Re: policy url is not set on selfsigs

2010-08-12 Thread David Shaw
On Aug 12, 2010, at 12:30 PM, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > Hi. > > Just found out, that a policy _is_ actually set when using > --set-policy-urls when creating a key (--gen-key) > > But it seems there is no way of changing that later.. > I've looked through the code but could not find t

Re: Change encryption on the secret key

2010-08-16 Thread David Shaw
On Aug 16, 2010, at 8:38 PM, Joseph Isadore Ziff wrote: > Dear Fellow Gnupg users, > > I recently grew more knowlegeable about of the different ciphers and > compression methods. I already generated my secret key but would like to > change the symmetric encryption protecting the secret key. I p

Re: Split Data Packet into Multiple Packets?

2010-08-16 Thread David Shaw
On Aug 16, 2010, at 6:24 PM, James Board wrote: > Hi, > > I looked into the OpenPGP Message Format spec, and some encrypted files, and > figured out that no matter how large my encrypted message is, gpg uses a > single Data Packet for the cipher text. Can I somehow split that Data Packet > in

Re: Strange behaviour of gpg when importing key from keyserver

2010-08-25 Thread David Shaw
> I'm using GnuPG 1.4.10b in a Windows XP machine, in Spanish > language. I don't know exactly the command used, since I use GPGShell > GUI, but I already contacted the author of GPGShell, and he told me > cmd-windows are GPG itself, so it is not a problem with GPGShell. > > Now, the pro

Re: Generating smart-card stubs on a clean computer?

2010-08-31 Thread David Shaw
On Aug 31, 2010, at 9:34 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > I can find docs on generating a key on a smart card, and migrating an > existing key to the smart card. But I can't figure out how to configure > the smart card on a clean machine that never had my secret keys. > > The card has both signing and e

Overflow bug in bzip2

2010-09-21 Thread David Shaw
Hi folks, This isn't a GnuPG bug per se, but given that many (most?) people using GnuPG have it linked against libbz2, please read http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-986-1 and upgrade appropriately for your platform. To tell if your installation of GnuPG is using libbz2, run "gpg2 --version" (or "g

Re: multiple keys vs multiple identities

2010-09-24 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 24, 2010, at 8:15 AM, Vjaceslavs Klimovs wrote: > Hi, > If I have multiple not related e-mail accounts, is it better to create > one key pair with multiple identities or a separate key pair for every > account? It's really a matter of taste. Some people like using different keys for diff

Re: per-user data signatures [was: Re: multiple keys vs multiple identities]

2010-09-24 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 24, 2010, at 11:23 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 09/24/2010 10:30 AM, Simon Richter wrote: >> Of course. I was talking about data signatures, i.e. "I'm signing this >> with my work hat on". > > ah, gotcha. sorry for the misunderstanding. > >> The main use case I have is my Debian w

Re: per-user data signatures [was: Re: multiple keys vs multiple identities]

2010-09-24 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 24, 2010, at 12:47 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 09/24/2010 11:53 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> There is actually a defined field for this in OpenPGP (see section 5.2.3.22, >> Signer's User ID). I don't think anyone implements it though. > >

Re: how slow are 4Kbit RSA keys? [was: Re: multiple keys vs multiple identities]

2010-09-27 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 24, 2010, at 4:29 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > Are there other interpretations of the above results? does anyone else > want to post comparable data points on different hardware? How powerful > is a typical smartphone anyway? What kind of a cutoff are people > willing to accept in te

Re: per-user data signatures [was: Re: multiple keys vs multiple identities]

2010-09-27 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 24, 2010, at 2:52 PM, Phil Brooke wrote: > On Fri, 24 Sep 2010, David Shaw wrote: >> There is actually a defined field for this in OpenPGP (see section 5.2.3.22, >> Signer's User ID). I don't think anyone implements it though. > > Is there any particular

Re: per-user data signatures [was: Re: multiple keys vs multiple identities]

2010-09-28 Thread David Shaw
On Sep 24, 2010, at 1:17 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > second, what does "this option implies --ask-sig-expire ..." mean? it > seems to mean "this implies that the following options are not > available" or something like that. You are correct. The manual is incorrect. Setting force-v3-sigs

Re: Remove key from an encrypted file?

