Hi there,
I cannot sign messages with gpgsm any more. beta834 was (and is)
still working, with beta864 and beta895 invalid signatures are
created:
--8<---cut here---start->8---
echo "Hi" > test.txt
gnupg-2.1.0-beta864/sm/gpgsm -o test.txt.sig --sign test.txt
gp
On Wed, 29 Oct 2014 09:00, lech...@wi.uni-muenster.de said:
> Note that I’ve got multiple keys, the first one is expired, one is
> revoked, and one is valid. Thus, I need to use --local-user to
> create signatures (otherwise, the expired key is tried).
I can't replicate that while also using --l
> Because this gets asked quite often, I've started to capture
> some arguments of the debate how long RSAs could/should/can be
> at http://wiki.gnupg.org/LargeKeys
I thought we largely addressed this in the FAQ, sections 11.1, 11.2,
11.3, 11.4 and 11.5.
Do we need to address it in more depth?
Why is brute force even mentioned in something about RSA? You couldn't
brute-force a 128 bit RSA key. I'd say 2048 bit quite covers it 8-)
Peter.
--
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <
> Why is brute force even mentioned in something about RSA? You
> couldn't brute-force a 128 bit RSA key. I'd say 2048 bit quite
> covers it 8-)
Sure you can. To brute-force a 128-bit RSA key would require you to
check every prime number between two and 10**19. There are in the
neighborhood of
On 10/29/2014 at 3:22 PM, "Robert J. Hansen" wrote:
>
>> Why is brute force even mentioned in something about RSA? You
>> couldn't brute-force a 128 bit RSA key. I'd say 2048 bit quite
>> covers it 8-)
-
Surely Peter knows this too ;-)
More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older
On 2014-10-29 21:49, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
Surely Peter knows this too ;-)
More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028
...
No, I'm using a strict definition of brute force.
For p = 2^63 to 2^64-1
For q = 2^63 to 2^64-1
If p * q == n:
Break
Next
Nex
> More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028
> ...
Either-or. RSA-1024's dangerously close to being brute-forceable, too.
We've already brute-forced RSA-768 and we're closing in on RSA-890. I
haven't looked into how well the general number field sieve
parallelizes, but
> No, I'm using a strict definition of brute force.
Technically, brute force is testing every *possible* value... not values
that you know aren't going to work. Why test those?
If you're trying to factorize 2701, for instance, you can feel free to
skip dividing by 2 (doesn't end in an even numbe
On 2014-10-29 22:30, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Technically, brute force is testing every *possible* value... not
values
that you know aren't going to work. Why test those?
Well, why not restrict ourselves to primes whose product equal the
modulus? I could solve any key in constant time that wa
I'm programming the smartcards on a bunch of YubiKey NEO tokens. Before
I give the token to the user, I would like to allow them to pick a new
user PIN and set it. I don't need to know their PIN and I actually don't
*want* to know it.
Ideally, I would run a script, have the user type in the ne
On Wednesday 29 October 2014 22:18:13 Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2014-10-29 21:49, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> > Surely Peter knows this too ;-)
> >
> > More likely 128 was a typo for the more common older RSA key of 1028
> > ...
>
> No, I'm using a strict definition of brute force.
>
> For p =
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