09/09/12 13:12, Milo wrote:
>> Also there are vim scrips allowing some level of integration with gnupg.
>
> Personally, I'd have more faith in a text editor that was written ground-up
> with
> security in mind.
Hi!
On 09/09/2012 09:16 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 09/09/12 21:06, Milo wrote:
>> I'm not sure what you are trying to say/prove by polemics with things I
>> didn't wrote. I won't speculate about your faith in editors, your threat
>> model, and probab
describing "secure data modification/handling" without troubling
yourself with defining "safe editor".
Also considering your chase after "safety" and "privacy" think about
focusing on "secure" hardware and OS (could be that your "safe text
editor
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