2010-10-06 Thread David Shaw
On Oct 6, 2010, at 1:19 PM, Benjamin Bressman wrote: > If I use GnuPG to encrypt a file with multiple keys is it possible to > remove one of those keys at a later date? > > Let's say I encrypt sensitive information so that three users could > decrypt it, but one of those users leaves the organiza

Re: Is there a maximum length for an OpenPGP UID?

2010-10-21 Thread David Shaw
On Oct 21, 2010, at 5:26 PM, MFPA wrote: > Is there a maximum length for an OpenPGP UID? Yes, but it's huge: 4,294,967,295 characters long. That's the OpenPGP answer. In practice, however, using GnuPG, the maximum is 2048 characters. David ___ Gnu

Re: Changing secret key encryption algorithms

2010-10-22 Thread David Shaw
On Oct 22, 2010, at 4:51 AM, Paul Richard Ramer wrote: > On Thu, 21 Oct 2010 09:40:11 -0700, Dan Cowsill wrote: >> It seems the algorithms are mapped to algo ID's. I can confirm that the >> algorithm is different than than the one used on my real secret key, but >> I had not been able to find any

Re: Overflow bug in bzip2

2010-11-07 Thread David Shaw
On Nov 7, 2010, at 6:19 PM, Morten Gulbrandsen wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > David Shaw wrote: >> Hi folks, >> >> This isn't a GnuPG bug per se, but given that many (most?) people using >> GnuPG have it li

Re: Examine a key file

2010-11-15 Thread David Shaw
On Nov 15, 2010, at 3:19 PM, Scott Lambdin wrote: > > Greetings: > > If I have a base 64 exported PGP key, how can I extract the descriptive > data about the key without importing it? > > I just want to see this stuff: > > pub 1024D/B00BFACE 2010-10-11 > uid S

Re: Examine a key file

2010-11-15 Thread David Shaw
On Nov 15, 2010, at 4:42 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 11/15/2010 4:38 PM, Ingo Klöcker wrote: >> The following is sufficient: >> gpg -v > Doesn't this import the key? The OP specified that it ought not import > the key. It does not import the key unless you explicitly say --import. David

Re: GPG does not build on SuSE SLES 11

2010-11-19 Thread David Shaw
On Nov 19, 2010, at 6:28 AM, Florian Schwind wrote: > On 19.11.2010 11:12, Florian Schwind wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> I was not able to run the "make ckeck" for GPG 1.4.10 on a SLES 11 >> (i386) successfully (I also tried 1.4.11). Since I'm not sure if there >> is some configuration issue with my se

Re: Remove a recipient from a message without viewing it

2010-11-21 Thread David Shaw
On Nov 21, 2010, at 4:31 AM, Nathan Krasnopoler wrote: > Is there a way to remove a recipient from a message without having any > of the private keys needed to view the message? > > For example, is message M is encrypted to Sam, John, and Bob as text > C, I would like to output C_s that is M encr

Re: minimum_ownertrust

2010-11-24 Thread David Shaw
On Nov 24, 2010, at 4:57 AM, Imran Khan wrote: > Hi, > Can some one please guide what is the difference between ownertrust and > minimum_ownertrust? > My understanding is that ownertrust is explicitly assigned to a key while, > minimum_ownertrust is computed from trust signatures on the key.Hav

Re: Store revoke cert. in symmetric file?

2010-12-07 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 7, 2010, at 8:05 AM, Chris Poole wrote: > I want to check I'm not doing something stupid. > > I have backed up my .gnupg directory, including my revoke certificate, > to a symmetrically-encrypted tar file. > > The password for this is a 50 character randomly-generated, stored in > my KeeP

Re: Store revoke cert. in symmetric file?

2010-12-07 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 7, 2010, at 11:56 AM, Chris Poole wrote: >> Why not just store the GPG encrypted file directly with the "strong >> passphrase that I know" ? > > I'm happy to do that, I'm just trying to keep the "very long, > complicated passphrases I have to remember" to as few as possible. > > I really

Re: Armor key - X.501

2010-12-08 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 8, 2010, at 8:01 AM, Mohan Radhakrishnan wrote: > Hi, > What is the standard that the GPG armor key is compliant with ? > X.501 ? RFC-4880 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880). See section 6 in particular for how the armor is formed, and sections 4 and 11 for what goes into t

Re: Protecting IDs at a key signing party

2010-12-08 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 8, 2010, at 3:20 PM, Hank Ivy wrote: > I moved to a small town in a new state for personal reasons. For work I > telecommuted as an > independent consultant. A computer user group I joined recently is going to > be holding a key > signing party. NOBODY has met me more than three time

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

2010-12-09 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 9, 2010, at 6:49 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: >> Or one can use enable-dsa2 in GnuPG and use any of the SHA2 hashes, >> they'll just be truncated down to 160 bits similarly to the >> SHA-224/SHA-256 arrangement described below. > > Just to clarify, does this mean that SHA-256 or 512 (or whateve

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

2010-12-09 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 9, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > Good to know. Should I make the transition now/soon, my current plan > is either of these two options: > > 1) 4,096-bit RSA signing key with a 4,096-bit Elgamal encryption key. > > 2) 4,096-bit RSA signing key with a 4,096-bit RSA encryption key

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

2010-12-10 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 9, 2010, at 1:01 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> Second, the >> OpenPGP Working Group ("the WG") is currently figuring out how to get >> SHA-1 out of the OpenPGP spec and how to replace it with something better. > > This discussion currently seems to be idle, so i would not wait on it. >

Speaking about SHA-3...

2010-12-10 Thread David Shaw
With the various discussions about OpenPGP and hashes recently, I thought this would be of interest to the folks here: http://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/ej7m2/sha3_finalists Incidentally, Skein is one of the finalists. Here's some analysis of Skein: http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/623 David

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

2010-12-11 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 11, 2010, at 4:15 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 10/12/10 2:33 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> >> A good way to look at this is to pick what you want your primary key >> to be. The subkeys don't really matter that much, as the primary is >> the one that gathers si

Re: Add sign key only?

2010-12-11 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 11, 2010, at 11:36 AM, Chris Poole wrote: > I have been using gpg for a while now, with just one subkey for signing and > encryption. > > I decided I wanted a separate key for signing, so if I have to give away my > private key for decrypting documents, they can't use it to impersonate me

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

2010-12-11 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 11, 2010, at 2:55 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: >> You can't actually turn on or off certify (which is to sign a key - >> either your own or someone elses). In OpenPGP, the primary key can >> always certify (it may be able to encrypt/sign/authenticate as well, >> but the only strict requirement

Re: Add sign key only?

2010-12-11 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 11, 2010, at 3:25 PM, Chris Poole wrote: >> If you were forced to disclose your encryption key, you could give them just >> that particular subkey and not give them the signing subkey at all. > > But isn't the likelihood that they'll get your passphrase too, so the > security lies in the

Re: Add sign key only?

2010-12-11 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 11, 2010, at 3:06 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 12/12/10 7:00 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> >> If you were forced to disclose your encryption key, you could give >> them just that particular subkey and not give them the signing >> subkey at all. What some peop

Re: Add sign key only?

2010-12-11 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 11, 2010, at 4:42 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 12/12/10 8:03 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> >> GPG has an option to create a special key like this. Basically, >> after you make your backup copy, run: >> >> gpg --export-secret-subkeys (thekey) > my-subkeys-

Re: Best Practices

2010-12-12 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 12, 2010, at 3:51 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 12/12/2010 3:03 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> what do you mean by "V4 certificate checksums"? > > Read the RFC. It's in there, and does a better job than I can do of > explaining it. Section 5.5.3. Ah, I also wasn't sure what you we

Re: Best Practices

2010-12-12 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 12, 2010, at 11:21 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 12/12/2010 10:23 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> What part of OpenPGP certificates require SHA-1? > > ... At first blush, V4 certificate checksums, symmetrically encrypted > integrity protected data packets, the MDC system in general, c

Re: Best Practices

2010-12-13 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 12, 2010, at 11:50 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > Can you help me understand why a change in the choice of fingerprint > technique and a change in the must-implement-digest-algorithm would > require a change in the certificates themselves? It doesn't work that way. If you want to make a

Re: Best Practices

2010-12-13 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 13, 2010, at 12:23 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > Avoiding a systemic change to the certificate format seems like it would > be a Good Thing in that people could participate in a global smooth > transition, without requiring a hard cut-over or a global interruption > of existing networks

Re: Best Practices

2010-12-13 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 13, 2010, at 4:40 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 12/13/2010 01:13 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> Why is it that using the method you advocate, there is a graceful >> changeover between fingerprint formats, but a change in the >> certificate format requires a "h

Re: best practices

2010-12-14 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 14, 2010, at 10:08 AM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote: > Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on > Tue Dec 14 15:47:08 CET 2010 : > >> > http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1- > revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf > > Page 63. >> > > Thanks. > > Always wondered abou

Re: best practices

2010-12-14 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 14, 2010, at 6:43 PM, Faramir wrote: > I know I asked before, but I can't remember if I saw an answer. Is > TwoFish implementation the 256 bit key version? Yes it is. David ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg

Re: clearsign failed: Bad signature

2010-12-19 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 17, 2010, at 11:22 AM, Chris Ruff wrote: > On Sat, 2010-12-11 at 14:57 +0100, Olav Seyfarth wrote: > >> My key: OpenPGP SmartCard v2 key 0x6AE1EF56 (3072 Bit RSA) Card 0005 0222 >> >> Why can't I use SHA256/SHA512 with this card? >> | enable-dsa2 >> is set and showpref lists > > The

Re: Block cipher mode?

2010-12-24 Thread David Shaw
On Dec 23, 2010, at 3:20 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 12/23/10 1:26 PM, smu johnson wrote: >> I was wondering what anyone thought of including which block cipher >> mode gpg uses in the -v[erbose] mode. > > OpenPGP specifies a kind of messed-up and strange variant of CFB. Don't > get me wron

Re: Is self-signing necessary? Basic questions.

2011-01-01 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 1, 2011, at 10:30 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: > I everybody, > > I tried to understand some of the concepts of GnuPG and would be grateful for > you to give me a feedback, whether I understood things right. I'm especially > interested in the concept of self-signed keys. My key type is

Re: Is self-signing necessary? Basic questions.

2011-01-02 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 2, 2011, at 7:27 AM, MFPA wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > Hi > > > On Sunday 2 January 2011 at 5:05:06 AM, in > , David Shaw > wrote: > >> There is a way to sign a key alone, without signing any >> user IDs. N

Re: Encryting both file contents and file name with GnuPG

2011-01-02 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 2, 2011, at 7:37 AM, Neil Phillips wrote: > Hi, > I'm completely new to GnuPG. > Can someone tell me how I can encrypt the name of the file that I want to > encrypt please. > > Example: > mySecrets.txt [a plain text file] > > I would like: > szstt.asd [some 'apparently random name' file]

Re: Encryting both file contents and file name with GnuPG

2011-01-02 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 2, 2011, at 10:06 AM, Neil Phillips wrote: > SecureZip will take a file and encrypt both the filename and the file. > > so far with GnuPG i can only see how to encrypt the file. > > i do not want to use a specific name as there are too many files to do that. > i want something like; > >

Re: Is self-signing necessary? Basic questions.

2011-01-02 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 2, 2011, at 2:43 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 01/02/2011 10:01 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> The only significant use of the direct-key signature is for key owners >> to add designated revokers to their key. Designated revokers are carried >> in a subpacket on a

Re: --digest-algo ignored on gnupg-1.4.9?

2011-01-06 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 6, 2011, at 5:37 PM, freej...@is-not-my.name wrote: >>> Sounds reasonable but then why is it using RIPEMD160? I tested with 3DES >>> instead of IDEA and got the same thing. RIPEMD160 is being used, not >>> SHA1. Thanks for looking at this. >> >> Try sharing your gpg.conf file. The answer

Re: How to create non-standard key pair

2011-01-11 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 11, 2011, at 9:41 AM, jack seth wrote: > Hello. I have been searching google for a couple of days now and I can't > figure out how to accomplish this. I need to create a v4 RSA keypair that > has a 16384 encryption key and a 4096 (possibly 8192) signing key using > AES-256 that I can e

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

2011-01-11 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 11, 2011, at 3:09 PM, Nicholas Cole wrote: > On Tue, Jan 11, 2011 at 12:19 PM, wrote: >> >> If one is a purist, then one wants sign>encrypt>sign >> >> See http://world.std.com/~dtd/#sign_encrypt > > That is a really interesting paper. Did the OpenPGP protocol ever > include a fix for

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

2011-01-12 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 12, 2011, at 11:13 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> More often "I have no confidence they keep their secret keys strictly under >> their control" might be the relevant objection. > > In my case, it's "I think these individuals are mentally unstable and > violent," but yes. :) > >>> Speak

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

2011-01-12 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 12, 2011, at 2:12 PM, MFPA wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > Hi > > > On Wednesday 12 January 2011 at 4:13:44 PM, in > , Robert J. > Hansen wrote: > > >> Show me the worth in a signed message that has any of >> (a) an incorrect signature, (b) from an invali

Re: Prosecution based on memory forensics

2011-01-12 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 12, 2011, at 10:54 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > When you close a laptop, Windows (or Mac OS X, or Linux, or what-have-you) > takes a snapshot of memory contents and writes it to disk. This can be a > really big problem, since encryption keys, passphrases, and so forth are > written out

Re: How do I list the GPG groups?

2011-01-13 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 13, 2011, at 3:44 PM, Bo Berglund wrote: > I have defined a group in the gpg.conf file. > If I encrypt and use this group as recipient then it works just fine. > > But if I try to list the existing groups I cannot find a command that > does that. > > gpg2 -k > > this just lists the publi

Re: What does the "sub" entry of a key mean?

2011-01-15 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 15, 2011, at 11:13 AM, Bo Berglund wrote: > I am building an application for GPG encryption, which ultimately will > be integrated into the Win7X64 Explorer context menu. > I have used the command line command "gpg2 -k" to retrieve a ley list > for the current key ring. Works fine. Now it i

Re: Missing 'END PGP MESSAGE' not detected

2011-01-19 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 19, 2011, at 10:46 AM, Kavalec wrote: > > Using GnuPG 1.4.4 we occasionally receive truncated files, but gpg decrypts > them anyway. > > Is there a way to force the decrypt to fail on a missing 'END PGP MESSAGE' ? Not really (or at least, not within GnuPG). The thing is, it doesn't real

Re: Missing 'END PGP MESSAGE' not detected

2011-01-19 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 19, 2011, at 12:09 PM, Kavalec wrote: > > > David Shaw wrote: >> >> On Jan 19, 2011, at 10:46 AM, Kavalec wrote: >> >>> Is there a way to force the decrypt to fail on a missing 'END PGP >>> MESSAGE' ? >> >> ... take

Re: Missing 'END PGP MESSAGE' not detected

2011-01-19 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 19, 2011, at 1:20 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 19 Jan 2011 17:46, ds...@jabberwocky.com said: > >> Not really (or at least, not within GnuPG). The thing is, it doesn't >> really matter in practice. OpenPGP has its own corruption detection >> called a MDC, that applies even if part of

Re: MacGPG2 v2.0.17 released!

2011-01-25 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 25, 2011, at 5:03 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: > Op 25-1-2011 9:50, Werner Koch schreef: > >> Another and real practical >> reason against such a long key is that it will unusable on my >> smartphone. > > What kind of smartphone do you have? Since when does GnuPG exists for > phones? I would b

Re: Future plans for implementation of other algorithms

2011-01-26 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 26, 2011, at 5:02 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 26 Jan 2011 05:21, k...@grant-olson.net said: > >> (Not that I'm saying there's anything wrong with using 1.4; I just doubt >> ECC will be back-ported.) > > Well, at some point in time we might need to do that. If there are many > ECC ke

Re: Add/remove recipient without re-encrypting

2011-02-03 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 3, 2011, at 9:38 AM, Alphazo wrote: > Is it possible to add or remove a recipient to an already encrypted file and > thus without re-encrypting the whole file? > > From what I understand GnuPG encrypts the payload (my binary file) with a > symmetric session key. Then it stores each recip

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

2011-02-03 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 3, 2011, at 5:10 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I invite you to look through the User IDs in your own keyring, from the >> perspective of a potential certifier, and ask yourself "what does it >> mean for me to certify these comments?" > > Zero. Comments don't get certified. All my signat

Re: ld.so.1: gpg: fatal: libusb.so.1: open failed: No such file or directory

2011-02-15 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 15, 2011, at 4:16 PM, hare krishna wrote: > Hi, > > Can someone help me out why i am facing this problem. > OS - Unix. > > I have set the > LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/sfw/lib:/lib:/usr/lib:/usr/local/lib:/lib/64:/usr/lib/64 > > But when i run this command: > gpg --list-keys > i am getting thi

Re: ld.so.1: gpg: fatal: libusb.so.1: open failed: No such file or directory

2011-02-15 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 15, 2011, at 11:25 PM, Jason Harris wrote: > On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 05:50:11PM -0500, David Shaw wrote: >>> I have set the >>> LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/sfw/lib:/lib:/usr/lib:/usr/local/lib:/lib/64:/usr/lib/64 >>> >>> But when i run this command: &g

Re: on possible ambiguity in Key IDs [was: Re: Help with OpenPGP plugin in Mozilla Thunderbird and Claws Mail]

2011-02-15 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 15, 2011, at 11:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 2/15/11 11:35 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> Long-form keyIDs (of the form 0xDECAFBADDEADBEEF) are significantly >> harder to spoof, but easily within reach of a well-funded organization. > > IIRC, Jon Callas says an accidental long-ID

Re: on possible ambiguity in Key IDs [was: Re: Help with OpenPGP plugin in Mozilla Thunderbird and Claws Mail]

2011-02-15 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 15, 2011, at 11:35 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 02/15/2011 09:22 PM, lists.gn...@mephisto.fastmail.net wrote: >> If you have your public key published somewhere, such as on a key >> server, the Key ID is a way for other people to unambiguously look up >> the full key. > > You're qui

Re: Some SHA-2 news

2011-02-19 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 19, 2011, at 9:53 AM, lists.gn...@mephisto.fastmail.net wrote: > I found this linked from slashdot; I thought some readers of this list > might find it interesting: > > http://www.thinq.co.uk/2011/2/18/nist-boosts-crypto-faster-sha-2-functions/ > > Think we'll see this included one day in

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-25 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 25, 2011, at 12:29 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 02/25/2011 12:11 PM, Martin Gollowitzer wrote: >> * Patrick Brunschwig [110225 10:10]: >>> The only mail client on Android I know of to handle OpenPGP messages is >>> K9 (together with APG). But K9 only supports inline-PGP, PGP/MIME >>

Re: Default hash

2011-02-26 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 25, 2011, at 6:05 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > Also, my understanding on how the preferences are chosen by GnuPG is the > following: > > 1. User wishes to encrypt mail to me, so my cipher preferences in my > public key are pulled. > 2. My first preference, Twofish, is used, only if the sende

Re: Default hash

2011-02-26 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 26, 2011, at 9:10 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: >> 3DES's history is instructive. NIST has declared it "dead in 20 years" >> more often than Netcraft has declared BSD to be dying.[*] At this >> point, I'm unaware of anyone who seriously believes 3DES will be gone in >> 20 years. Most people s

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 2:48 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >>> 2. And seeing strange MIME attachments doesn't confuse people? >> >> Less than strange text fragments at the head and the bottom of a message >> (Some people even think they are being spammed when they see inline PGP >> data), because an a

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 2:48 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 2/27/11 2:37 PM, Martin Gollowitzer wrote: >> I sign *all* my e-mail except for messages sent from my mobile (in that >> case, my signature tells the receiver why the message is not signed and >> offers the receiver to request a signed proo

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 10:05 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I'm not at all surprised that you had those results. A limited subset of >> people have support for OpenPGP signatures. A limited subset of those >> people actually verify signatures. A limited subset of those people >> actually pay at

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 9:38 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I disagree with this. Obviously a bad signature doesn't say much (except >> perhaps "check your mail system - it's breaking things"), but there is still >> value in the continuity between multiple signed messages. It's important to >> no

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 10:27 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I think we're missing each other here. We have Martin (the real one), the >> fake Martin (let's call him "Marty"), and various other people on a mailing >> list. Martin always signs his messages. One day Marty shows up and tries >> to

Re: Question regarding shared keys

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 8:25 PM, Denise Schmid wrote: > Hello list, > > first of all: Sorry if my question reaches the wrong list, but I have a > question someone on this list may probably answer easily. > > If a company has shared keys: How does encryption work then? Are several > owners of a sha

Re: Android PGP/MIME test results

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
Not exactly Android, but FWIW, an iPod touch (which has the same mail program as an iPhone) displays PGP/MIME just fine (as in shows the mail - but doesn't verify the signature). David ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.g

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 27, 2011, at 8:35 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > On Feb 27, 2011, at 5:17 PM, David Shaw wrote: > >> Can I see the HCI study that MIME attachments confuse people? ;) > > I would love to see such a study. However, I never made that claim. :) > > Someone e

Re: Rebuilding the private key from signatures

2011-02-27 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 24, 2011, at 9:39 AM, Atom Smasher wrote: > On Thu, 24 Feb 2011, Aaron Toponce wrote: > >> However, I was in a discussion with a friend, and the topic came up that it >> is theoretically possible to rebuild your private key if someone had access >> to all your signed mail. We debated the

Re: Question regarding shared keys

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 2:07 AM, Denise Schmid wrote: >> It depends on what you mean by a "shared key". There is just giving a >> copy of the key to multiple people (in which case any one of them can use >> it), >> or there are various key splitting algorithms where a key is broken into a >> number

Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 6:47 AM, Guy Halford-Thompson wrote: > Assuming I have password protected secret keys, can I assume that the > gpg private keyring is secure? I.e., if my private keyring was to > fall into malicious hands, would the aforesaid hands be able to > extract any useful information f

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 8:18 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > On 02/27/2011 08:27 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> FM: [message] >> RM: Hey, that's not me! I'm me. See? I've signed this with the same cert >> I've used for everything else on this list. >> FM: No, I'm the real Martin. I didn't sign up for

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 12:01 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 2/28/11 9:12 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> In this particular case, though, key signatures aren't even necessary >> - RM just needs to prove that he is the same entity that signed the >> other messages to the list. T

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 4:59 PM, MFPA wrote: >> It is reasonable >> that if someone was being masqueraded, that person >> would speak up and challenge the forger (e.g. "Hey, >> you're not Martin! I'm the real Martin, and I can >> prove it by signing this message with the same key I've >> used all alo

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 5:47 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 2/28/11 12:10 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> Well, I suppose that's up to you whether you want to trust RM or not. >> A question on trustworthiness is outside crypto, and not what the >> discussion was about here in an

Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 5:40 PM, MFPA wrote: > On Monday 28 February 2011 at 3:47:16 PM, in > , > Guy Halford-Thompson wrote: > > >> Thanks for the help, didnt really occur to me how much >> info is available in the public keyring, guess you cant >> do much about it tho. > > > I think key UIDs gen

Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?

2011-02-28 Thread David Shaw
On Feb 28, 2011, at 7:09 PM, David Tomaschik wrote: >> I think key UIDs generally reveal more information than I am >> comfortable with. For example, why does your UID need to contain your >> email address in plain text rather than as a hash? Searching for that >> email address would need to retur

Re: Why do we use a different key to sign than to encrypt

2011-03-01 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 1, 2011, at 8:13 AM, Guy Halford-Thompson wrote: > Not GPG specific, but I was wondering if someone could point me in the > direction of some resources that explain why we use different keys to > sign and encrypt (for cases where the same key _could_ do both e.g. > RSA). I cant seem to pic

Re: need help on non-interactive gnuPG binary

2011-03-01 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 1, 2011, at 7:39 AM, ravi shankar wrote: > Hi, > >I am planning to use gnuPG (v1.4.10) binary in netbsd 5 for encryption. > The key generation is supported as interactive session, but I want to use non > interactive session. I could not find any binary with non interactive > session

Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?

2011-03-01 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 1, 2011, at 6:29 PM, MFPA wrote: > On Tuesday 1 March 2011 at 8:56:56 PM, in > , Ingo Klöcker wrote: > > >> Hmm. Why do the keyservers need to support it at all? >> IMO the clients that want to upload a key should check >> for this flag and warn the user if a key has this flag. > > I th

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

2011-03-02 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 2, 2011, at 10:04 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 1/03/11 9:33 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> >> That experiment, while interesting, is not relevant to the "real >> Martin" / "fake Martin" situation we've been talking about. If both >> Real M

Re: signed messages take an eternity to be formatted by evolution

2011-03-09 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 9, 2011, at 3:12 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 9/03/11 5:52 PM, Bernhard Kleine wrote: >> Hi everybody, >> >> I am using ubuntu 10.10, gpg and evolution. And I am reading this >> mailing list for quite some time. Lately to read this list is a pain >> since many keys are no longer found on

Re: non-exportable OpenPGP certifications [was: Re: hashed user IDs ]

2011-03-11 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 11, 2011, at 5:08 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > On 11/03/11 6:50 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> On 03/11/2011 01:44 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: >>> Ah, this is what I've been looking around for! For the sake of the >>> archives, how does one provide a non-exportable certification? >>> Obviously

Re: Compression used in an encrypted message

2011-03-11 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 11, 2011, at 12:50 PM, Avi wrote: > Forgive my ignorance, but is there a way to take a given > encrypted message/file and determine which compression algorithm > was used (and which level)? I know how to set compression > algorithm and level prefs, but I'm curious to see what others > use,

Re: Compression used in an encrypted message

2011-03-11 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 11, 2011, at 2:01 PM, Avi wrote: > Thanks, everyone. > > So we can see the algorithm, but can not be able to see the compression level > used, correct? Not directly, no. OpenPGP just encapsulates the compressed stream, so you'd have to extract the compressed data and examine it. I'm n

Re: hashed user IDs [was: Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?]

2011-03-11 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 11, 2011, at 8:33 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 3/11/2011 1:07 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: >> Out of curiosity, how big is that now? > > My complete /var/lib/sks/DB directory comes in at 7.8G. Not too large. That's the on-disk SKS database format, and so contains a good bit of non-key da

Re: RSA Versus DSA and EL GAMAL

2011-03-13 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 13, 2011, at 11:21 PM, Jonathan Ely wrote: > I apologise in advance if this is a stupid question to ask now or if > people already asked it before I stepped on the scene, but which > algorithm is more secure: DSA and EL GAMAL or RSA? I know the latter has > undergone a ridiculous amount of

Re: GPG and PGP

2011-03-15 Thread David Shaw
On Mar 15, 2011, at 10:17 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: > Op 15-3-2011 14:19, Aaron Toponce schreef: > >> 1. The U.S. patent expires for IDEA on January 7, 2012. > > I propose to include the IDEA module then in GnuPG 1.4.12 and 2.2.(then > current + 1), just like the extra version that came out when t

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